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Part I
Dissertation Overview
1

Dissertation Overview
My dissertation consists of three chapters on Economic Policy and Development. In
the first chapter, I use a general equilibrium trade model as in Eaton and Kortum (2002)
to estimate the effect of transport infrastructure on regional development. I apply the
analysis to India, a country with a weak and congested transportation infrastructure.
I first analyze the effect of a recent Indian highway project that improved connections
between the four largest economic centers. I estimate the impact of this new transporta-
tion infrastructure on income across Indian districts using satellite data on light intensity
at night. The results show aggregate net gains from this recent highway project, but
very unequal effects across districts. China has followed a different strategy in designing
its highway network and has experienced more convergence across regions than India. I
therefore use the model to quantify the effects of a counterfactual transportation net-
work for India that replicates the Chinese strategy of connecting intermediate-sized cities
with modern highways. I find that such a counterfactual network would have significantly
benefited the lagging regions of India, leading to a more equal regional development. How-
ever, the effects on average growth would have been modest. I also construct additional
counterfactuals and discuss their effects on average and regional development.
The second chapter is joint work with Lin Shao and Fabrizio Zilibotti. We estimate
the effect of the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in China on its economic
development. SEZ were geographically limited areas and usually located in cities. We
use a panel of 276 Chinese cities and prefectures from 1988 to 2010. These zones were
representative for the reform process in China since the late 1970s because they combined
market mechanisms with a strong role of the state. Our baseline empirical specification
is a difference-in-difference estimator that exploits the variation in the establishment of
SEZ across cities and years. We find that the long run effect of the establishment of a
state-level SEZ is about a 20% increase in the level of GDP, but there is no evidence
of a permanently steeper growth path. This finding is confirmed in a sub-sample of
provinces in inland China, where the selection of cities to host the zones was transparent
and based on administrative criteria. We also use a number of alternative specifications
and find similar results. A decomposition of the effect of SEZ on GDP into different
channels suggests that the effect of the SEZ worked mainly through the accumulation of
physical capital. There is some weaker evidence of increasing productivity and human
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capital investments. To mitigate concerns about the quality of the GDP data, we use
light intensity as an alternative measure for economic activity and also find a positive
effect of SEZ.
The third chapter is joint work with Yikai Wang. We propose a theory of ethnic
conflict and endogenous polarisation between ethnic groups. A political elite strategically
initiates conflicts between two ethnic groups in order to polarize them. It uses this divide-
and-rule strategy to sustain its own power as an elite, which allows it to tax people and
extract rents. We model polarization as a lack of trust in order to provide a micro-
foundation for how the elite can induce the groups to polarise even though people are
rational. Trust is shaped by trade interactions between different groups as in Rohner,
Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013). Low trust implies low expected gains from trade. By
starting a conflict and thereby interrupting trade, the elite can stop trust between the
two groups from emerging. The elite follows this strategy in situations where it faces a
large threat of revolution. This threat can originate in the common interest of people of
both ethnic groups to reap gains from peaceful trade without being taxed by the elite.
This is more likely to be the case if current trust levels are high or if the cost of revolution
is low.
Policy plays a crucial role in all three chapters and the insights we gain point towards
an important role of the state. Transport infrastructure connects markets and thereby
allows agents to reap gains from trade. These interactions between market participants
are complex and generate externalities that call for coordination. The combination of
general equilibrium trade theory with disaggregated data on economic activity employed
in the first chapter allows comparing the effects of different ways in which a government
may design infrastructure networks to connect markets. The second chapter shows how
economic reforms and industrial policy have supported the development process during
China’s transformation. The interaction between regions with different economic poli-
cies clearly depends on the infrastructure connecting them – as is suggested by the first
chapter. The benefits from integrating regions also depend on how beneficial trade is and
trust between trade partners can be a crucial prerequisite to reap these gains from trade.
The third chapter shows that trust can be strategically destroyed by political elites who
provoke conflicts in order to sustain their own power. Policies to prevent such actions and
to increase the gains from trade are therefore crucial.
Part II
Research Papers
5

1 Chinese Roads in India: The Effect of Trans-
port Infrastructure on Economic Develop-
ment
1.1 Introduction
China and India, the two most populous countries in the world, are developing at un-
precedented rates. Yet, their spatial, or regional, development patterns are surprisingly
different. Throughout China, new clusters of economic activity emerge and there is a
strong pattern of convergence across Chinese counties. In contrast, a substantial number
of Indian districts of intermediate density experience low growth and there is generally less
convergence. While such differences in the spatial development of China and India have
been documented in the literature (Desmet et al., forthcoming; Chaudhuri and Ravallion,
2006), we still lack precise explanations and possible policy measures.
This paper links the differences in the spatial development of the two countries to
their transport networks. The Indian government launched a national highway project in
2001 that improved connections between the four largest economic centers Delhi, Mum-
bai, Chennai, and Calcutta with the “Golden Quadrilateral” (GQ). In contrast, China
built a National Expressway Network (NEN) that had the explicit goal of connecting all
intermediate-sized cities with a population above 500,000 and all provincial capitals with
modern highways. Overall, China invested about ten times more in its highway network
than India, which is seen as being severely constrained by its insufficient infrastructure
(Harral et al., 2006).
If transport infrastructure is a determinant of development, then one may ask how a
network should be designed in order to foster growth and regional development. In this
paper, I first identify the effect of a major highway project in India, the construction of the
GQ. Then, in light of the stark difference in the transport infrastructure strategies of India
and China, I ask how India would have developed if it had built a network like the Chinese
NEN. To this aim, I construct a counterfactual Indian highway network that mimics the
Chinese approach of connecting intermediate-sized cities. The counterfactual is built
based on the precise location of cities and on the topographic features of India, which are
modeled using a geographic information system (GIS). The paths of the counterfactual
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highway connections are chosen to minimize the construction costs based on slope and
land cover. The resulting road network then allows me to compute bilateral transport
costs between all 590 mainland districts in India using a shortest path algorithm. In the
empirical analysis, the bilateral transport costs are related to income, which is measured
using data on luminosity at night. This data is available from satellite images and captures
human economic activity at a high spatial resolution and over time. Luminosity has
been shown to be a good proxy for income growth (Henderson et al., 2012) and can be
aggregated with digitized maps to the level of districts, for which official GDP data is not
available.
The empirical analysis builds on general equilibrium trade theory. I follow Donaldson
and Hornbeck (2013) who derive from a Ricardian trade model a reduced-form measure
for the aggregate impact of transport infrastructure on income.1 This reduced form cap-
tures the market access of a location by summing over the income of trading partners,
discounted by the bilateral trade costs and by the destination’s market access.2 Transport
infrastructure determines bilateral trade costs such that changes in the infrastructure over
time generate variation in market access. More precisely, the bilateral transport costs can
be computed for the transport network in 2000 (before the start of the recent Indian high-
way project), in 2009 (after completion of the first phases), and for the counterfactual
(replicating the Chinese network). The resulting bilateral transport costs are then used
to derive districts’ market access for each version of the transport network.
The model predicts a log-linear relationship between income and market access. The
time variation in market access between the actual networks in 2000 and 2009 allows
me to estimate this relationship. Given the resulting estimate for the elasticity of in-
come with respect to market access, I predict each district’s income based on the market
access implied by the counterfactual network. Importantly, market access captures the
general equilibrium consequences of transport infrastructure and the resulting predictions
therefore represent aggregate effects.3
The empirical analysis makes three contributions. First, I quantify the aggregate effect
of the realized GQ, India’s major highway investment project between 2001 and 2009. The
results suggest that aggregate income was 2.4 - 3.5 percent higher in 2009 than it would
have been if the GQ had not been built. This implies a gain after one decade that is more
1Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) estimate the effect of American railways on land value, while I
estimate the effect of Indian highways on real income. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 will discuss the differences in
more detail.
2A related measure is market potential, which has been derived from models in the new economic
geography literature. See for example Redding and Venables (2004) and Hanson (2005).
3An increase in market access of the trading partner (e.g. because it is better connected to a third
district) can reduce the market access of an origin. Market access therefore captures general equilibrium
consequences such as trade diversion (see Section 1.5).
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than three times the construction costs. Second, I predict the aggregate effects of the
counterfactual transport infrastructure, which replicates the salient aspects of the Chinese
network in India in a way that minimizes road construction costs. Taking into account
the construction costs of counterfactual roads, the results imply in the aggregate a modest
difference relative to the existing infrastructure. The third contribution is to evaluate the
distributional consequences of the actual and counterfactual networks. The results show
that initially less developed regions would gain substantially from the counterfactual.
The reason is that this network, by connecting all intermediate-sized cities, also reaches
into regions that previously had low growth and were neglected by the GQ. Thus, a
transport network that follows the Chinese strategy would increase growth particularly in
India’s lagging regions. This provides an explanation for the weaker convergence in India
compared to China. Two alternative ways to replicate the Chinese network in India lead
to qualitatively similar results.
The distributional consequences are particularly relevant in light of the unequal re-
gional development of India. Policy makers are aware of this and the national highway
development strategy did include plans for other highway connections besides the GQ. In
particular, the government planned the North-South and East-West Corridors which cross
through regions that were not reached by the GQ. However, these other projects were de-
layed and by 2009 only a small part has been finished. In an additional counterfactual
exercise, I find that the completion of these corridors would indeed increase income in some
of the lagging states. However, the explicit strategy of connecting all intermediate-sized
cities would have larger aggregate effects and benefit more lagging districts.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 1.3 discusses the spatial development and transport infrastructure
in India and China. Section 1.4 shows how the counterfactual network is constructed
and what data is used. Section 1.5 presents the conceptual framework and Section 1.6
discusses the results. Section 1.7 shows alternative ways to replicate the Chinese network
and discusses the robustness of the results. Section 2.6 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
The role of transport infrastructure for development has been the subject of a large
literature.4 A recent increase in this literature was triggered by a combination of economic
theory with geographic information such as the exact location of transport infrastructure.
My methodology for evaluating the impact of infrastructure builds on Donaldson and
Hornbeck (2013) who estimate the aggregate effect of the expansion of the American
4See for example Redding (2010) and a recent survey by Breinlich et al. (2013).
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railway network in the 19th century. They derive market access as a reduced form measure
for the impact of transport infrastructure in a general equilibrium trade model as in
Eaton and Kortum (2002). Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) also compare the effect of
the actually built network to counterfactual scenarios in which railways are replaced by
roads and canals.5 I adapt their framework to the use of light data as a measure of real
income in India. To determine the precise paths of the counterfactual roads, I use the
least-cost network that connects a given set of cities. Such a network has previously been
used by Faber (2013) within China in order to construct an instrument for the actually
built highways. I follow the approach of connecting cities which fulfill the criteria of the
NEN in a way that minimizes road construction costs, but I apply it to Indian cities and
to the local terrain in order to construct a counterfactual network.
While the empirical analysis in this paper builds on general equilibrium trade theory,
it is also related to several recent studies on the local effects of transport infrastructure.
Datta (2012) and Ghani et al. (2012) study the effects of the GQ and find a positive impact
on firms located in the proximity of the new highways.6 An important aspect of these
studies is the identification of exogenous sources of variation in transport infrastructure.
They rely on an identification strategy similar to the one proposed by Chandra and
Thompson (2000) and Michaels (2008) who estimate the effect of US highways on counties
that lie between two important nodal cities. This is based on the observation that the
highways were built to connect larger cities and thereby passed through other counties
which consequently obtained access to the new transport infrastructure without being
targeted. The results of Datta (2012) and Ghani et al. (2012) suggest positive effects on
firms located close to the GQ. I use this strategy in order to estimate the effect of the GQ
on non-nodal districts, excluding the four cities that were targeted by the GQ. Several
related studies have analyzed the Chinese transport network (see Banerjee et al., 2012;
Baum-Snow et al., 2013; and Faber, 2013).7
The above studies focus on identifying the local effects in the proximity of new roads.
Two recent contributions that estimate the general equilibrium consequences of the na-
tional transport infrastructure in India and China are Donaldson (forthcoming) and
Roberts et al. (2012). Donaldson (forthcoming) estimates the effect of railways in colo-
nial India and finds that historical income levels of Indian districts had increased by 16
percent when they were connected to the railway network. He also shows that there is
a sufficient statistic for the general equilibrium effect of transport infrastructure on in-
5Such a counterfactual exercise was also proposed in the seminal work by Fogel (1964).
6Both studies use firm surveys to evaluate the effect of the GQ. Ghani et al. (2012) point out that it
would be valuable to estimate the effect with luminosity data.
7Transport infrastructure in other countries has recently been studied by Atack (2008), Baum-Snow
(2007), Gollin and Rogerson (2010), Herrendorf et al. (2012), and Storeygard (2013).
Chapter 1 11
come, which explains most of the variation due to transport infrastructure. Roberts et al.
(2012) use a structural new economic geography model to measure the aggregate effect of
the expansion of the NEN in China and find that aggregate income was 6 percent higher
in 2007 due to the NEN. My analysis differs from the above studies by estimating the
aggregate effect of transport infrastructure through market access, as was proposed by
Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013), and using this estimate to predict income under var-
ious counterfactual infrastructures. To identify exogenous variation in market access, I
apply the above-mentioned identification strategy by Chandra and Thompson (2000) and
Michaels (2008).
The market access approach used in this paper is closely related to models in the
new economic geography literature. Several authors analyze the role of market access
(or market potential), which can be affected by transport costs (Puga, 2002; Redding
and Venables, 2004; Hanson, 2005; Redding and Sturm, 2007; Head and Mayer, 2011,
2013). They find that market access is associated with trade, income, and population
within and between countries. This paper also relates more broadly to a large literature
on trade, in particular on the gravity structure (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Allen
and Arkolakis, 2013, Atkin and Donaldson, 2013; Coşar and Fajgelbaum, 2013; Redding,
2012). Head and Mayer (2011) point out that the gravity structure and market access can
be derived from various trade models with different market structures and sources of gains
from trade. A contribution of this paper is that the digital transport network can model
explicitly how trade costs and thus proximity change due to transport infrastructure.
Thus, changes in transport costs generate variation in market access which allows to study
the relationship between income and market access over time. While these models are
static, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (forthcoming) propose a model of spatial development
based on technology spillovers where growth depends on the density of economic activity.
The assessment of the development effects of transport infrastructure also relates to
cost-benefit analyses of individual infrastructure investments. For example, as a major
investor in transport infrastructure in developing countries, the World Bank has developed
procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of infrastructure projects (see World Bank, 2007a
for an overview). While those concepts have advantages in capturing project-specific
aspects such as safety and road deterioration, the methodology applied in this paper is
able to capture the general equilibrium effects at a large scale, which allows evaluating
and comparing national infrastructure strategies.
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1.3 Spatial Development and Transport Infrastructure
This paper makes a link between regional growth and transport infrastructure. India and
China provide an interesting context to study this relationship. While both countries are
growing fast, they also show substantial differences in their regional development patterns
and in their transport infrastructure. This section first reviews the evidence on the spatial
distribution of income and growth in the two countries and then discusses their transport
infrastructure.
1.3.1 The Spatial Development of India and China
During the past two decades, real GDP per capita in India has been growing at an
average rate of 4.8 percent (World Bank, 2013). China’s growth, averaging at 9.2 percent,
has been even more spectacular and its income per capita overtook India’s in the early
1990s. Although there is substantial variation in the regional growth rates within both
countries, previous studies found that China has overall seen more convergence (Desmet
et al., forthcoming; Chaudhuri and Ravallion, 2006). The same finding emerges when
using light as a measure of income.8
Figure 1.1 shows the spatial distribution of light in the year 2000. Not surprisingly,
there is a strong clustering of income in both countries. A similar picture arises when
aggregating the light pixels to the sub-national units of Chinese prefectures and Indian
districts. Interestingly, there are substantial differences in the spatial development over
time. To illustrate this, Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show the spatial distribution of initial density
and growth in the two countries. While China has seen the highest growth rates in
prefectures with initially low density (measured as average light intensity per pixel in
2000), this has not been the case for Indian districts. In particular, the right panel of
Figure 1.3 suggest that the districts with initially low or intermediate light density had
experienced surprisingly low growth. This is consistent with the evidence presented in
Desmet et al. (forthcoming) and Chaudhuri and Ravallion (2006) who found stronger
convergence patterns in China than in India.9
While the finding that regional growth patterns differ between the two countries is
well known, we still lack precise answers for what is driving these differences. Transport
infrastructure is a potential candidate since it is an important determinant of the spatial
8Section 1.4 discusses the light data in more detail. Henderson et al. (2012) show that light correlates
strongly with GDP in a panel of 188 countries.
9The observation is confirmed when regressing light growth of each prefecture or district on its ini-
tial density. The slope coefficient is significantly smaller in China than in India, suggesting stronger
convergence.
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distribution of economic activity. India and China indeed have followed different strategies
for how to invest in their transport networks and these differences will be outlined next.
1.3.2 Transport Infrastructure in India and China
Infrastructure is a key determinant of transport costs and trade (Limao and Venables,
2001) and investments in transport infrastructure have been used extensively to promote
development (World Bank, 2007a). India and China have both invested in their trans-
port infrastructure during the past decades, but with different intensities and strategies
(Harral et al., 2006). In this section, I first review the key elements of the infrastructure
investments in the two countries and then discuss the construction of a counterfactual
network for India which mimics the Chinese strategy.
In the early 1990s, the Indian road infrastructure was superior to the Chinese in
terms of total km length and km per person, but both countries had about the same low
quality of roads. Travel speeds on roads were further reduced by the simultaneous use by
pedestrians and slow vehicles.10 Over the 1990s, China’s highway and railway network
developed significantly faster than the Indian counterpart. In particular, it built the
National Expressway Network (NEN) with the explicit objective of connecting all cities
with more than 500,000 people and all provincial capitals in a modern highway system.11
At that time, China’s transport infrastructure was at risk of becoming a constraint for
economic development which was gaining speed since the reforms started in the late
1970s (Asian Development Bank, 2007). The new network, shown in red in Figure 1.4,
had reached a length of 40,000 km by 2007 and it continued to be expanded. It consists
of four-lane limited access highways that allowed significantly higher driving speed than
the existing roads.12
India also invested in its road infrastructure, but about ten times less than China
and with a focus on the main economic centers. In particular, it launched a National
Highways Development Project (NHDP) in 2001 and the first achievement of that project
was the GQ, which connects the four major economic centers with four-lane highways
(shown in green in Figure 1.4). Construction, mostly upgrades of existing highways to
higher quality, began in 2001 and was completed by 2012 with a total network length of
10The railway infrastructure in the two countries was similar in terms of passengers but the Chinese
railways transported four times more freight than the Indian railways. The numbers in this section are
taken (if not otherwise stated) from Harral et al. (2006).
11This is also referred to as the National Trunk Highway System. The program was later expanded to
include all cities with more than 200,000 people. See Chinese Ministry of Transportation (2004), World
Bank (2007b), Roberts et al. (2012), and Faber (2013) for a discussion.
12A description of the history of the Chinese highway network and its different components is provided
by ACASIAN. See www.acasian.com for further details.
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5,846 km and at a cost of USD 6 billion (1999 prices).13 The NHDP in India was not
restricted to the GQ and also included the so-called North-South and East-West (NS-EW)
Corridors. However, these projects were delayed and not fully completed by 2010. Figure
1.5 shows the parts which were completed by 2010.
The GQ in India, like the NEN in China, has significantly reduced the transport
times between places with access to these new highways. The average driving speed on
a conventional national highway (i.e. a highway which was not upgraded or built as part
of the NHDP) was below 40 km/h (World Bank, 2002), while the driving speed on the
GQ is around 75 km/h.14 However, there is ample evidence that, even today, insufficient
transport infrastructure is a severe constraint for the Indian economy. Raghuram Rajan,
the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, recently stated that India needs to
improve its infrastructure with the same discipline in order to catch up with China (FAZ,
2013). The same view is held by the World Bank and several consultancies and logistic
firms, stating that a lack of adequate infrastructure hampers the regional development in
India (World Bank, 2008; DHL, 2007; Ernst and Young, 2013; KPMG, 2013).
The road investment projects described above were among the largest inter-city trans-
port infrastructure investments in the two countries and dominated investments in other
means of transportation. The spending on the NEN in China was around USD 30 billion
per year, roughly three times as much as its investments in the national railway system
during the period 1992-2002. The importance of highways relative to railways also in-
creased in India and the share of expenditures on railways in total transport infrastructure
declined from 50% in the 1990s to 30% by the end of the 2000s (Ministry of Railways,
2012). Today, roads are by a large margin the most important transport mode in In-
dia, carrying 60% of the freight turnover compared to 31% for railways.15 The highway
projects undertaken in the two countries are therefore the crucial parts of their transport
strategies and of high importance for the development of the two countries.
Although the analysis undertaken here captures a key aspect of the modern transport
infrastructure in India and China, some caveats must be pointed out that concern possible
changes in other types of infrastructure. But I will show that these concerns are mitigated
by my empirical strategy which exploits exogenous variation in transport infrastructure
and controls for location and time fixed effects. The first concern is the omission of other
13Most parts were already completed by 2007. See the webpage of the National Highway Authority
of India (http://www.nhai.org/index.asp) for details. The cost estimates are based on Ghani et al.
(2012).
14The official speed limit was increased to 100 km/h in 2007, but the actual driving speed is significantly
lower. This was derived by selecting a random sample of locations and exporting bilateral transport times
with a routine from google maps.
15The share of highways in the total freight turnover is even higher in India than in China (KPMG,
2013).
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types of domestic transport infrastructure such as railways or urban transport systems
such as subways. Second, access to international markets via sea ports or airports is not
modeled as part of the transport network here. Third, villages’ access to the transport
infrastructure via rural roads is not considered due to a lack of precise data.16 Finally, non-
transport infrastructure such as electricity and water also affect economic development.
However, these caveats would limit the validity of the exercise here only if the omitted
factors were time-varying at the district level and correlated with the explanatory variable
market access. Section 1.5 discusses in detail how I address this with a suitable empirical
strategy.
The above discussion, and the illustration in Figure 1.4, makes clear that India and
China have followed different strategies to improve their road infrastructure. While In-
dia’s highway investments focused on connecting its largest economic centers with better
highways, China has built a network that connects all cities that have a registered pop-
ulation of more than 500,000 and all provincial capitals. Furthermore, it is clear that
highways play a key role in the overall transport infrastructure. India currently faces
severe constraints due to insufficient transport infrastructure, which is less the case for
China. A natural question therefore is how India would develop if it had a transport
infrastructure like China. To answer this question, I propose a counterfactual road net-
work for India by applying the policy objective of the Chinese government to identify the
Indian cities which would be connected with the Chinese network. The exact routes are
chosen such that the costs of building the roads, which depend on characteristics of the
Indian terrain, are minimized. The next section will present the data that is required to
build such a counterfactual network and to evaluate its effect on economic development.
1.4 Counterfactual Roads
In this section I build a counterfactual network of highways and compute bilateral trans-
port costs. First, I use topographic features of India in order to determine the precise
paths of the counterfactual roads such that road construction costs are minimized. Based
on the geographically explicit road network, I then calculate the bilateral transport costs
between all Indian districts using a shortest path algorithm. The data and methods
required for this procedure are described next.
16According to Harral et al. (2006), India has prior to the start of the NHDP in 2001 focused its
infrastructure investments on the improvement of roads which provide access to highways, while China
has from the start of its program in 1992 put the emphasis on investments in arterial highways to connect
cities. While I cannot observe the upgrades of local roads prior to my sample period, the NHDP was a
large infrastructure program to which the Chinese NEN can be directly compared.
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1.4.1 Data
In order to analyze the effect of transport infrastructure on economic development, I
construct a dataset that incorporates the precise geographic location of different types
of roads and of local income. I add to this data set the boundaries of Indian states and
districts and multiple maps of the Indian terrain.
Transport Infrastructure and Terrain
I use geographic information system (GIS) methods to process the spatial data.17 Digital
maps with the location of the actual Indian transport infrastructure are taken from three
sources: CIESIN (2013) provides a digitized road network that includes both highways
and local roads. Esri (2013) also has digitized roads but is limited to the national highway
networks. These first two sources allow to localize the current transport infrastructure in
space, but they do not allow to accurately track changes over time and cannot distinguish
the higher quality of today’s GQ. Therefore, I use as a third source maps of the NHDP
issued by the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI, 2010 and NHAI, 2013). These
maps, which were digitized manually, show the location of several new highways, including
the Golden Quadrilateral and the completed parts of the North-South and East-West
Corridors. The average driving speed on existing roads are taken from several transport
efficiency studies. World Bank (2005) reports that the typical driving speed on the existing
Indian national and state highways is between 30 and 40 km/h and I therefore assume a
speed of 35 km/h for all highways built before the start of the NHDP.18 Roads of lower or
unknown quality are also controlled for and the assumed travel speed is 25 km/h, which
is suggested by surveys of rural Indian transport infrastructure (Liu, 2000). For areas
where there are no roads reported in the digitized maps, I assume a travel speed of 10
km/h, which corresponds to the speed on unpaved roads (Roberts et al., 2012). The
travel speed on the counterfactual network is taken to be the same as for the the Chinese
expressways and the GQ, which according to google maps is 75 km/h. For a comparison of
the highway networks, the digital maps of the Chinese expressway network were obtained
from ACASIAN (2013).
In order to determine the construction costs for the counterfactual roads, I need dig-
itized information on the terrain. I use digital elevation data produced by Jarvis et al.
(2008) for a measure of slope. For land cover, I use the classification by the Global Land
Cover Facility (2013) at the University of Maryland Department of Geography.
17The software used here are ArcGIS Desktop 10.1 and the spmat functions in Stata 13.
18These estimates are in line with more recent numbers by KPMG (2013).
Chapter 1 17
Political Boundaries and Luminosity
The units of analysis in this paper are Indian districts. I focus on mainland districts, of
which there are 590. Luminosity measured by weather satellites has been shown to be a
good proxy for income (Henderson et al., 2012). Two important advantages of the light
data are that is has a high spatial resolution and is independent of countries’ statistical
capacity. It is particularly useful when official GDP figures are not available, for example
for subnational administrative units such as Indian districts.
The digitized district boundaries are provided by Global Administrative Areas (2012)
and the light data is available from the Earth Observation Group (2013) of the National
Geophysical Data Center of the United States. The satellite images originate from the
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Operational Linescan System (OLS) to
detect cloud cover. The data is available from 1992 to 2012 as composites over cloud-free
evenings.19 The raster are 30 arc second grids, spanning -180 to 180 degrees longitude
and -65 to 75 degrees latitude. To derive a measure of real incomeI for each district,
I aggregate light within district boundaries using an equal area projection. The light
summary statistics of the sample of mainland Indian districts are presented in Table 1.1.
In order to interpret the light data in terms of GDP, one first has to analyse the
relationship between GDP and light. GDP data is not available for Indian districts
such that the relationship has to be inferred from other samples. GDP at the level
of sub-national units such as districts is also in other countries difficult to obtain. An
exception is China where one can rely on GDP data at the prefecture level based on
official statistical yearbooks.20 This data allows estimating the relationship with light
at a similar level of aggregation as Indian districts. However, there are some caveats
when using this approach. First, light intensity is measured by various satellites over the
years. These satellites can have somewhat different calibrations such that observations
from different satellite years cannot directly be compared. Second, GDP data is measured
within administrative boundaries and these may also change over time.21 I therefore rely
only on the year 2010 for which I have GDP figures for Chinese prefectures and the digital
maps of administrative boundaries that match the units in the statistical yearbooks. This
allows me to measure light and GDP on the same land area and with the same satellite,
thereby addressing the two concerns above. I then regress the logarithm of GDP on the
logarithm of light within Chinese prefectures in order to estimate the relationship. The
19The last two years have recently been made available and they have not been included in the present
analysis.
20See Alder et al. (2013) for a more detailed description of the GDP data in the Chinese statistical
yearbooks.
21The Chinese statistical yearbooks also report the land area. These figures show that subnational
borders have indeed been changing.
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estimated elasticity is 1.05 and significant, but indistinguishable from 1. In the empirical
analysis, I therefore interpret the magnitude of an effect on light as an equally large effects
in terms of GDP.22 While the elasticity that is used to translate the estimate from light to
GDP clearly affects the magnitude of the aggregate effects, the distributional implications
are not affected by this.
1.4.2 Building a Counterfactual Highway Network for India
To replicate the Chinese network in India, I first identify the cities in India which would
have been chosen by the Chinese policy and then build a counterfactual network to connect
them through the Indian terrain in a way that minimizes construction costs.23 68 Indian
cities fulfill one of the two criteria, i.e. having a population above 500,000 or being a state
capital. The location of these cities is shown in Figure 1.6.
In order to determine the network which connects all targeted cities in a least-cost
manner, one first needs to obtain a measure for road construction costs on the Indian
terrain. I follow Faber (2013) and assume that the construction costs on a given 1x1 km
cell of land depends on the slope and the share of water and built up area in the following
way:
ConstructionCostsc = 1 + Slope+ 25×Builtup+ 25×Water (1.1)
Slope is measured in percent and Builtup and Water are binary indicators which take
the unit value if the majority of the cell is built up or water, respectively.24 Applying this
formula using detailed terrain data produces a fine 1×1 km grid of construction costs for
the entire Indian landscape. Given this grid of construction costs, one can in a second
step apply the Dijkstra algorithm to find the cheapest connection between any two given
points through the cost grid.25 The procedure is illustrated in Figure 1.7, where the cells
22Note that to estimate the relationship between GDP and light I do not exploit time variation. An
alternative, which has also been used in Henderson et al. (2012), is to estimate the relationship in a panel
or in long differences. In the period from 2000 to 2009, the result for the later suggests an elasticity of
roughly 0.5. However, it is subject to the two concerned raised above and in this context I prefer to rely
on the estimate based on the 2010 cross section.
23This approach has previously been applied by Faber (2013) in China to construct an instrument for
the actually built expressways. In the steps below, I adapt this approach to replicate the Chinese network
in India.
24The implication of this formulation is that a 25 percentage points increase in slope raises the road
construction costs in the same way as when the road has to be built through an area with existing houses,
other infrastructure, or water. Different from Faber (2013), my formulation does not include wetlands.
25This algorithm is implemented in the ArcGIS Network Analyst extension. The same algorithm can be
used to compute the least-cost transport route (instead of least cost construction path). The algorithm
has already been widely used in the economics literature, for example in Dell (2012), Faber (2013),
Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013), and Donaldson (forthcoming).
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represent different construction costs (based on Equation 1.1) and the lines are the least-
cost paths to connect the cities (shown as circles). The third step in order to obtain the
counterfactual network is to find the cheapest possible way to connect all targeted cities
to the network.26 This is achieved by the Kruskal algorithm (Kruskal, 1956), which uses
as inputs all bilateral construction costs and finds the minimal links needed to connect all
cities at least once to the common network. This produces the least-cost network. Once
it is determined which bilateral connections must be made, the counterfactual highways
can be drawn with GIS software following the least-cost path computed above (illustrated
by lines in Figure 1.7). The resulting counterfactual network is shown in Figure 1.9. It
represents the cheapest way to formally fulfill the Chinese policy objective (connecting
cities which have a population above 500’000 or are state capitals) in India.27
Despite its immediate link to the official policy objective, this minimalistic network is
not one that would typically be implemented by governments. One reason is that planners
would most likely complement it with additional connections between "loose ends" created
by the algorithm. For example, if two cities are indirectly connected through other cities,
then connecting them is redundant from the perspective of the policy objective, even if
the cities are close to each other. However, in reality, the additional link may possibly
be effective for reducing transport times. This illustrates that the least-cost network is
not minimizing transport costs nor maximizing aggregate income. However, the least-
cost network is a useful benchmark for the counterfactual analysis because it improves
transport infrastructure for a particular set of cities which would have been targeted by
the NEN. Importantly, it is an objective way to replicate the Chinese network because the
least-cost network is unique. The counterfactual network therefore allows an interesting
comparison between a network that focused on the four largest economic centers (the
Indian GQ) and one that connects all intermediate sized cities (the Chinese NEN). In the
robustness section, I discuss the results for alternative counterfactual networks in India.
In particular, I propose an alternative network exploiting that the Chinese government
also specified that the targeted cities should be connected with rays out of the capital city
and with horizontal and vertical corridors. These alternative networks resemble more the
structure of the network which was actually built in China. The disadvantage is that they
are not unique as there would be several ways to make the connections. In the main part
of this paper, I will therefore focus on the least-cost network and discuss the alternatives
in the robustness section.
26Note that the previous step computed the least-cost construction path between all bilateral pairs of
cities. Most of these paths are redundant because a given city may already be connected to the network
through another city.
27More precisely, it is the cheapest way to connect a given set of nodes with bilateral links. The
procedure does not allow endogenous nodes or hubs.
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1.4.3 Computing Transport Costs Through a Road Network
Transport infrastructure affects economic activity in several dimensions, such as the time
it takes to move goods and people, pecuniary costs from tolls, or risks associated with
the use of inadequate or overused infrastructure. I will focus on the transport times as
a determinant of transport costs. Higher road quality, limited access, and more capacity
are all reflected in the time it takes to move goods between two locations.
The counterfactual analysis requires information on the transport times between all
pairs of Indian districts for different versions of (actual and counterfactual) transport net-
works. While the transport times on the current network can be derived from automated
searches on applications like google maps, this is not the case for past or counterfactual
networks. My approach is to use the Dijkstra algorithm that finds the shortest path (in
terms of transport time) between any two locations on a digitized road network. The
advantage of this approach is that the same algorithm can compute all bilateral transport
times for different road networks. The required inputs (described in Section 1.4.1) are the
geographically referenced roads and the transport speed on different types of roads. With
these inputs, it is possible to construct a grid of India where the value of each 10×10 km
cell represents the costs of traveling through this cell. These travel costs depend on the
quality of the road inside of each cell, i.e. the travel costs are high if there are only roads
of poor quality with low travel speeds. Such a grid of transport costs is shown in Figure
1.8. The Dijkstra algorithm then calculates the cheapest way to travel from one location
(district centroids, represented by dots in Figure 1.8) to another location. Depending on
the road infrastructure and thus on the transport costs in each cell, the cheapest path may
not be the shortest in terms of distance. More importantly, the transport times associated
with the cheapest path change when the infrastructure is improved, thus generating time
variation in the transport costs. Following Roberts et al. (2012), I assume that there are
economies of scale in transport, such that transport costs increase less than proportionally
in transport times.28 More precisely, I calculate transport costs between an origin o and
a destination d as
TransportCostsod = 1 + TransportT ime
0.6
od , (1.2)
where the exponent of 0.6 is an average value that Roberts et al. (2012) derived for the
Chinese network. A particular case is when o = d, i.e. transport costs within a district.
Although a district is represented here by its centroid and the iceberg assumption in such
a case implies transport costs of 1, this would not be accurate for actual Indian district
28This is a common assumption, see for example also Au and Henderson (2006) who assume that
transport costs increase less than proportionally in distance.
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which differ substantially in size. One solution which has been used in the literature
is to normalize it to the observation with the smallest land area (Au and Henderson,
2006). I use the distance between the district centroid and the nearest district border as
a measure for within-district costs and normalize all travel costs to the smallest distance
in the sample.
By applying the Dijkstra algorithm to all versions of the transport networks (past,
current, and counterfactual network), one can derive the bilateral trade costs of any pair
of districts for each version. In the empirical analysis, this variation in trade costs over
time is related to growth in income. The channel through which this relationship works
is shown by the the conceptual framework in the next section, which serves as guide for
the empirical analysis.
1.5 Conceptual Framework
This section first presents a conceptual framework that illustrates how transport infras-
tructure affects economic development.29 Then I discuss how the light data and the
transport networks presented in Sections 1.3 and 1.4 are used to estimate this effect. The
setup is a general equilibrium trade model as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). Donaldson
and Hornbeck (2013) derive from a variation of that model a reduced form expression for
the impact of transport infrastructure on income. That expression captures the "market
access" of a location, which is the sum over trading partners’ income, discounted by the
bilateral trade costs and by the market access of the trading partners. They use this
framework to estimate the effect of the expansion of the American railway network on
land prices. I follow this approach to estimate the effect of the Indian transport network
on income by adapting their framework to a version which can be estimated with light
data as a measure for real income.
1.5.1 A Ricardian Model of Trade
The basic setup is a Ricardian trade model with the immobile production factors land
and labor and the mobile factor capital.30 The economy consists of many trading regions
(i.e. Indian districts), where the origin of a trade is denoted by o and the destination by
d. Each district produces varieties indexed by j with a Cobb-Douglas technology using
29The presentation in this section focuses on the key aspects of the model. The details are discussed
in the appendix.
30Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) assume that labor is mobile. The motivation for and implication of
the assumption that labor is immobile will be discussed below.
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land (L), labor (H), and capital (K),
xo(j) = zo(j)
(
Lo(j)
)α(
Ho(j)
)γ(
Ko(j)
)1−α−γ
, (1.3)
where zo(j) is an exogenous probabilistic productivity shifter as in Eaton and Kortum
(2002).31 The production function implies marginal costs
MCo(j) =
qαow
γ
or
1−α−γ
o
zo(j)
(1.4)
where qo is the land rental rate, wo is the wage, and ro is the interest rate.
Trade costs between locations o and d are modeled according to an “iceberg” assump-
tion: for one unit of a good to arrive at its destination d, τod ≥ 1 units must be shipped
from origin o. This implies that if a good is produced in location o and sold there at
the price poo(j), then it is sold in location d at the price pod(j) = τodpoo(j). With per-
fect competition, prices equal the marginal costs of producing each variety such that
poo(j) = MCo(j), which implies
pod = τodMCo(j) = τod
qαow
γ
or
1−α−γ
o
zo(j)
(1.5)
zo(j) = τod
qαow
γ
or
1−α−γ
o
pod
. (1.6)
Consumers have CES preferences and search for the cheapest price of each variety (in-
cluding trade costs), such that prices in each district are governed by the productivity
distribution across districts. Eaton and Kortum (2002) show that this implies a CES price
index of the following form:32
Pd = γ
(∑
o
[
To
(
τodq
α
ow
γ
or
1−α−γ
o
)−θ])− 1
θ . (1.7)
I follow the notation in Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) and define the sum over origins’
factor costs as “consumer market access”, because it measures district d’s access to cheap
31Each district draws its productivity zo(j) from a Fréchet distribution with CDF Fo(z) = Pr[Zo ≤ z] =
exp(−Toz−θ) where θ > 1 governs the variation of productivity within districts (comparative advantage)
and To is a district’s state of technology (absolute advantage).
32Using the fact that the rental rate for capital is equalized everywhere to ro = r, we can define the
constant κ ≡ γ−θr−(1−α−γ)θ where γ =
[
Γ
(
θ+1−σ
θ
)] 1
1−σ
and Γ is the gamma function.
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goods,
P−θd = κ
∑
o
[
To
(
τodq
α
ow
γ
o
)−θ]
≡ CMAd. (1.8)
This equation provides a relationship between prices and consumer market access, which
will be exploited below to derive real income.
1.5.2 Trade Flows and Gravity
Eaton and Kortum (2002) show that the fraction of expenditures of district d on goods
from district o is
Xod
Xd
=
To
(
qαow
γ
o
)−θ
τ−θod∑
o
[
To
(
qαow
γ
o
)−θ
τ−θod
] . (1.9)
Assuming that a district’s expenditure equals income (Xd = Yd),33 this can be rearranged
to
Xod = To
(
qαow
γ
o
)−θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Origin’s productivity and factor costs
× τ−θod︸︷︷︸
Trade costs
× Yd︸︷︷︸
Destination’s income
(1.10)
× κCMA−1d︸ ︷︷ ︸
Destination’s CMA
.
This is a gravity equation where the amount of trade from o to d depends positively on the
origin’s competitiveness (productivity) and the destination’s income, but negatively on
the consumer market access of the destination and on the bilateral trade costs. Summing
the gravity equation over destinations d yields total income of origin o,
Yo =
∑
d
Xod = κTo(q
α
ow
γ
o )
−θ∑
d
[
τ−θod CMA
−1
d Yd
]
, (1.11)
where Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) define “firm market access” of district o as
FMAo ≡
∑
d
τ−θod CMA
−1
d Yd. (1.12)
33Capital is a mobile production factor such that output and expenditure could actually differ within
districts. Since I cannot distinguish the two in the data, I assume that capital income is spent where it
is used for production which implies that expenditure equals income.
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If trade costs are symmetric, then a solution must satisfy CMAo = FMAo. Donaldson
and Hornbeck (2013) refer to this term as "market access" (MA),
MAo =
∑
d
τ−θod MA
−1
d Yd. (1.13)
Equation (1.11) for income then becomes
Yo = κTo(q
α
ow
γ
o )
−θMAo. (1.14)
Equations (1.13) and (1.14) summarize how trade costs affect income. While Equation
(1.14) provides a relationship between income and market access, Equation (1.13) shows
that this market access measure is the channel through which transport costs affect in-
come. This framework resembles a gravity equation in the sense that locations which are
better connected influence each other more and the influence is increasing in the size of
their markets. This feature is shared by models in the new economic geography literature
(see Fujita et al., 1999) and has found strong support in the data. A second appealing
property of the model is that it is a general equilibrium setup and thus allows to quan-
tify aggregate effects. In particular, the market access approach takes into account that
a reduction in bilateral trade costs τdi between two trading partners d and i can affect
market access in o. This can be seen in Equation 1.13, where an increase in MAd (due to
a decrease in τdi) reduces MAo.
1.5.3 Empirical Implementation
The framework summarized by Equations (1.13) and (1.14) suggests a relationship be-
tween transport costs and income that can be estimated with the appropriate data. To
this aim, I rewrite the model in terms of real income (which can be measured by light in
each district) and I use an appropriate identification strategy to estimate the causal effect
of market access on income.
Market Access
In order to incorporate luminosity as a measure for real income, I use the property in
Eaton and Kortum (2002) that the price index is related to market access in the form
Pd = MA
− 1
θ
d . (1.15)
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This allows rewriting Equation (1.13) as
MAo =
∑
d
τ−θod MA
−(1+θ)
θ
d Y
r
d , (1.16)
where Y rd =
Yo
Po
denotes real income. For given income (measured by light), bilateral
transport costs (computed from the transport network), and trade elasticity θ (taken
from Donaldson, forthcoming), I solve this system of non-linear equations and obtain
each districts market access measure.34
Real Income
Equation (1.14) can be written in terms of real income. The wage and land rental rates
can be substituted with the factor income shares to obtain
Y ro =
(
κTo
) 1
1+θα+θγ
( α
Lo
) −θα
1+θα+θγ
( γ
Ho
) −θγ
1+θα+θγ
(
MAo
) 1+θ(1+α+γ)
(1+θα+θγ)θ . (1.17)
Estimating this equation in a cross-section would require to control for relevant district
characteristics which are difficult to obtain. It is therefore useful to exploit the panel
structure to identify the causal relationship. Therefore, the above equation will be esti-
mated with a fixed effect panel regression that relies on the time variation within districts.
This allows accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity across districts. Equation (1.18)
shows the analogue of Equation (1.17) in logs and over time:
ln
(
Y ro,t
)
= − θα
1 + θα + θγ
ln(
α
Lo
)− θγ
1 + θα + θγ
ln(
γ
Ho
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Constant over time
+
1
1 + θα + θγ
ln
(
κt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Country characteristics
+
1
1 + θα + θγ
ln
(
To,t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity
+
1 + θ(1 + α + γ)
(1 + θα + θγ)θ
ln(MAo,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Market access
. (1.18)
Time variation in real income is measured by light in the years 2000 (the year before the
NHDP started) and 2009. Variation in the market access measures, obtained from solving
Equation (1.16), can either be due to changes in the transport infrastructure (differences
34Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) estimate the effect of market access on land values. They measure
market access with population and their benchmark estimation uses a first order approximation MAo ≈∑
d τ
−θ
od N
d, where N denotes population. They compare their results to those based on the numerical
solution for MA implied by the model and find similar effects (Column 2 in their Table 1). I focus on the
second approach and use the market access measures based on the numerical solution of Equation (1.16).
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in the bilateral transport costs τod) or in income. The corresponding panel fixed effects
specification is
ln(lighto,s,t) = φo + δs,t + β ln
(
MAo,t
)
+ εo,s,t, (1.19)
where φo is a location fixed effect and δs,t is a state-year fixed effect.35 The link to
Equation (1.18) is as follows. The first line in Equation (1.18) collects parameters and
factor endowments, which are assumed to be constant over time and are thus absorbed by
the location fixed effects φo. The second line includes country characteristics (the interest
rate inside of κ) and productivity of each district. While changes in the national interest
rate are absorbed by the state-year fixed effects, local productivity can potentially vary
over time and districts. As will be argued below, my identification strategy uses exogenous
variation in transport infrastructure such that there is no effect of unobserved productivity
changes on transport infrastructure. Furthermore, part of this variation is absorbed by
the state-year fixed effects. The last line in Equation (1.18) shows the effect of market
access, which is computed in Equation (1.16) for different transport infrastructures.
A caveat of the specification in Equation (1.19) is that the state-time fixed effects
may absorb differences in the growth rates across states that could be driven by some
states being more exposed to infrastructure investments. As an alternative specification,
I will also report the results for the case when the state-year fixed effects are replaced by
predetermined state-characteristics such as state-level growth trends prior to the start of
the NHDP.
The model predicts an elasticity of real income with respect to market access of
β =
1 + θ(1 + α + γ)
(1 + θα + θγ)θ
. (1.20)
While I identify only β and cannot estimate the individual parameters separately, one
can verify whether the resulting estimate for β is close to what would be predicted by
certain parameter values. Using 0.3 for the capital share (and therefore 0.7 for the sum
of the land and labor shares) and 3.8 for the trade elasticity would imply an elasticity of
income with respect to market access of 0.54. This value is not rejected by the estimates
in Section 1.6.
Model and Data
The data required for the estimation of Equation (1.19) are income of each district (ob-
tained from light data) and bilateral trade costs (computed based on a shortest path
35State is an administrative unit above districts.
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algorithm). I consider the period from 2000 to 2009 in order to capture the infrastruc-
ture investments of the NHDP, which started in 2001. The GQ and NS-EW were built
in different phases during which fragments of new or upgraded highways were added to
the network. I abstract from the yearly variation and only consider the total construc-
tions between 2000 and 2009. Using data for the years 2000 and 2009, Equation (1.19)
can be estimated in first differences. For the computation of the market access measures
in Equation (1.16), a value for the trade elasticity θ is assumed. Ideally this would be
estimated with bilateral trade data between Indian districts. While I am not aware of
an estimate for the trade elasticity for contemporaneous India, Donaldson (forthcoming)
has estimated θ using bilateral trade data between Indian districts for his study on the
colonial railway system and I use his estimate of 3.8. This estimate is also in line with
recent results by Simonovska and Waugh (2013) using international trade data.
Identification
Identifying the causal effect of infrastructure on income is challenging for several reasons.
First, the choice of where to build infrastructure is not exogenous. In particular, the
GQ had the explicit goal of connecting the four largest economic centers. This raises the
concern that infrastructure may have been built where high growth was expected. But
the clear objective of the GQ also poses an advantage for identification. By connecting
the four largest centers with fairly straight lines, it affected districts which happened to
be in between two important cities. By excluding the nodes of a network, it is therefore
possible to exploit plausibly exogenous variation in transport infrastructure in districts
which were accidentally affected by the GQ. This identification strategy was proposed
by Chandra and Thompson (2000) and Michaels (2008) and similar strategies have been
applied to China and India by Banerjee et al. (2012), Datta (2012), and Ghani et al.
(2012). I follow this strategy and exclude the nodal cities and the corresponding states
Maharashtra, Delhi, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu.
A second challenge to identification is that shocks to income may be spatially corre-
lated. Since the market access of o sums over incomes of trading partners d and a spatially
correlated income shock may affect both o and d, changes in market access over time are
likely to be correlated with o’s own income. Therefore, an observed correlation between
income and market access can arise even if there was no change in trade costs. To address
this, I hold income fixed in 2000 when computing market access and exploit only the
variation due to changes in transport infrastructure (and thus bilateral trade costs), as is
shown in Equation (1.21),
MAo,t =
∑
d
τ−θod,tMA
−(1+θ)
θ
d,t Y
r
d,2000. (1.21)
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According to the model, the elasticity of income with respect to market access, β, is
constant over the counterfactual. Therefore, given an identification strategy that allows
to estimate this β, income can be predicted for counterfactual transport networks that
imply different market access values. The results of these two steps are discussed in the
next section.
1.6 Results
The results of the empirical analysis are presented in three steps. First, I estimate the
elasticity of income with respect to market access based on Equation (1.18) of the model.
I exploit time variation in market access due to actually built infrastructure in India.
The market access measures are computed from Equation (1.21) and they capture general
equilibrium effects.36 Second, I will use the estimated elasticity to predict income levels in
2009 for various (actual and counterfactual) transport networks and assess their aggregate
effects. The distributional consequences of the different transport networks are discussed
in the third step.
1.6.1 Elasticity of Income with Respect to Market Access
The estimate of β in Equation (1.19) represents the elasticity of income with respect
to market access. The results from estimating β based on the time variation in market
access due to the construction of the GQ and parts of the NS-EW between 2000 and
2009 are shown in Table 1.2. As a benchmark, column 1 uses the full sample of mainland
Indian districts and regresses the logarithm of income on the logarithm of market access,
controlling for district fixed effects and state-year fixed effects. The estimated coefficient
implies that a one percent increase in market access is associated with a 0.39 percent
increase in income. For the subsequent counterfactual exercise, it is crucial to estimate
the causal effect of market access on income. In particular, one has to address concerns
related to omitted variables and reversed causality. I first discuss how I address omitted
variables in the context of column 1 of Table 1.2 and then turn to the problem of reverse
causality (addressed in column 2).
The problem of omitted variables can be mitigated by the panel structure of the data.37
36The results are similar when using Equation (1.21) to instrument Equation (1.16).
37This is an important advantage over a cross-sectional analysis, where unobservable location charac-
teristics would likely be correlated both with income and transport infrastructure. An example for this
issue is the economic or political situation in a state or district, which may determine whether (and how
effectively) investments in roads are made. The same characteristics may also affect the economic per-
formance through the overall investment climate or other government actions. As it is difficult to control
for all relevant location characteristics, transport infrastructure could be correlated with the error term
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More precisely, the inclusion of district fixed effects in the panel estimation in column 1
absorbs all time-invariant district characteristics such as the initial level of development.
The estimation only exploits the changes in income and in transport infrastructure over
time. Although in principal it could also be that there are time-varying district charac-
teristics (for example economic or political shocks) that affect changes in income, it is less
likely – given the national scope of the NHDP – that such shocks would also affect the
transport network. Furthermore, time-varying heterogeneity at a higher level of aggrega-
tion is absorbed by state-year fixed effects which allow for differences in states’ growth
trends.
A second source of endogeneity is due to reverse causality of economic performance
on transport infrastructure. As mentioned in the discussion of the identification strategy
in Section 1.5, it is evident that the GQ was not built randomly, but targeted the four
nodal cities Delhi, Calcutta, Chennai, and Mumbai. It is possible that the choice of
this network structure was driven by the economic performance (or the anticipation of
which) in these regions. Following the identification strategy by Chandra and Thompson
(2000) and Michaels (2008), I exclude the nodal states and only exploit the variation in
districts that were in between these nodes and therefore accidentally affected by the roads
connecting the four largest centers. This identification strategy is exploited in column 2,
which re-estimates the specification of column 1 for the sub-sample of non-nodal districts.
The point estimate changes only marginally to 0.395 and continues to be significant at 5
percent. This suggests that the observed correlation between market access and income
is not driven by the endogenous location of infrastructure.38
The first two specifications include state-year fixed effects to control for potential dif-
ferences in the time trends across states. The identification therefore comes from variation
in districts over time and within states. The inclusion of the state-year fixed effects im-
plies that cross-state differences in the growth rates from 2000 to 2009 are absorbed. This
could be a concern if these differences are related to changes in the transport infrastruc-
ture during this period, such that part of the effect of transport infrastructure may be
attributed to the state-year fixed effect instead of to an increase in market access. This
is a likely scenario, since some states experienced larger average reductions in travel costs
than others and may have had higher growth for this reason. Furthermore, the estimated
fixed effects are unlikely to be constant over the counterfactual networks. An alternative
approach would be to find controls for district trends which are independent of the road
in a cross-sectional analysis.
38Further evidence against the concern that the location of transport infrastructure is driven by eco-
nomic performance is provided in the robustness section. There, I show that changes in transport infras-
tructure between 2000 and 2009 are uncorrelated with districts’ growth trends prior to the start of the
NHDP.
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investments. Since the light data goes back to 1992, it is possible to include the pre-2000
growth in light to capture state-specific trends prior to the road investment program. I
also include initial levels of light and the shares of services and industry in state income.39
As column 3 shows for the full sample, when the state-year fixed effects are replaced with
the state-level control variables, then the point estimate increases to 0.537 and continues
to be statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In column 4, I re-estimate the speci-
fication of column 3 for the sub-sample of non-nodal states and find a similar estimate of
0.574.
For the counterfactual exercise, I rely on the sub-sample of non-nodal districts to
estimate the causal effect of market access on income. I therefore report the results of
the counterfactual exercise based on the estimates of columns 2 (state fixed effects) and 4
(state controls). Each of the two specifications has its advantages and the two estimates
provide a credible range for the true effect. Column 2 appears to be the more conservative
specification to estimate β since it absorbs the state-level effects of roads. I therefore view
this estimate as a lower bound. Column 4 provides an alternative for controlling for state
trends and its estimate for β of 0.574 is close to the elasticity predicted by the model
(for a reasonable choice of parameter values). In this case the identification of the causal
effect relies fully on the randomness in the treatment of non-nodal states.
1.6.2 Aggregate Effects of Transport Infrastructure
The results above established an effect of transport infrastructure on income through the
channel of market access. The estimate of this effect can be used to predict each district’s
income for various counterfactual networks. Because market access captures the general
equilibrium effects of transport infrastructure, this allows to analyze the aggregate and
the distributional consequences.
Aggregate Effects of the Existing Infrastructure
In order to interpret the magnitude of the impact of a counterfactual infrastructure, I first
evaluate the effect of the actually built GQ and NS-EW. To this aim, I construct a network
in 2009 in the absence of the GQ and NS-EW and ask how India would have developed
if the GQ and the NS-EW had not been built.40 In the conceptual framework used here,
this would imply that there was no change in the measures for market access because the
39More precisely, I include interactions of the year indicator with these variables, as the district fixed
effects absorb the time-invariant characteristics.
40In order to avoid confusion with the terminology, I do not use the term "counterfactual" when
considering the 2009 network without the GQ and NS-EW, although it is evidently a counterfactual
network. The term "counterfactual" will only be used for the network proposed in Section 1.4.2.
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actually built GQ and finished parts of the NS-EW are the only sources of variation in
the road infrastructure that I consider. Based on the specification in the second column
of Table 1.2, the results suggest that aggregate income in 2009 would be 3.4 percent lower
if the GQ and the NS-EW had not been built. The result based on the specification with
state controls instead of state fixed effects would imply an effect of 4.7 percent of income.
Most of this effect is due to the GQ, which alone led to a 2.4 - 3.5 percent higher income
by 2009. Aggregate GDP in India in 2009 was USD 905 billion (1999 prices) such that a
3.4 percent difference would correspond to roughly USD 31 billion.41
Aggregate Effects of the Counterfactual Infrastructure
In this section I ask how India would have developed if it had built a transport infras-
tructure like the Chinese NEN. There are two scenarios which may be considered in this
context. First, I add a network that mimics the Chinese NEN to the Indian transport in-
frastructure. Given the evidence that the current transport system does not have enough
capacity, this is an interesting scenario to analyze. However, the counterfactual network
will create certain redundancies with the already improved infrastructure. The results
based on column 2 of Table 1.2 suggest that income in 2009 would have been 2.2 percent
higher if in addition to the existing infrastructure also the network discussed in Section
1.4 had been built, which translates into a USD 20 billion benefit. The increase in income
amounts to 3.2 percent when the specification of column 4 of Table 1.2 is used, or USD
29 billion.
In a second scenario, I ask how India would have developed if instead of building the
GQ it had chosen a similar strategy as the Chinese NEN. Therefore, I consider a highway
network where the GQ is replaced by the network proposed in Section 1.4. The total
length of the GQ is 5,846 km, while the length of the counterfactual is 12,840 km. Given
this difference, it is not surprising that the aggregate effect of replacing the GQ with
the counterfactual is an increase in aggregate income relative to the actual network. This
increase is (based on column 2 of Table 1.2) roughly 1.5 percent of income in 2009 (USD 13
billion). The increase is 2.2 percent based on the specification with state controls, which
implies a USD 20 billion benefit. Although the counterfactual network has more than
twice the length of the GQ, the aggregate effects are relatively small in comparison to the
2.4 - 3.5 percent increase due to the GQ. The likely reason is that the GQ connected the
four largest economic centers and could thereby generate a substantial increase in market
access. However, there are important distribution consequences, which will be discussed
further below.
41In what follows the base is omitted, but all values are in USD at 1999 prices. The costs of the
investments are discussed below.
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Construction Costs of the Counterfactual Infrastructure
In order to evaluate the net aggregate gain of the counterfactual networks as described
above, it is necessary to compute the construction costs of the counterfactual network.
The challenge is that the normalized units of Equation (1.1) do not correspond to actual
monetary costs and only represent the relative increase in construction costs due to the
various topographic features. In order to derive the expected costs of the counterfactual
in USD, I first replicate the GQ on the cost grid discussed in Section 1.4, which yields the
costs of the GQ in terms of the units in Equation (1.1). Since the actual cost of the GQ are
known, one can derive the ratio between the costs in units of Equation (1.1) and the actual
USD costs. This ratio then allows to predict the USD costs of the counterfactual roads by
scaling the costs in Equation (1.1). Using this approach, the costs of the full counterfactual
network are approximately USD 17.5 billion. However, when adding the counterfactual
network to the existing network, then a number of connections are redundant because
they have already been made by the GQ or NS-EW. When excluding these connections
from the cost calculations, then the total costs amount to USD 14.3 billion.42. To compare
costs and benefits, I have to make assumptions on the interest rate and on the year in
which the construction costs have to be paid. For the later I assume that the costs were
evenly spread over the years 2001-2009. For the real interest rate during the period 2001-
2009, I take 2 percent.43 With accumulated interests until 2009, the costs amount to USD
19 for the full network and to USD 16 billion for the network without redundancies.
Comparing these costs to the benefits suggests aggregate net gains from adding the
counterfactual of about USD 4 billion when using state fixed effects and USD 13 billion
when using state control variables. The net gains from replacing the GQ with the coun-
terfactual would lie between zero and USD 7 billion.44 Besides these gains over the first
9 years of the project, there may be higher benefits of such infrastructure projects on a
longer horizon, although in that case the discount rate plays a key role and one has to
consider additional costs for maintenance.
Overall, I conclude that by connecting the largest economic centers, the GQ had
achieved relatively large aggregate effects at a moderate cost, i.e. there were net gains
from the GQ. Taking into account the construction costs, the additional net gains of
42The costs of the GQ were USD 6 billion (Ghani et al., 2012), but it had less than half the length of
the counterfactual.
43According to the Reserve Bank of India, the average nominal interest rate on central government
bonds for the period 2001-2009 was 7.5 percent. However, the benefits and costs above are denoted in
1999 constant prices and the average inflation rate between 2001 and 2009 was 5.7 percent. Using, instead
of an average value of 2 percent, the yearly real interest rates based on government bonds and inflation
would imply costs of USD 15.3.
44In this case the costs of the full counterfactual network have to be paid, but USD 6 billion would
have been saved on the GQ.
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the counterfactual are small. However, the counterfactual network also includes the
intermediate-sized cities and thereby reaches into more districts, including the less de-
veloped. This has important distributional consequences, which will be quantified below.
1.6.3 Distributional Effects of Transport Infrastructure
China and India have shown significant differences in their regional development. In par-
ticular, India had less convergences and some "lagging regions" (Chaudhuri and Ravallion,
2006). In this light, an important question is how transport infrastructure may contribute
to these differences in regional development. One advantage of the approach used here is
that the effects of different transport networks can be assessed both at the aggregate and
at the local level, allowing to analyze the distributional consequences and the regional
development patterns under each scenario. As will be shown below, the effects on the
local development of Indian districts differ substantially over the various versions of the
transport networks. I will start by discussing the effects of the actually implemented parts
of the NHDP and then consider the effects of the two counterfactual scenarios. To be able
to discuss the differences across states and districts, the analysis builds on the specifica-
tion using state-level control variables (column 4 of Table 1.2) instead of state-year fixed
effects.
Distributional Effects of the Existing Infrastructure
Figure 1.10 shows the estimated effects of the GQ and the finished parts of the NS-EW
(the network in Figure 1.5) at the level of Indian districts. The numbers represent the
percentage gains from building the GQ and finished parts of the NS-EW.45 As expected,
the effects are strongest along the paths of the newly built or upgraded highways. The
largest beneficiaries had a 33 percent higher income level in 2009 than they would have
had in the absence of the GQ and NS-EW. Although transport costs did not increase
anywhere, there are some losers from the infrastructure investments, which is due to
trade diversion.
Distributional Effects of the Counterfactual Infrastructure
Adding the counterfactual network to the existing infrastructure increases particularly
the market access of regions in the center and in the east which have been neglected
by the recent improvements in infrastructure. Particularly the central regions were also
45More precisely, the numbers correspond to differences between the prediction of income with the
actual network and the prediction with the counterfactual network, relative to the prediction with the
actual network.
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the ones with low growth during the past decade. As there are several cities in that
area which would fulfill the criteria of the NEN, they become better connected by the
counterfactual network and thus experience increases in market access. The results from
adding the counterfactual network to the existing infrastructure, illustrated in Figure
1.11, also show that the growth benefits are generally more equally distributed across
the country compared to the existing network with the GQ and the NS-EW. The largest
beneficiaries gain 32 percent of income, but there are also some districts with moderate
losses. This is purely due to trade diversion, since trade costs do not increase anywhere
when transport infrastructure is added.
When replacing the GQ with the counterfactual network, then the above results in
terms of distribution are strengthened and the largest beneficiaries are still regions with
low growth during the past decade (Figure 1.12). But in this scenario, there are also
significant losses because, by replacing the GQ with an alternative network, those cities
which were well connected by the GQ have higher (or at best the same) trade costs. In
particular, the four large cities which were targeted by the GQ experience declines. The
largest beneficiaries have gains of up to 36.8% and the largest loss is 17.4%.
Planned Highway Projects and Policy Implications
The above evidence on the impact of transport infrastructure makes clear that there are
both aggregate and distributional consequences. By choosing a network that connects
the four largest economic centers, India has been able to achieve an increase in income
that is well above the construction costs of the new or upgraded highways. However, the
strategy also implied that lagging regions were largely neglected by the new infrastructure
investments. These distributional consequences are particularly relevant in view of the
unequal regional development of India. Policy makers seem to be aware of this and
the NHDP did include plans for other highway connections besides the GQ that reach
into more states. In particular, the government planned the North-South and East-West
Corridors which cross through regions that were not reached by the GQ. However, these
other projects were delayed and by 2009 only a small part has been finished (see also Ghani
et al, 2012). A complementary exercise is therefore to compare the effects which could
be expected from completing the planned corridors to the effects from the counterfactual
network that follows the Chinese strategy. The results suggest that the counterfactual
network generates about 1 percent higher income than the completion of the NS-EW
corridors. Clearly, districts along the planned but not yet implemented routes reap larger
gains from these corridors than from the counterfactual. There are therefore losers if
instead of the planned NS-EW corridors a network with Chinese characteristics is built.
But, as is shown in Figure 1.13, the counterfactual network reaches more regions and
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especially parts of the country that have experienced low growth rates.
1.7 Robustness
The results presented so far rely on a particular counterfactual network (the least-cost
network), Furthermore, I had to make a number of assumptions to estimate the effect
of transport infrastructure and to perform the counterfactual analysis. This section first
presents the results for further counterfactual networks and then discusses robustness to
pre-investment trends, weighting, and alternative choices for parameter values.
1.7.1 Alternative Counterfactual Highway Networks
The least-cost network presented in Section 1.4 implements the cheapest network that
connects with bilateral links the cities which would fulfill the criteria of the Chinese NEN.
The advantage of this network is that it represents an objective way to replicate the
Chinese policy. The disadvantage is that it has some features that we do not observe
in reality. In particular, there are some cities which are relatively close but not directly
connected. The reason for this is that the Kruskal algorithm has as its only objective to
connect all cities in the cheapest way. It does not take into account that a connection
between two cities which are already part of the network could be made in order to further
reduce transport costs. This is particularly evident when considering the "loose ends" in
Figure 1.9.
In order to evaluate the effect of networks that are closer to those we observe in reality,
I construct two alternative counterfactual networks. I first "close" the network of Figure
1.9 by adding connections between the loose ends. This network is shown in Figure
1.14. The results suggest that replacing the GQ with this counterfactual network would
increase income by 1.9 - 2.8 percent, roughly 0.5 percentage points more than the least-cost
network. For a second counterfactual network, I exploit that the Chinese policy not only
specified which types of cities should be connected, but also how (World Bank, 2007b).
More precisely, the policy stated that the cities with a population above 500,000 and state
capitals should be connected in a network that consists of rays spreading out from the
capital city Beijing and with horizontal and vertical corridors. I apply this approach to
India by connecting the targeted cities with rays from Delhi and horizontal and vertical
connections, while the precise routes of these connections are again determined by the
terrain. I follow the rough rule that the number of connections should be proportional
to the total land area of the two countries, thus making about three times fewer rays
and corridors in India than in China. The resulting network is illustrated in Figure 1.15.
This network resembles the actually built NEN and is significantly denser than the least-
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cost network proposed in Section 1.4. It is therefore not surprising that this network
generates large gains when replacing the GQ. The estimated effects are between 3.3 and
4.9 percent. The gains correspond to between USD 30 and 44 billion, while the estimated
construction costs of this network amount to USD 31 billion.46 This result is consistent
with the finding for the least-cost network that there may be some net gains but that
they are not necessarily large. However, the maybe more important implication is again
due to the distributional effect. As is shown in Figure 1.16, some of the largest gains are
precisely in those regions which previously experienced low growth.
1.7.2 Trends in District Growth Prior to Road Investment
The identification strategy used in Section 1.6 relied on the assumption that non-nodal
districts were randomly affected by the GQ that connected the four largest economic
centers. One may have the concern that the structure of the GQ was chosen precisely
because it goes through certain targeted but non-nodal regions. One hypothesis could be
that the GQ was planned such that it goes through regions that were already growing fast.
Since the light data goes back to 1992 and the NHDP started after 2000, it is possible
to test whether districts’ growth rates prior to the NHDP are related to the subsequent
reduction in travel costs due to new roads. To this aim, I estimate the specifications of
columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.2 for non-nodal states but use as the dependent variable the
growth in light between 1992 and 1999. If it was the case that transport infrastructure
was improved precisely in those districts that were already growing fast, then we should
observe a positive correlation between increases in market access due to the GQ and the
growth rate prior to its construction. The results are shown in Table 1.3. In neither of
the two specifications is the estimate significant. Furthermore, the point estimate is in
both cases substantially lower than the ones in Table 1.2 or even negative. This provides
compelling evidence against the hypothesis that the GQ connected non-nodal districts
that were already growing faster.
1.7.3 Weighting by Initial Income
A further concern may be that the results presented so far are driven by districts with little
initial light, because small absolute changes in light in these districts may generate large
growth rates. Although it is not evident that smaller districts should be given less weight,
one may worry that their measurement error is larger. Table 1.4 repeats the regressions
of Table 1.2 but weights observations by the logarithm of initial light in 2000. While not
46I again assume that the costs were evenly spread over the 9 years and I use an average annual real
interest rate of 2 percent.
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being more precise, the estimates are of lower magnitude when weighting by initial light.
Using these estimates for the counterfactual analysis yields somewhat smaller aggregate
effects, but does not change the distributional implications of the different transport
networks.
1.7.4 Alternative Values for the Trade Elasticity
When solving the system of equations in (1.21) numerically to derive the market access
measures, it was necessary to make a choice for the trade elasticity parameter θ. The value
of 3.8 was chosen based on Donaldson (forthcoming) who estimated the trade elasticity
using bilateral trade data between Indian districts during the colonial time. Although
not estimated from current trade data, this estimate is in line with recent evidence by
Simonovska and Waugh (2013). Other estimates in the literature tend to be higher.
Therefore, Tables 1.5 - 1.7 report the estimated effect of market access on income with
values for the trade elasticity θ of 3, 5, and 7. The point estimates for the preferred
specifications in columns 3 and 4 range from 0.41 to 0.65. With one exception (column 4
in Table 1.5), the estimates are significant at the 10 percent level. The preceding analysis
in Section 1.6, by using a value of 3.8 for the trade elasticity, estimated the effect of income
with respect to market access around 0.54 or 0.57. These appear to be intermediate values
compared to the estimates from the various alternative θ.
1.7.5 Light per Capita
In the conceptual framework and in the empirical analysis so far, I have abstracted from
changes in population across districts that may lead to changes in income per capita.
In a further robustness check, I therefore use census data on population size in each
district in 2001 and 2011 in order to estimate the effect on light per capita.47 The decadal
growth rates of light per capita across mainland Indian districts are shown in Figure 1.17.
The elasticities of income per capita with respect to market access (using the baseline
specification in Table 1.2) are shown in Table 1.8. The estimates suggest that the result
is similar when using aggregate or per capita figures. For example, the fixed effects
regression without nodal states (column 2) suggests a small increase in the point estimate
from 0.395 to 0.408 and the standard errors are also relatively similar.
47Data collection for the 2011 census began in 2010. Although there is still a small discrepancy to the
period for the light data (2000 to 2009), it is unlikely that this would change the results substantially.
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1.8 Conclusion
Investments in transport infrastructure are often at the heart of efforts to foster economic
development, as it is generally agreed that insufficient transport infrastructure is a key
constraint in many countries. However, the impact of these investments is difficult to
identify due to the general equilibrium consequences of transport networks. Furthermore,
we often lack sources of exogenous variation in infrastructure, which is needed to estimate
the causal effects.
This paper contributes to our understanding of the effects of transport infrastructure
on development by analyzing a major Indian highway project in a general equilibrium
trade model. I combine the theoretical framework with satellite data and geographically
referenced information to measure income, terrain features, and road infrastructure at a
high spatial resolution. The integration of precise geographic data and economic theory
allows me to perform detailed counterfactual analyses. The findings suggest that the
recent Indian highway investments led to positive aggregate net gains, but unequal effects
across districts. A comparison to a counterfactual network that connects intermediate-
sized cities shows modest aggregate effects relative to the actual network. However, there
are important distributional effects. In particular, previously less developed regions would
benefit substantially from such a network that integrates regions of intermediate density.
The results of this counterfactual stand in stark contrast to the ones of the actual highway
investments in India, which have focused on connecting the four largest economic centers.
The comparison of the regional development effects under the actual and counterfactual
networks therefore provides an explanation for the lack of convergence by India’s lagging
regions.
The implications of the findings above extend to other countries. The theoretical
framework allows to quantify the aggregate and distributional effects and I find that
particularly the later are sizable. This suggests that the debates about infrastructure
investments in other countries should give careful consideration to the distributional con-
sequences of alternative networks. Data on geographic and economic characteristics based
on high-resolution satellite images is commonly available. Therefore – with the methods
applied in this paper – the effects of infrastructure projects could be evaluated in many
other settings.
The possibilities from integrating economic theory with geographic data also raise
interesting new questions. For example, it would be fascinating to identify the optimal
network with respect to policy objectives such as aggregate income or distributional goals.
There could also be important interactions of regional economic policies with the transport
network. Since infrastructure investments are often tied to economic policy, it would
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be important to consider them jointly for the policy analysis. Finally, the decision of
how to invest in transport infrastructure can hardly be separated from environmental
considerations. This connection is apparent in many policy debates and there may be
tradeoffs between different objectives. The present paper contributes to this debate by
quantifying the economic impact of transport infrastructure and thereby providing a sound
basis for a more general assessment.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Sum of light 2000 17884.53 18965.65 0 138936.5 590
Mean light intensity 2000 4.35 6.52 0 62.91 590
Sum of light 2009 19552.13 22124.29 0 151527 590
Mean light intensity 2009 4.89 7.41 0 63 590
Within-sat yearly growth rate 0.03 0.11 -0.22 1.85 588
District area (km2) 5329.64 4676.99 18 47855 590
The table shows the summary statistics of the light data. Sum of light is the total
light measured within a district’s boundaries. Mean light intensity is light per pixel.
The within-satellite yearly growth rate from 2000 to 2009 is reported to address
differences in satellite calibration. This figure is the average growth rate when only
growth observations from the same satellite are used. The total sample consists of
590 Indian mainland districts.
46 Chinese Roads in India
Table 1.2: Income and Actual Transport Infrastructure Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Market Access 0.392** 0.395** 0.537** 0.574**
(2.58) (2.36) (2.54) (2.29)
Excluding nodal states No Yes No Yes
State-year fixed effects/State controls FE FE State controls State controls
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 585 501 582 498
R2 0.497 0.492 0.212 0.209
The table shows the elasticity of income with respect to market access (based on
within-variation). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the sum of light in
each district in the years 2000 and 2009. The explanatory variable is market access
computed based on Equation (1.21). All regressions include district fixed effects.
Columns 1 and 2 include state-year fixed effects. In columns 3 and 4 the state-year
fixed effects are replaced by a set of state-level control variables (interactions of year
with initial log light in 1992, growth of state-level light from 1992-2000, and shares
of services and industry). T-statistics are shown in brackets. Standard errors are
clustered at the state-level.
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Table 1.3: Income Prior to Road Investments
(1) (2)
Log Market Access 0.128 -0.0834
(0.43) (-0.33)
Excluding nodal states Yes Yes
State-year fixed effects/State controls FE State controls
N 489 486
R2 0.412 0.232
The table shows the results from regressing districts’ income growth
between 1992 and 1999 on changes in market access between 2000 and
2009. Column 1 includes state fixed effects. In column 2 the state fixed
effects are replaced by a set of state-level control variables (interactions
of year with initial log light in 1992, growth of state-level light from
1992-2000, and shares of services and industry). T-statistics are shown
in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level.
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Table 1.4: Income and Actual Transport Infrastructure Investments when Weighting by
Initial Light
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Market Access 0.282*** 0.268** 0.385** 0.391*
(2.88) (2.57) (2.36) (1.91)
Excluding nodal states No Yes No Yes
State-year fixed effects/State controls FE FE State controls State controls
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 585 501 582 498
R2 0.520 0.515 0.212 0.206
The table shows the elasticity of income with respect to market access (based on
within-variation). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the sum of light in
each district in the years 2000 and 2009. The explanatory variable is market access
computed based on Equation (1.21) with a trade elasticity (θ) of 3.8. All regressions
include district fixed effects (not shown). Columns 1 and 2 include state-year fixed
effects. In columns 3 and 4 the state-year fixed effects are replaced by a set of state-
level control variables (interactions of year with initial log light in 1992, growth of
state-level light from 1992-2000, and shares of services and industry). Observations
are weighted by the log of districts’ light in 2000. T-statistics are shown in brackets.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-level.
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Table 1.5: Income and Actual Transport Infrastructure Investments with Trade Elasticity
(θ) of 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Market Access (θ = 3) 0.297** 0.277** 0.414* 0.416
(2.61) (2.27) (1.85) (1.54)
Excluding nodal states No Yes No Yes
State-year fixed effects/State controls FE FE State controls State controls
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 585 501 582 498
R2 0.493 0.488 0.204 0.201
The table shows the elasticity of income with respect to market access (based on
within-variation). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the sum of light in
each district in the years 2000 and 2009. The explanatory variable is market access
computed based on Equation (1.21) with a trade elasticity (θ) of 3. All regressions
include district fixed effects (not shown). Columns 1 and 2 include state-year fixed
effects. In columns 3 and 4 the state-year fixed effects are replaced by a set of state-
level control variables (interactions of year with initial log light in 1992, growth of
state-level light from 1992-2000, and shares of services and industry). Observations
are weighted by the log of districts’ light in 2000. T-statistics are shown in brackets.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-level.
50 Chinese Roads in India
Table 1.6: Income and Actual Transport Infrastructure Investments with Trade Elasticity
(θ) of 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Market Access (θ = 5) 0.453** 0.464** 0.598*** 0.648***
(2.70) (2.54) (3.00) (2.82)
Excluding nodal states No Yes No Yes
State-year fixed effects/State controls FE FE State controls State controls
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 585 501 582 498
R2 0.499 0.494 0.213 0.212
The table shows the elasticity of income with respect to market access (based on
within-variation). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the sum of light in
each district in the years 2000 and 2009. The explanatory variable is market access
computed based on Equation (1.21) with a trade elasticity (θ) of 5. All regressions
include district fixed effects (not shown). Columns 1 and 2 include state-year fixed
effects. In columns 3 and 4 the state-year fixed effects are replaced by a set of state-
level control variables (interactions of year with initial log light in 1992, growth of
state-level light from 1992-2000, and shares of services and industry). Observations
are weighted by the log of districts’ light in 2000. T-statistics are shown in brackets.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-level.
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Table 1.7: Income and Actual Transport Infrastructure Investments with Trade Elasticity
(θ) of 7
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Market Access (θ = 7) 0.413*** 0.422*** 0.501*** 0.531***
(3.08) (2.98) (4.67) (4.52)
Excluding nodal states No Yes No Yes
State-year fixed effects/State controls FE FE State controls State controls
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 585 501 582 498
R2 0.495 0.491 0.205 0.203
The table shows the elasticity of income with respect to market access (based on
within-variation). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the sum of light in
each district in the years 2000 and 2009. The explanatory variable is market access
computed based on Equation (1.21) with a trade elasticity (θ) of 7. All regressions
include district fixed effects (not shown). Columns 1 and 2 include state-year fixed
effects. In columns 3 and 4 the state-year fixed effects are replaced by a set of state-
level control variables (interactions of year with initial log light in 1992, growth of
state-level light from 1992-2000, and shares of services and industry). Observations
are weighted by the log of districts’ light in 2000. T-statistics are shown in brackets.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-level.
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Table 1.8: Income per Capita and Actual Transport Infrastructure Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Market Access 0.398** 0.408** 0.485** 0.520*
(2.37) (2.20) (2.20) (2.01)
Excluding nodal states No Yes No Yes
State-year fixed effects/State controls FE FE State controls State controls
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 584 500 582 498
R2 0.505 0.502 0.222 0.223
The table shows the elasticity of income per capita with respect to market access
(based on within-variation). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the sum of
light in each district in the years 2000 and 2009 relative to the population size in 2001
and 2011. The explanatory variable is market access computed based on Equation
(1.21). All regressions include district fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 include state-
year fixed effects. In columns 3 and 4 the state-year fixed effects are replaced by a
set of state-level control variables (interactions of year with initial log light in 1992,
growth of state-level light from 1992-2000, and shares of services and industry). T-
statistics are shown in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level.
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1.11 Figures
Figure 1.1: Distribution of Economic Activity in 2000
The figure shows the light intensity of each pixel in China and India
in the year 2000.
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Figure 1.2: Initial Density and Growth in China
The two maps show the initial density (left map) and growth (right map) in light
in China. The initial density measures the average light intensity per pixel in
the year 2000. The growth rate measures the long difference in light intensity
between 2000 and 2009. The units are 341 Chinese prefectures. Darker colors
refer to higher density or higher growth rates.
Figure 1.3: Initial Density and Growth in India
The two maps show the initial density (left map) and growth (right map) in
light in India. The initial density measures the average light intensity per pixel
in the year 2000. The growth rate measures the long difference in light intensity
between 2000 and 2009. The units are 590 Indian districts. Darker colors refer
to higher density or higher growth rates. The small green areas in the north and
east represent missing observations due to zeros in the initial light per district.
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Figure 1.4: Indian GQ and the Chinese NEN.
The figure shows the major highway investment programs in China
(NEN, in red) and India (QG, in green).
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Figure 1.5: Completed parts of the NHDP by 2010
The map shows the parts of the NHDP which were completed by
2010. The GQ is shown as a thick green line and the finished NS-
EW corridor parts are shown as thin blue lines.
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Figure 1.6: Cities in India with more than 500,000 residents and all state capitals.
The figure shows the cities in India with more than 500,000 resi-
dents and all state capitals. The image in the background shows
luminosity in the year 2009.
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Figure 1.7: Road construction costs on the Indian terrain
The figure shows the road construction costs as a function of slope
and land cover. Dark red refers to high construction costs, orange
and yellow to intermediate costs, and light green to low costs. The
green circles represent cities in India which fulfill one of the two
criteria of the Chinese NEN. The blue connections between the
cities represent the cheapest construction routes.
Chapter 1 59
Figure 1.8: Travel cost grid based on different qualities of roads
The figure shows a part of the Indian landscape, where the colors of
different cells represent differences in travel costs. The green lines
represent highways of the NHDP and the blue lines highways of
lower quality. The dots represent the centroids of Indian districts
between which bilateral trade costs are computed as the least-cost
path through the cost grid.
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Figure 1.9: Least-cost counterfactual network
The map shows the counterfactual highways in India which connect
all 68 targeted cities in a least-cost network.
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Figure 1.10: Percent increase in income generated by the NHDP
The map shows the boundaries of Indian districts. Darker color
represents higher percentage difference in income generated by the
NHDP until 2009 compared to a network without the NHDP.
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Figure 1.11: Percent increase in income from adding counterfactual network
The map shows the boundaries of Indian districts. Darker color rep-
resents higher percentage difference in income generated by adding
the counterfactual to the existing network.
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Figure 1.12: Percent increase in income from replacing GQ with counterfactual
The map shows the boundaries of Indian districts. Darker color
represents higher percentage difference in income generated by re-
placing the GQ with the counterfactual network.
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Figure 1.13: Percent difference between counterfactual and completion of NS-EW corri-
dors
The map shows the boundaries of Indian districts. Darker color
represents higher percentage difference in income between the coun-
terfactual network and the completion of the planned NS-EW cor-
ridors.
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Figure 1.14: Counterfactual network when connecting loose ends of the least-cost network
The map shows the counterfactual highways in India which connect
all 68 targeted cities in a least-cost network and in addition connects
loose ends.
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Figure 1.15: Counterfactual network with rays and corridors
The map shows the counterfactual highways in India which connect
all 68 targeted cities with rays, horizontal corridors, and vertical
corridors following the Chinese strategy.
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Figure 1.16: Percent increase in income from replacing GQ with counterfactual of rays
and corridors
The map shows the boundaries of Indian districts. The colors repre-
sent percentage difference in income generated by replacing the GQ
with the counterfactual network that is constructed by connecting
cities with rays and corridors.
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Figure 1.17: Growth of Light per Capita in India
The map show the growth of light per capita in India. Light is
measured in the years 2000 and 2009. Population in each district
is obtained from the Census in 2001 and 2011. The units are 590
Indian districts. Darker colors refer to higher growth rates. The
small green areas in the north and east represent missing observa-
tions due to zeros in the initial light per district.
2 Economic Reforms and Industrial Policy in
a Panel of Chinese Cities1
Joint with Lin Shao and Fabrizio Zilibotti
2.1 Introduction
The process of economic reforms launched in 1978, and gradually extended until current
days, has catapulted China into a stellar growth trajectory that has proven highly resilient.
These reforms affect a variety of policies and institutions. Even today, it is difficult to
pinpoint which of its components were crucial. Yet, disentangling the sources of China’s
development boom is key to an accurate appraisal of its experience. China’s transition
has been fostered by economic institutions that differ significantly from those adopted
by Western economies. For instance, market liberalization has gone hand-in-hand with
a set of proactive industrial policies granting special status and privileges to specific
cities, industries and regions. State intervention continues to play a major role in the
economic activity today. While liberalization is a centerpiece of the orthodox doctrine,
the imbalances and distortions to resource allocation imposed by China’s industrial policy
run against the tenets of the Washington consensus.
This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the policy roots of China’s
success by focusing on industrial policy. We exploit the variation across cities and years
in the establishment of different types of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) to estimate the
effects of SEZ on economic development. SEZ are a salient component of the reform
process for a variety of reasons. First, they have been a centerpiece of the gradualist
development strategy based on the learning-through-experimentation principle. Second,
they have fostered an uneven development across geographic areas and sectors – possibly
exacerbating inequality. Last but not least important, their effects are easier to measure
than those of other reforms, as they took the form of well-defined changes in the legal
status staggered across different Chinese regions and cities. The first SEZ were introduced
as experiments in market allocation in geographically restricted areas along the coast.
SEZ enjoyed special rules applying to labor markets, foreign direct investments, firms’
1This chapter is currently under revision at the Journal of Economic Growth.
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ownership, and export controls. Another important difference from the rest of the country
is that local political leaders were granted substantial autonomy and could shape key
aspects of the industrial policy. After the success of the early experiments, SEZ were
extended first to other cities along the coast and then, starting in the early 1990s, to
inland regions. The establishment of new zones has continued until today. For instance,
on September 29, 2013, the government of Li Keqiang has launched the Shanghai Pilot
Free Trade Zone in the Pudong area, that will enjoy both full liberalization of foreign trade
and capital market liberalization – the innovative aspect of this new zone. Although too
recent to assess, the new experiment shows that the guiding principle of the SEZ continues
to inform China’s economic reform strategy.
We use a panel of 276 cities over the period 1988-2010 to compare development across
treated and non-treated cities. Our econometric strategy is a difference-in-difference es-
timator controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity at the city level. We also control
for province-specific shocks by using province×time fixed effects. We first regress (the
logarithm of) GDP on a reform indicator that switches on (i.e., takes the unit value) in
the year after a city has received SEZ status, controlling for city characteristics such as
size and population. In our baseline specification, the introduction of a SEZ is associated
with a permanent increase in the city’s GDP level of about 12%. The result is robust to
controlling for local government spending. To account for gradual effects of the reform,
we also consider more flexible specifications where the effect of the reform is allowed to
vary, both parametrically and non-parametrically, as a function of the time elapsed since
the start of the treatment. We find an increasing cumulative effect of the policy treatment
that flattens out after about ten years; the long-term effect of a SEZ is estimated to be a
differential increase of about 20% in the GDP level.
Our analysis is subject to two important caveats. First, the assignment of cities
to treatment and control groups may not be random. The Chinese government might
have selected cities based on some prior knowledge that the conditions for industrial
development might be especially favorable ("picking winners"), or to the opposite, in
order to curb regional inequality. One might suspect the picking winners strategy to have
been especially important in the first stage of the reforms, when all SEZ were chosen along
the coast and close to potential trading partners and investors such as Hong Kong and
Taiwan. Ideally, one would like to have valid instruments to isolate exogenous sources
of variation in the reform treatment, but finding instruments is difficult in practice. We
mitigate the concern with endogeneity through two complementary strategies. First, we
restrict the sample to cities located in inland provinces where the selection of the zones was
largely based on a rigid administrative criterion, i.e., being a provincial capital. Second,
we augment the regressions with indicators for the immediate pre-reform years to capture
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differential trends. The results are reassuring in both cases: the effect of SEZ is robust
in the restricted sample, and the pseudo-effects before the actual establishment of the
zone are insignificant. Therefore, there appears to be a clear structural break around the
reform year.
The second caveat concerns data quality. One might worry that local statistics be
manipulated strategically by local officers in order to create the impression that an SEZ
was successful so as to attract government support. In addition, while city-level nominal
GDP data are available, city-level price deflators are more problematic (and only available
for fewer cities/years). In our main specification, we use only nominal variables. The
inclusion of city fixed effects removes any bias arising from time-invarying price level
differences. Inflation differences across provinces are absorbed by the interaction between
time and province fixed effects. Yet, this leaves open the possibility that different cities
within the same province may experience different inflation rates. This would be a problem
for our strategy if the SEZ status triggers systematically higher inflation rates, as in this
case part of our estimated effect would be due to inflation. To address this concern, we
first document that, in the more restricted sample for which we have data on prices at the
city level, treated cities do not appear to have experienced higher inflation than did cities
without SEZ. Next, we complement our analysis with alternative proxies of GDP that do
not depend on prices: light intensity measured by satellites and electricity consumption.
The results confirm the existence of robust significant effects of SEZ.
We also study the channels through which GDP increased as cities were granted SEZ
status. First, we show that the treatment effect is positive and highly significant when
one considers GDP per capita, instead of GDP levels, as the dependent variable. The
estimated coefficient is almost identical between coastal and inland cities. Second, the
treatment effect is strong and significant for capital labor ratios, showing that SEZ attract
investments and trigger capital deepening. The effect on total factor productivity (TFP)
and human capital also are positive, although with some caveats. For TFP the effect is
positive and significant in the total sample, but insignificant (albeit positive) in the inland
sample. The results for human capital are subject to data constraints, as census data are
only available for three years. When we restrict the sample to census years, we find that
the introduction of SEZ has a large and significant effect on the share of college graduates
in the population.
Finally, one might suspect that the SEZ led to a concentration of resources in the
SEZ, drawing resources away from adjacent areas. We find no evidence of such beggar-
thy-neighbor effects. When we run our regressions at the prefectural level, a larger ad-
ministrative unit that includes both the city core (our main unit of analysis) and a large
surrounding periphery, and exclude the city core (where SEZ are hosted) we continue to
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find large positive effects. This suggests that there were no negative spillovers within pre-
fectures, where if anything, crowding-in effects appear to prevail. However, our analysis
cannot rule out negative externality across prefectures.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is related to a large literature on the effects of policy changes on economic
development. We contribute to this literature by showing the effects of an important
component of industrial policy in China. We are not first to study the effects of China’s
SEZ, although earlier studies, arguably due to data constraints, rely on comparisons
of the cross-sectional variation in economic performance rather than on a difference-in-
difference methodology. Wei (1993) uses city-level data for a sample of coastal cities
where special policies were introduced in 1984, and documents that cities hosting SEZ
have a significantly higher average growth rate during the early reform period, while other
types of preferential policies do not produce the same effects.2 Since his sample ends in
1990, when only a small subset of the cities had been granted the status of SEZ, his
identification relies on the cross-sectional comparison between early reformers – a small
and arguably selected group – and cities that were never granted the SEZ status at the
time of his study. Wei’s pioneer study is extended by Démurger et al. (2002) and Jones et
al. (2003), who also document differences in growth rates between treated and non-treated
cities. Different from these articles, our study exploits the staggered establishment of SEZ
across cities. This allows us to estimate the treatment effect controlling for time-invarying
heterogeneity (city fixed effects) and time-varying province-level shocks.
Other studies focus on different economic outcomes. Cheng and Kwan (2000) show
that provinces hosting SEZ attract significantly more foreign direct investment (FDI) than
do other provinces. A recent study by Wang (2013) uses a panel of Chinese cities and finds,
using a difference-in-difference approach similar to ours, a strong positive effects of SEZ on
FDI, exports, and the output of foreign enterprises. The effects on other outcome variables
(which do not comprise GDP) are smaller and less robust. Our findings are complementary
to Wang (2013) insofar as we focus on GDP, a comprehensive measure for the development
of the local economy, while her study focuses on direct intermediate targets of the policy.
An important difference for our analysis is that we distinguish between state-level and
province-level SEZ (see below for a detailed motivation for this choice). Without drawing
such a distinction, the introduction of SEZ yields no statistically significant effect in
our sample. Some studies document the effect of China’s SEZ at the firm level. Head
and Ries (1996) analyze the location decision of international firms in Chinese cities and
2Wei (1993) uses two samples: the first has 434 cities but only a limited time variation from 1988-1990.
The second sample includes fewer cities (74) and covers the period 1980-1990.
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find that SEZ have a positive effect that this is amplified by agglomeration economies.
Schminke and Van Biesebroeck (2013) estimate the effect of being located inside SEZ on
firm’s productivity and export behavior. They find that firms in SEZ export more, have
higher output per worker and higher capital intensity, but no higher TFP once selection
is controlled for.
Zones with special policies are not unique to China (see Akinci and Crittle 2008). In a
recent study on US “Empowerment Zones”, Busso et al. (2013) compare locations selected
for special treatment, such as tax-credits and subsidies for disadvantaged neighborhoods,
with similar locations that were rejected or treated in a second round. They conclude that
the policy had significantly positive effects on employment and wages, while the efficiency
costs were relatively small.
Our study also relates more generally to a large literature on liberalization and indus-
trial policy, including specific applications to the Chinese reform process.3 Rodrik (2006)
argues that government policies creating distortions in favor of more advanced industries
had an important role in the success of Chinese reforms. Dewatripoint and Roland (1995)
and Rodrik (2004) argue that, through experimentation, the state can generate informa-
tion about the potential of different sectors. Our findings are broadly consistent with
these theses. Finally, our study has some similarity in both the methodology and motiva-
tion with Aghion et al. (2008) studying the effect of industrial policy (the demise of the
License Raj) in India. Similar to our study, they exploit the fact that the reforms were
staggered across time and sectors. However, different from our study, they emphasize the
interaction between the reform and state-level characteristics of the labor market. More-
over, they study an episode of pure liberalization (delicensing) while China’s industrial
policy also entails proactive policy elements (tax credits, subsidies, etc.).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the
institutional background of economic reforms in China with special focus on SEZ. Section
2.3 describes the data sources and the sample. Section 2.4 discusses the empirical strategy
and the main results. Section 2.5 performs a variety of robustness checks. Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 China’s Economic Reforms and Institutions
Since its establishment in 1949, the People’s Republic of China relied on rigid economic
planning. The State Planning Commission, a division of the State Council, was in charge
of economic development. The two decades preceding Mao’s death in 1976 were character-
ized by low and volatile economic growth, and by an intense social turmoil. The reformist
3See Perkins (1988), Naughton (2007), Brandt and Rawski (2008), and Xu (2011).
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political leadership that won the battle for Mao’s succession in 1978, led by Deng Xiaop-
ing, faced the desperate need for measures to reconstruct social cohesion and revitalize the
economy. There were, however, no existing blueprints showing how to proceed. Learning-
through-experiment became then the guiding principle of economic reforms. As Deng put
it: “one has to grope for stepping-stones as he crossed the river”.
The first policy breakthrough happened in rural areas, where agricultural production
until then had been carried out in collective communes. Under a new production system
which was later called the Household Responsibility System, farmers were entitled, after
fulfilling their procurement quota, to the rest of their agricultural output. The new system
was first implemented in Anhui and Sichuan provinces and extended to the whole country
by the end of 1982. It was a major success. The national grain harvest increased from
304.8 million tons in 1978 to 407.3 million tons in 1984.
The leadership soon realized that reforms had to be extended to the urban area, and
that industrialization necessitated opening up China to foreign investments. However, the
reformists’ plans to open the economy met the strong resistance of the conservative frac-
tion of the Communist Party (CCP) central committee. To the conservative ideologists,
renting China’s land to foreign companies and allowing them to exploit China’s cheap
labor would mean selling out China and exposing it to the influence of western ideologies.
1980-1984
The establishment of SEZ resulted from the compromise between the reformist and con-
servative forces. In the year 1980, four cities in the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong,
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, were granted the status of SEZ. These are geo-
graphically limited pieces of land and usually located in the suburban areas of cities. The
SEZ were given special economic treatment, including tax deduction and special tariffs
for import and export as well as less regulation on foreign exchange and land use. Foreign
firms that resided inside of the SEZ enjoyed first two years of tax holiday, then three years
of a low tax rate of 7.5%, and after the initial five years a tax rate of 15% (outside of the
zones, the tax rate for foreign firms was 33% and for state-owned firms 55%) (see Wei
1993).
The location of the zones was carefully chosen. First, all were located in cities on
the southeastern coast of China, far away from the political center Beijing. There, lo-
cal officials, facing less political resistance from the conservative leaders in the central
committee, had more freedom and flexibility to design and implement innovative policies.
Second, the zones were geographically close to Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Over
the past several hundreds of years, the people in Guangdong and Fujian province had
established deep connections with the overseas Chinese through kinship and trade.
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The idea of SEZ was per se no Chinese innovation. China’s SEZ inherited some essen-
tial characteristics of the Export Processing Zones, which had already been established in
over 80 countries by 1980 (Naughton 2007, and Vogel 2011). Like the Export Processing
Zones, the SEZ were designed to circumvent the complex rules of import and export.
China’s SEZ were special in the sense that they also bore the responsibility of policy
innovation and experimentation. They were the laboratories for the market economy.
According to the official document issued by the party center and State Council, “the four
Special Economic Zones would carry on systems and policies that are different from other
places. The Special Economic Zones will be regulated primarily by the market.” (Vogel
2011: p.399). The local officials of the zones were implicitly encouraged to be innovative
in designing economic policies and institutions. Many of the policy innovations inside of a
zone, including the establishment of China’s first labor market in Shenzhen, were deemed
illegal outside of it. They were, however, later extended to the rest of the country after
proving successful.
1984-1991
The success of the SEZ was remarkable: between 1980 and 1984 Shenzhen grew at an
annual rate of 54%, and in 1984, the four SEZ alone attracted 26% of China’s total FDI. In
addition, the zones had developed a set of well-functioning markets for labor, land, capital,
transportation and technology (Zeng 2010). The success of the four SEZ strengthened
the reformist fraction in the CCP and softened the position of the conservative leaders.
In 1984, 14 coastal cities were granted the right to build Economic and Technological
Development Zones (ETDZ). The ETDZ shared most of the policies and privileges granted
earlier to the initial four SEZ. Many of the 14 cities were old treaty ports that were opened
up at the end of the Qing Dynasty. Even before receiving the special status, these cities,
with an established industrial base and a well educated labor force, were among the
most developed areas in China. According to the official statistics, the 14 coastal cities
constituted 21.8% of the national total industrial output in 1985.
1991-2003
During January and February of 1992, Deng made his celebrated tour to southern China,
including stops at the SEZ of Shenzhen and Zhuhai, to mark the end of a period of polit-
ical instability and to restate the commitment of the CCP to the reform process. Shortly
afterwards, a new SEZ called Pudong New Area, was established in Shanghai. In May, the
CCP’s party center issued document No. 4, announcing the plan to grant the five inland
cities along the Yangtze River, nine border cities and all thirty of the provincial capital
the same privileges as the SEZ (Fewsmith 2001). Following the instruction, 18 state-level
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ETDZ were approved during 1992-1993 and 17 more during 2000-2002, all located in in-
land provinces. Another type of zone, the High-tech Industry Development Zone (HIDZ),
was also established during the same period. The establishment of the HIDZ was an
essential part of the "Torch Program", a program carried out by the Ministry of Science
and Technology to guide and facilitate the development of China’s high-tech industries.
ETDZ and HIDZ were granted the same preferential policies and administration status.
However, they emphasized different goals of the development strategy. The main goal of
HIDZ was to help transform domestic research outcomes into profitable high-tech compa-
nies. The HIDZ were located in cities with many universities and research institutions. In
several cases, the HIDZ and ETDZ were located in the same city, with HIDZ established
several years ahead of ETDZ.
2003-present
During the past ten years, the reform of SEZ spread quickly across China. By the year
2005, the system of state-level development zones comprised 54 ETDZ, 53 HIDZ, 15
Bonded Zones (BZ) and 60 Export Processing Zones (EPZ).4 In the year 2005, the 54
ETDZ contributed 4.49% of the national GDP and 14.93% of national export (Ministry
of Commerce 2006). Establishing a development zone became a common strategy for the
local government to attract FDI and foster local economic growth. Through shuﬄing local
officials across different regions, the governments diffused the knowledge and experiences
accumulated in the early zones to help develop new SEZ (Xu 2011). Figure 2.2 shows
that by 2010 SEZ had been established throughout the country.
Besides the state-level zones, a large number of lower-level zones also were established
during the same period. On the one hand, the preferential policies, given by the central
government to the state-level zones, did not apply to these lower-level zones. On the
other hand, the lower-level zones were not under close monitoring and regulation of the
central government. In December 2003, the State Development and Reform Commission,
the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of
Commerce together issued Document No. 2343 to request a thorough investigation into
development zones regarding the violation of the land-use plan. Before the investigation,
there were a total number of 6866 development zones of all levels (WEFore 2010). By
the end of 2006 when the investigation came to an end, only 1568 zones survived and
gained official approval from the state (see State Development and Reform Commission
(2006) for the list of zones). A large number of the development zones were abolished
following the investigation, including all zones at a lower than province-level and several
4BZ were mainly free trade zones. Most of the EPZ were established within existing SEZ. They were
regulated by local customs to assist firms’ import and export.
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province-level zones. After 2006, there existed only two levels of development zones –
state-level and province-level. Starting from 2010, a number of province-level zones were
promoted to state-level conditional on passing certain standards, including performance
in economic growth, production safety and environmental protection. By the end of 2010,
the number of state-level ETDZ had increased from 54 to 88.
2.2.1 Experimentation and Convergence in the Policies of the
Zones
During the early stage of the development of SEZ, the policies were intended not only to
attract FDI but also to foster institutional innovation. Therefore, except for tax deduc-
tion, protection of private property and land-use policies, local governments were given
significant freedom to design new institutions. Successful innovations were retained and
extended to later waves of development zones (see Yeung et al. (2009)). Gradually, the
institutional structure of the SEZ became stable. Policy treatment became uniform across
all state-level ETDZs and HIDZs. At present, the preferential policy treatment for the
state-level ETDZ and HIDZ includes: 1) tax and customs duty deduction, 2) discounted
land-use price, 3) no regulation on labor contracts and 4) special treatment on bank loans.
2.2.2 Different Types of the State-level Development Zones
There are five types of state-level development zones: comprehensive SEZ (a label we use
to distinguish the early created special zones from the broad notion of SEZ), Economic
and Technological Development Zone (ETDZ), High-tech and Industrial Development
Zone (HIDZ), Bonded Zones (BZ), Export Processing Zone (EPZ) and Border Economic
Cooperation Zones (BECZ). They all share the same preferential treatment in terms of
tax deduction, custom duty deduction, reduced land-use price, flexibility in signing labor
contract and financing. But the types of zones differ along several dimensions. First, they
are administered by different authorities. Among them, the comprehensive SEZ, ETDZ
and HIDZ are directed by State Council (HIDZ is co-directed by the Ministry of Science
and Technology). BZ and EPZ are directed by customs. BECZ were directed by the State
Council until 2007, and are now under the control of the Ministry of Commerce.
Second, the zones reflect different aspects of the development plan. The comprehensive
SEZ, located in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou, Hainan, Shanghai and Tianjin, are
the largest in scale and enjoy the most autonomy among the zones. They are expected
to play an active role in defining the frontier of economic and social development. The
ETDZ share similar policies and development goals with the comprehensive SEZ, such as
attracting FDI and boosting export, only on a smaller scale. Although the institutional
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innovation was more active and frequent at the early stage of the reform process, even
today the comprehensive SEZ and ETDZ are encouraged to design and experiment with
new institutions and policies. The HIDZ, which are co-directed by the Ministry of Science
and Technology, focus on fostering the domestic high-tech industries. The BZ are typical
free trade zones: small and closed areas where import and export can take place at a
faster speed. They are all located in coastal port cities or border cities, which also helps
to develop the logistics industry. The function of EPZ is "export processing", which
means to import raw materials from abroad, process them and export the final goods
without entering the real territory of China. Many of the EPZ are established inside of
the ETDZ and HIDZ. The BECZ intend to take advantage of the location of the border
cities to foster trade with other countries.
2.2.3 The State-level and Province-Level Zones
State-level and province-level development zones co-existed during the 30-year history of
the economic reform. In some cities, province-level development zones were established
before the state-level zones. Despite some commonalities, there are fundamental differ-
ences between state-level and province-level SEZ suggesting that their effects might be
highly diverse. First, province-level zones include areas where the special status meant
de facto almost nothing. This causes a rampant measurement error problem that is much
less severe for state-level zones.
Second, the preferential economic policies granted to the province-level zones have been
heavily constrained by the administrative and legislative power of the provincial govern-
ment. The state council explicitly requested that "the policies given to the province-level
development zones should not be comparable to those given to the state-level ones", in
order to prevent excessive competition between the zones and the waste of land resources
(State Administration of Taxation 2004). In reality, the policy treatment of the state-
level zones normally included both the policies usually accorded to provincial zones and
farther-reaching measures granted under the direct control of the central government.
Another difference is that in many cases province-level zones targeted specific indus-
tries (often catering to local interest groups). In contrast, the most important policies of
the state-level zones, such as tax and custom duty deduction, were generally industry-
blind. If there are exceptions to this principle, they reflect a general strategy of the
government (such as the promotion of the development of particular industries nation-
wide) rather than the influence of local interests: for instance, in recent years state-level
zones have favored high-tech industries.
In Table 2.1, we list the number of state-level and province-level development zones
and their average share of industrial output in three coastal provinces hosting a large
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share of SEZ. The data are from WEFore (2010) for the year 2009. All three provinces
have a larger number of province-level than of state-level zones. However, the state-level
zones account for a far larger share to industrial output. We will show that, empirically,
state- and province-level zones have very different effects on economic development at the
city level.
2.3 Data
In this section, we describe the variables we use in the empirical analysis. Our data come
from two main sources. First, the official statistics from the National Statistics Bureau of
China (NSB) including GDP, electricity consumption, population, education, government
spending, and land area. We also use the light intensity data from weather satellites as
a proxy for GDP. More detailed information about our data sources is provided in the
appendix.
The main unit of analysis is the core urban area of a prefecture-level city, an admin-
istrative division ranking below a province and above a county in China’s administrative
structure. A prefecture-level city comprises a core urban area (corresponding to the stan-
dard notion of city area) and a large surrounding area that may include rural areas, other
smaller cities, towns and villages. Since SEZ are located in core urban areas, and the NSB
reports separate statistics for the core and periphery of each prefecture-level city, we focus
on the urban core of prefecture-level cities, unless we state otherwise. A more detailed
discussion and motivation of this choice of the unit of analysis is deferred to the appendix.
For simplicity, henceforth, we refer to the the core urban area of a prefecture-level city as
a city and to the whole prefecture-level city area as a prefecture.5
2.3.1 Main Variables
We denote by i the city, by p the province, and by t the year.
2.3.1.1 Dependent Variables
• logGDPipt is the logarithm of nominal GDP at the city level from the China City
Statistical Yearbooks.
• log GDPipt
Lipt
is the logarithm of nominal GDP per capita at the city level. The popu-
lation Lipt is taken from the China City Statistical Yearbooks.
5In the China City Statistical Yearbooks, the prefecture is called "di ji shi" and the city is called "shi
qu".
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• logElectricityipt is the electricity consumption at the city level from the China City
Statistical Yearbooks (available for the same set of cities as GDP). It measures the
use of electricity for household consumption and industrial production and is a proxy
for the level of economic activity.
• logLightipt is the average light intensity at the city level, another proxy for economic
activity. In the data provided by the National Geographical Data Center, light
intensity is measured on each square km (pixel) on a discrete scale from 0-63. We
use digital maps of Chinese cities to aggregate the light intensity of the pixels to
administrative units.
• log Kipt
Lipt
is the logarithm of physical capital per capita. The physical capital stock
Kipt is constructed with the perpetual inventory method. To construct the physical
capital stock, we take the data on new investment for the period 1988-2010 from the
China City Statistical Yearbooks, and assume an annual depreciation rate of 8%. For
some cities, we collect the new investment data from New China in 60 Year Provin-
cial Statistical Collection for the earlier period 1978-1987. The province-specific
series of investment deflator is obtained from New China in 60 Years Statistical
Collection. The population Lipt is taken from the China City Statistical Yearbooks.
• log hipt is the logarithm of average human capital, constructed using average educa-
tional attainment of population over the age of 6. The educational attainment data
comes from China Population Census.
• logAipt is the logarithm of TFP, constructed as a standard Solow residual.
2.3.1.2 Explanatory Variables
Our main explanatory variables are indicators for the presence of a SEZ. More precisely,
for each of the different types of SEZ we construct a dummy, I_Reformit, which switches
on (i.e., takes the unit value) in the year after the establishment of a zone and retains
the unit value in all following years. Formally, we define the reform indicator based on
the establishment of a zone as
I_Reformit =
1 if ReformY eari < t0 otherwise. ,
where ReformY eari is the year in which a zone was established in city i and t is the
current year. Note that for cities that never host a zone I_Reformit = 0 for all t. We
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also construct separate dummies for each lag from the reform year, as discussed in more
detail in the empirical sections.
2.3.1.3 Primary Control Variables
We use two main control variables from the China City Statistical Yearbooks. First, the
geographic size of the city, to which we refer as land area measured in square kilometers.
This variable is available at both the city and prefecture level, and varies over time re-
flecting changes in the legal city boundaries during the reform period. The second control
variable is population, which again we observe for each city and prefecture. Although
population is partly endogenous to the establishment of a SEZ, we find it useful to filter
out the part of the SEZ’s effect on GDP that originates from mere population changes. In
Section 2.5 we add to the list of control variables the expenditure of the local government,
also from the China City Statistical Yearbooks.
2.3.1.4 Fixed Effects
We include in all regressions two sets of dummies in order to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. Time-invariant city characteristics are absorbed by city fixed effects. Time-
varying heterogeneity at the province-level is absorbed by province×time fixed effects. In
some regressions we also include city-specific linear time trends.
2.3.2 Price Data
The China City Statistical Yearbooks published by the National Bureau of Statistics report
nominal GDP for the period 1988-2010. We rely on this source because it provides a
consistent measurement of GDP across cities and years. Since Chinese price data are
regarded as somewhat unreliable (see, for example, Young 2003), we opt to use nominal
data. Time invariant differences in price level across cities and time varying inflation
differences across provinces are absorbed, respectively, by city and province×time fixed
effects. This approach would be problematic if inflation rates differed significantly across
cities within each province. The main concern is that the SEZ treatment might increase
systematically local inflation. We check if there are differences in inflation rates between
treated and non-treated cities in those years for which real GDP data are available from the
NBS. More precisely, we compute an implicit city-level deflator using the data on nominal
and real GDP, and compare it between cities with and without a SEZ. We find that, within
each province, cities with a SEZ did not have higher inflation.6 As an alternative strategy
6A real GDP index of prefecture level city centers is available from the NBS for the period 2002-2010.
For this period, cities with a SEZ had an average yearly inflation rate (as implied by the implicit deflator
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that avoids relying on prices altogether, we use electricity consumption (in GWh) and
light intensity as proxies for the level of economic activity.
2.3.3 Sample
The sample period is 1988-2010 for the China City Statistical Yearbooks and 1992-2010
for the light data. For this period, we have a consistent definition of city borders, and
information on the main variables of interest.7 We focus on 276 cities, excluding from our
analysis the four cities in which comprehensive SEZ were introduced before 1988, as well
as Hainan, where the entire province received the status of SEZ in 1988. Furthermore, we
exclude Tibet, where we have data for only one city, and the province-level municipalities,
including Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin, because our set of province-time
fixed effect would absorb all variation in GDP.
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
In this section, we discuss the econometric strategy and the main results. We use a
difference-in-difference estimator exploiting the variation in economic policy across cities
and years following the establishment of SEZ. The main dependent variable is GDP at
the city level, which we measure in three alternative ways: first, from official statistics
(this section), then using light intensity and electricity consumption as proxies of the level
of economic activity (section 2.5).
Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics of our dependent variables and of the main
control variables. We have over 5100 observations for GDP from an unbalanced panel of
276 cities from 1988 to 2010. Our policy variable, the establishment of SEZ, is illustrated
in Figure 2.1. This figure shows the time evolution of the shares of cities hosting the
different types of zones in the balanced sample. The two most important types of zones
are HIDZ and ETDZ with shares reaching 31% and 24% in 2010, respectively. Two types
of zones existed before the start of our sample: the comprehensive SEZ, established in
1980, and a few early ETDZ, established in 1984. ETDZ and HIDZ are altogether the
most frequent zone types. We also consider Export Processing Zones (EPZ) and other
constructed from nominal and real GDP series) of 3.3%. Cities without a SEZ had an average yearly
inflation rate of 4.0%. This suggests that reformer cities, if anything, have a lower inflation rate, although
the difference is not statistically significant. The data on real GDP of the prefecture (instead of the city)
dates back until 1996. When using this longer time series, we find that prefectures with a SEZ had
an average yearly inflation rate of 1.8%, while prefectures without a SEZ had an average of 2.3%. The
difference is again not statistically significant.
7During the period of economic reforms, there was also a reform of the administrative levels and
borders of cities. Our data from the National Bureau of Statistics provide a consistent definition across
cities and time.
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less frequent types of zones (e.g., BZ and BECZ), introduced in cities that already hosted
either ETDZ or HIDZ. We control for province-level zones, but we do not combine these
with our state-level SEZ because these are more limited in scope and highly heterogeneous,
as discussed above.
2.4.1 Baseline Specification
Our baseline specification is a city-level panel regression whose dependent variable is the
log of GDP. The main explanatory variables are reform indicators switching on in the year
after part of a city’s territory is granted the status of SEZ.8 Note that cities may have
multiple zones of different types. Since our goal is to assess the effect of different types of
zones, in some specifications we allow each city to be subject to multiple treatments. All
regressions control for city fixed effects and province-time interaction dummies. Standard
errors are clustered at the city-level. More formally, we run regressions of the form
yipt = φi + γpt + α I_Reformit +Xitβ + εit, (2.1)
where yipt is log nominal GDP, φi is a city fixed effect, γtp is a province-time fixed effect
and I_Reformit is an indicator switching on, for each city, in the year after a SEZ is
established. Xit is a vector of time-varying controls including log land area and log pop-
ulation. εit is a normal error term. City fixed effects absorb time-invariant heterogeneity
in city characteristics like initial development or geographical location. Thus, the effects
of reforms are identified across city-time within each province. Province-time fixed effects
control for time varying province-specific shocks that can play a confounding role. In
particular, they absorb cross-province inflation differentials.
The econometric specification in (2.1) restricts the treatment effect to a shift in the
after-reform GDP level path, namely, in reformed cities the GDP level (or trend) is
allowed to shift whenever the reform indicator switches on. This specification is clearly
restrictive. One might expect reforms to have cumulative effects on development, such as
temporary or even permanent changes in growth rates. For this reason, we explore below
more flexible econometric specifications allowing for trend breaks and distributed lags.
We start our analysis by aggregating all state-level reforms into a single indicator
switching on after a city is granted, for the first time, the status of any state-level SEZ.
We construct a similar single dummy for province-level reforms. The estimated coefficients
are shown in Table 2.3. In column (1), we include no additional control variable except
for the fixed effects. The coefficient of the "post-reform indicator for any state-level
reform" is positive and highly significant. Becoming the host of a SEZ increases the
8Including the year of the reform in the dummy does not alter the baseline results significantly.
84 Economic Reforms and Industrial Policy in a Panel of Chinese Cities
average GDP level of the treated city by 19% in post-reform years. In contrast, the
effect of province-level reforms is small and insignificant. In column (2) we control for
the log of the city center area. This variable controls for changes in city borders, which
are relatively frequent in China and would change GDP mechanically, possibly at the
time of the introduction of a SEZ. The size of a city’s land area has, as expected, a
positive effect on GDP. Its inclusion reduces the treatment effect, but this remains large
(14.7%) and highly significant. In column (3) we add the log population of the city center
as a further control. Population has, as expected, a positive coefficient, and its inclusion
causes land area to lose explanatory power. The treatment effect falls slightly but remains
large (12.7%) and highly significant. Finally, in column (4) we use GDP per capita as
our outcome variable. The estimated reform effect is now 11.7%, highly significant. In
columns (5)–(8) we repeat the analysis for the sub-sample of inland provinces. In this
sub-sample, cities were granted the status of SEZ on the basis of administrative criteria,
such as being a provincial capital.9 This is an interesting sub-sample since it involves
less selection, as discussed above. To mitigate selection concerns even further, we exclude
from the inland sub-sample cities that were granted the status of SEZ in spite of not
being provincial capitals. Thus, the restricted inland sample only contains provincial
capitals (treatment group) and cities that were never granted the SEZ status (control
group). Columns (5)–(8) in Table 2.3 show that the results are largely robust to this
sample restriction.10 The coefficient of interest is positive and significant, and even larger
than in the total sample.
2.4.2 Pre-reform Trends
A concern with the results of Table 2.3 is that cities hosting SEZ might already have been
on a higher-growth trajectory – or might even have been selected precisely because of
their promise of success. The focus on inland capitals alleviates such concerns. However,
the year in which capitals were assigned to the treatment group may not be random.
Moreover, provincial capitals may be a special group per se.
We address this point through two strategies. First, we investigate whether the perfor-
mance of treated cities was different from that of other cities in the same province in the
9In the sub-sample of inland cities, 44 cities were granted SEZ status. Of these, 18 were provincial
capitals.
10Arguably, inland capitals is per se a special group. Since the selection of treated cities was based on
an administrative criterion (rather than on unknown, possible heterogenous criteria), we can control for
features making capital cities different from the control group, such as infrastructure and education, and
allow the treatment effect to depend interactively on such features. In a regression not reported, available
upon request, we find that including these interactions does not alter significantly the main treatment
effect which remains in all cases highly significant. The only significant interaction effect is that with the
number of universities, whose sign is positive.
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years shortly pre-dating the reform. Table 2.4 is the analogue of Table 2.3, reporting the
results of regressions where we add four pre-reform indicators taking on the unit value, re-
spectively, in the year of reform and one, two and three years before the reform.11 If cities
were granted the status of SEZ due to their promising pre-reform trends, these coefficients
ought to be positive and significant. In contrast, we find the estimated coefficient of the
pre-reform dummies to be insignificant, and often negative. The treatment effect instead
continues to be positive and significant, except in columns (7) and (8), where it turns
marginally insignificant. It is useful to note that the point estimates in the restricted
sample (including those that are not statistically significant) are similar to those in the
full sample, although estimated less precisely. In summary, the results of Table 2.4 are
reassuring, and suggest that there were no important differences in pre-reform economic
performance between treated cities and the control group.12
Second, we consider a more flexible specification allowing treated cities to have different
time trends from the non-reformers. This addresses the potential worry that in our
baseline specification the positive effect of SEZ might arise spuriously due to the omission
of pre-existing trends. The new specification allows the GDP of cities that host, at some
point, a SEZ to have a linear time trend that differs from the control group’s already
before the reform. In some specifications, we even allow this trend to undergo a structural
break at the time when the reform indicator switches on. More formally, we consider the
following specification:
yipt = φi + γtp + α1I_Reformit + α2 [(t− 1987)× I_Reformeri] (2.2)
+ α3 [max {0, (t−ReformY eari)× I_Reformit}] +Xitβ + εit,
where, as above, I_Reformit is an indicator switching on in the first year after the reform.
Moreover,
• I_Reformeri is a dummy identifying cities that were reformed at any time. t ≥
1988 denotes the year of the observation. Therefore, α2 captures the steepness of a
linear trend specific to reformers, i.e., how many percentage points the growth rate
differs between reformers and non-reformers.
11We also explored longer lags. There is evidence of some marginally significant effects at the five-year
lag. However, lags longer than three years are identified out of a significantly smaller set of reforming
cities (since many cities were granted the SEZ status in the early 1990’s, and our sample only starts
in 1988). For instance, in the full sample the first three lags are identified out of 73 to 75 cities, while
the fifth lag would only be identified out of 27 cities. In the restricted sample, the first three lags are
identified out of 18 cities, whereas the fifth lag is only identified out of 3 cities.
12Note also that the earliest zones ("comprehensive SEZ") introduced before 1989, likely the most
selected group, are either excluded or exhibit no time-variation in the policy indicators in our sample
period. Thus, they play no role in the identification of the treatment effect.
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• ReformY eari is the year in which the first SEZ was introduced in city i (if a city
never became a SEZ, then we let ReformY eari = 0). The interaction
[(t−ReformY eari)× I_Reformit]
allows a differential trend (i.e., a trend break) starting as of the introduction of the
first SEZ. The coefficient α3 measures the steepness of such a trend break.
• α1 captures a level shift as in the baseline specification of equation (2.1).
The results for the full and restricted (inland) samples are shown in Table 2.5, columns
(1)-(4) and (5)-(8), respectively. We build here on the specification of columns (3) and (7)
in Table 2.3, including all control variables (whose estimated coefficients are not reported,
for simplicity). The results are robust to the other specifications presented in Table 2.3.
Columns (1) and (5) of Table 2.5 simply reproduce for convenience columns (3) and (7)
in Table 2.3, respectively. In the regressions of columns (2) and (6) we add a linear
trend specific to reformers. The estimated coefficient αˆ2 ("time trend of reformers (state-
level)") is statistically significant in both the full and the restricted sample. Interestingly,
the coefficient αˆ1 continues to be highly significant in the full sample, although much of
the effect is now absorbed by the trend. However, it becomes marginally insignificant in
the restricted sample. The trend in columns (2) and (6) does not distinguish pre- and
post-reform periods. Thus, in columns (3) and (7) we allow a structural break in the
trend of reformed cities, by including max {0, (t−ReformY eari)× I_Reformit} in the
regression. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient αˆ1 remains almost unchanged in the full
sample and increases slightly in the restricted sample. Moreover, the estimated coefficient
of the pre-reform trend, αˆ2, is small and only marginally significant in the full sample,
while it is insignificant in the inland sample. The post-reform trend, αˆ3, is insignificant
in both samples. Altogether, the statistical specification studied so far suggests that the
baseline model with a GDP level shift performs better than one allowing for a trend break
implying a permanent GDP divergence between the treatment and control groups.
The specification of columns (2)–(3) and (6)–(7) – allowing for permanently diverging
paths – may be too extreme. We consider, then, an alternative specification allowing
SEZ to have a non-linear effect of the SEZ relative to the pre-reform trend. To avoid an
overparameterization, we omit the level shift, and we estimate the following alternative
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econometric specification:13
yipt = φi + γtp + α2 [(t− 1987)× I_Reformeri] (2.3)
+ α3 [max {0, (t−ReformY eari)× I_Reformit}]
+α4 [max {0, (t−ReformY eari)× I_Reformit}]2 +Xitβ + εit.
The regression results from this specification are provided in columns (4) and (8). In
both cases, we find that αˆ3 > 0 and αˆ4 < 0, implying that the SEZ are associated with an
acceleration of growth in the immediate post-reform years, but that the acceleration dies
off in subsequent years. The coefficients are both individually and jointly statistically
significant. Interestingly, in the full sample there continues to be some evidence of a
positive pre-reform differential trend for reformers. In contrast, in the restricted sample
of inner cities we find no such evidence (the estimated coefficients αˆ2 turns negative and
totally insignificant). This suggests that the government might have picked winners in
the full sample, but not in the restricted inland sample. In summary, this specification
suggests that the effect of SEZ is a significant gradual increase in the GDP level, rather
than a permanent increase in growth (i.e., a linear trend break of the treated cities after
reforms).14
2.4.3 Lagged Effects of SEZ
Motivated by the findings in the previous section, we now perform a non-parametric
analysis of the effects of the reform with the aid of a model that imposes no functional
form restrictions on post- (and pre-) reform effects. All effects are captured by separate
lag- or lead-specific dummies. More formally, we run the following regression:
yipt = φi + γt,p +
JF∑
n=−JB
αnI
n
it{(t−Reformyeari) = n}+Xitβ + εit,
where positive values of t − Reformyeari measure how many years before year t city i
became the host of a SEZ. Negative values measure how many years ahead of t city i will be
reformed. Note that this specification allows us to identify some of the lagged effects out
of reforms that took place before 1988. For instance a city that hosted its first SEZ in 1986
will have variation for all leads ranging from 2 to 24 years. In our baseline specification,
13It would be possible to include also the term α1I_Reformit to this specification. However, it is very
difficult to identify separately all the effects in such a highly parametrized model. Therefore, we omit
this term, and regard the current specification as a non-nested alternative to equation (2.2).
14Clearly, the quadratic model is not a correct specification itself, since it would imply a negative
long-run effect of SEZ. Given the short sample, the data only capture the increasing part of the quadratic
relation. See the next section for a more general specification.
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instead, such a city would display no within variation, and the reform indicator would be
collinear with the city fixed effect. In our sample, the maximum number of post-reform
leads, JF , is 26, corresponding to a single city which hosted its first SEZ in 1984. We
construct these indicators also for the year of reform and the three years prior to the
reform (i.e. JB = 3), so we can test whether reforming cities already had a significantly
different performance prior to the establishment of the first zone.15 The omitted categories
(for which all indicators are zero) are never-reforming cities and cities more than three
years before the reform. The controls include land area, population, and the usual set of
fixed effects.
The results are displayed in Figure 2.3, showing the lead and lagged effects of the
treatment n years past the reform (for instance, n=10 measures the effect ten years past
the introduction of a SEZ). This specification confirms the results of the previous section.
In particular, there is a break in the GDP path a year after the reform, followed by
a temporarily higher growth rate that levels off after about ten years. The size of the
effects are comparable to those in the previous section.16 There is only some marginal,
statistically insignificant evidence of a higher GDP growth in the three years before the
reform, indicating some minor positive selection. Note that the standard errors increase
after nineteen years after the establishment of the zone (corresponding to the vertical line
added to each figure). This is due to a significant drop in the number of observations,
since many cities were reformed in 1991 and 1992.17
We estimate the same regression for the restricted sample of inland provinces (ex-
cluding cities which had a reform but are not provincial capitals), see Figure 2.4. The
qualitative pattern and the point estimates are similar, although the estimation is less
precise, and only the effects 9-12 years after the reform are statistically different from
zero.18 In section 2.5.7, we show that if residuals are clustered at the province×years
of reform (instead of city) level, the effects 7-18 years are statistically significant in the
inland sample.
15For the same reasons described in the discussion of Table 2.4, we do not include more pre-reform
indicators. When we include also indicators for four and five years prior to the reform, these indicators
are marginally significant, but identified by only 27 observations.
16The average over the yearly estimates (weighted with the number of observations identifying each
estimate) of all post-reform indicators is 17.1%, which is even somewhat higher than the result in the
simple regression in Table 2.4.
17When the cities reformed in 1991 and 1992 reach the year 2010, the subsequent number of cities that
identify the individual coefficients drops from 54 to 9. The vertical dashed line in the figure marks this
drop.
18The reforms in the inland provinces started almost a decade later than in the coastal provinces. The
post-reform effects are therefore estimated for a shorter period and based on fewer observations.
Chapter 2 89
2.4.4 Different Types of SEZ
In this section, we attempt to disentangle the effects of the different types of SEZ which
had distinct policies. To this aim, we create separate post-reform indicators for each of the
three most important (and most common) SEZ: ETDZ, HIDZ and EPZ. In addition, we
create a single dummy for other types of state-level SEZ. Table 2.6 has the same structure
as Table 2.3 but replaces the indicator for "any" state-level zone with the four separate
indicators for each type of state-level SEZ. ETDZ and HIDZ appear to have a large effect.
In the full sample, the effects of these two types of zones are quantitatively similar to those
of the first zone in Table 2.3. In the inland sample, there are two deviations. First, the
point estimate of ETDZ remains positive but becomes insignificant when the dependent
variable is GDP per capita. Second, the OtherTypes have in two cases a higher estimate
than ETDZ and HIDZ, although these results are driven by very few observations.19 EPZ
are insignificant throughout, although the coefficient is positive in seven out of eight cases.
Overall, the disaggregation highlights the relative importance of the ETDZ and HIDZ,
which are the two largest and most comprehensive types of zones in our sample, as well
as those emphasizing most explicitly technology development aspects.
The regressions with simple post-reform indicators for the different types of zones is
restrictive in the sense that it assumes a jump in the GDP level after the reform. Since
we have seen that the effects of "any" zone build up gradually during about ten years and
then level off, we investigate whether the same pattern holds true for the individual types
of zones. Since the pre- and post-reform effects of different types of zones often overlap
(treated cities often had multiple zones of different kinds), the approach in section 2.4.3
is quite demanding. Nevertheless, the resulting picture is reasonably clear. Figure B.1,
which can be found in the appendix, plots the coefficients of the different types of zones
(estimated in the same regression) over the years since reform. The first panel shows
that the pattern for ETDZ looks remarkably similar to that of Figure 2.3 (first zone
reformed). The second panel shows that HIDZ also display a concave pattern, although
the effect appears to decline after lag 10.20 EPZ and OtherTypes show a more mixed
picture (the two lower panels in Figure B.1).21 The standard errors are very large and
the effects typically are imprecisely estimated and statistically insignificant. In summary,
1914 cities have a zone type other than ETDZ, HIDZ, or EPZ, but in 11 of these the zone this is in
conjunction with an ETDZ or HIDZ.
20There is a sharp (statistically insignificant) drop in the last lag (19). This may be due to the changing
sample size, as the number of cities identifying this last coefficient drops discontinuously by more than
half in this period.
21The stark drop in OtherTypes is identified by only one observation. EPZ were established after 2000
and often inside an existing zone. Furthermore, the EPZ may have gained importance after the WTO
accession in 2001, which could explain their upward trend (though insignificant).
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most development effects appear to stem from ETDZ and HIDZ.
2.4.5 Decomposing the Effects of the SEZ
In the previous sections, we document that the establishment of SEZ has a positive effect
on GDP at the city level. In this section, we investigate the channel through which the
zones promote growth. To this aim, we decompose GDP per capita into the following
input factors: physical capital per capita, human capital and TFP. We then estimate how
the establishment of a SEZ affects each of the three components.
Following Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005), we perform a level-decomposition
exercise based on the standard Cobb-Douglas production function Y = AKα(hL)1−α.
More formally,
log
Yipt
Lipt
= logAipt + α log
Kipt
Lipt
(2.4)
+(1− α) log hipt
where A denotes total factor productivity, K
L
the physical capital per capita, and h the
human capital. We use the local population size to proxy the size of labor force and use
the average educational attainment of the population to proxy the human capital. The
details can be found in the appendix.
In Table 2.7, we display the results of baseline difference-in-difference regressions anal-
ogous to those performed in section 2.4.1, where each of the components of the decom-
position equation 2.4 is used sequentially as the dependent variable. Column (1) shows
that the establishment of a SEZ has a significantly positive effect on GDP per capita.
Becoming the host of a state-level SEZ is associated with a 13.8% increase in the city’s
GDP per capita relative to non-reformed cities in the same province. When restricting
the sample to inland cities, we find the effect on per capita GDP to be 13.1% and also
highly significant, as shown in column (5). The estimated effect on the capital-labor
ratio is displayed in column (2) and column (6). Column (2) suggests that becoming a
host of a state-level SEZ increases the physical capital per capita of that city in the full
sample by 14.8%. The effect on the capital labor ratio is more prominent in the inland
sub-sample, as shown in column (6) – the point estimate is 24.4% and highly significant.
The estimated effect on TFP in the full sample is 8.3% and highly significant. On the
contrary, the SEZ seems to have a smaller (4.4%) and insignificant effect on TFP in the
inland sample (column (8)). The SEZ does not have a significant effect on human capital
in either of the two samples (column (3) and (7)).
Taking these results at face value suggests that the establishment of SEZ has a major
positive effect on investments and leads to capital deepening. The capital deepening
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effect is more prominent in the inland sample while the full sample shows a more balanced
picture of development, where both the capital-labor ratio and TFP experience significant
increases after the establishment of a state-level zone.22 There is no selective migration
effect, i.e., the SEZ do not seem to attract better educated workers.23
One important caveat here is that the quality of the data on human capital is low.
The only data available at the city-level for education attainment are from the population
census, which are ten years apart from each other. During our sample period, three
population census took place, in the years 1990, 2000 and 2010. Between the census
years, we must resort to an interpolation. This reduces the accuracy of our measures of
human capital and TFP.
The results on human capital are somewhat different if one evaluates the effects of SEZ
by using only the three years for which direct observations of the education attainment
are available from the census data. Rather than aggregating the existing information to
obtain an estimate of the average years of schooling, we study the effect of SEZ on the
share of each educational attainment level for which data are available. This yields a better
sense of the impact of the policy on the distribution of human capital in the population.
The results are shown in Table 2.8. Columns (1) and (2) suggest that after changing to
SEZ status, the average years of schooling in the city increases by 0.17 years in the full
sample and 0.23 years in the restricted (inland) sample.24 Columns (3) and (4) show that
establishing a SEZ has no impact on the share of the population with a low educational
attainment (elementary degree or less). Second, SEZ appear to decrease significantly the
share of the population with junior and senior high school degrees (columns 5-6). Finally,
the share of college graduates in the whole population increases significantly by 3.1% and
3.8%, respectively, in the full and inland sample (columns 7 and 8). In summary, the
main finding is that the establishment of SEZ is associated with an increase in the share
of college graduates, at the expense of the share with intermediate education.25 This
22However, as argued in Klenow and Rodrigez-Clare (1997) and others, the increased capital-labor
ratio should be attributed to increased TFP.
23Note that our specification seeks to identify differential improvements in TFP in cities with SEZ
compared to cities without SEZ. Other studies that investigate the differential effect of SEZ include
Schminke and Van Biesebroeck (2013) and Wang (2013). Schminke and Van Biesebroeck (2013) find that
after controlling for selection bias, the firms that are located in the zones do not achieve significantly
higher TFP than firms outside of the zones. Wang (2013) finds an effect of SEZ on TFP growth after
a lag of six years. It should be noted that TFP on average may still be increasing even if there is no
differential effect for SEZ. For example, Brandt and Zhu (2010) found that increases in TFP in non-state
non-agricultural firms contributed significantly to growth.
24Ideally, we would want to compute the educational attainment of the working population (age 25-64).
Unfortunately, we are unable to do so because the population census only reports educational attainment
for the population over the age of 6.
25In an alternative specification, we bundle senior high school together with college graduates while
leaving junior high school graduates as the middle level category and find a similar result: the share of
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may be due either to selective immigration (i.e., cities with a SEZ attracting more highly
educated immigrants) or to stronger incentives for locals to obtain higher education.
Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 display the reform effect on GDP per capita, physical capital
per capita and TFP over time. The specification employed here is the analogue to that
of Figure 2.3. The pattern for GDP per capita in Figure 2.5 is very similar to that of
GDP in Figure 2.3. The path of GDP per capita shows a structural break one year after
the reform. GDP per capita grows at a temporarily higher rate for about 10 years and
remains at a permanently higher level afterwards. We see a similar concave post-reform
path for physical capital per capita in Figure 2.6. The path of physical capital per capita
also breaks one year after the reform and only becomes statistically significant 5 years
after the reform, presumably because it takes time to build up the physical capital. After
19 years, as observed before, the effects are estimated very imprecisely. The path for
TFP also features a break one year after the reform takes place and the break becomes
significant 6 years after reform. The effect on TFP becomes insignificant 16 years after
the reform (see Figure 2.7).
2.5 Robustness
In this section we perform robustness analysis. First, we test whether there is evidence
of negative or positive spillovers to neighboring locations. Second, we repeat the baseline
regressions using alternative proxies for GDP. Third, we test the robustness of the results
to the inclusion of additional control variables and years. Fourth, we perform a variety of
placebo exercises. Finally, we consider alternative clustering strategies.
2.5.1 Local Spillovers
We have focused so far on the main urban center (labelled as the "city") of each prefecture
which is the area where all state-level SEZ in our sample were established. Recall that
the urban center is a subset of the prefecture, that also include a large peripheral area
comprising smaller cities, towns, villages and rural areas. In this section, we investigate
the existence of local spillovers by studying whether the policy has any effect on the area
surrounding the main urban center. To this aim, we re-run our baseline regressions of
section 2.4.1 using as the dependent variables, first, the GDP of the entire prefecture
(Panel A of Table 2.9); and then the GDP of the prefecture’s periphery, i.e., the whole
junior high school decreases significantly and the share of senior high school and college graduate increases
significantly.
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prefecture excluding the city (Panel B of Table 2.9).26 Panel A shows that the effects at
the prefecture level are of comparable magnitude to those obtained for the city only. Panel
B shows that the results hold up when we consider only the periphery of the prefecture.27
The results of this section suggest that the positive effects of the SEZ did not come
at the expenses of surrounding areas. Rather, it looks as if the SEZ brought positive
spillovers to the periphery of the prefecture of which the host city is part. However, our
analysis cannot rule out negative spillovers across prefectures.
2.5.2 Satellite light as an Alternative Measure of GDP
Chinese price-level data are generally regarded as problematic, especially at the local
level. Our empirical methodology has the advantage of not relying on any price deflator.
Differences in price levels are filtered out by city fixed effects, whereas province-time
fixed effects filter out cross-province inflation differentials. Yet, one might worry that
cities within each province might have experienced different inflation rates. In particular,
our estimated treatment effect would be biased upwards if the establishment of a SEZ
systematically brought about higher inflation. As discussed above, the fact that the
existing price data do not suggest that the establishment of a SEZ is associated with
higher inflation is reassuring in this respect. However, one might also worry that the local
authorities could over-report the nominal GDP of treated cities, in order to meet the
expectation of the central government regarding the performance of SEZ.
To address these issues, in this section we use light intensity measured by weather
satellites as an alternative proxy for GDP. A number of recent papers have argued that
light intensity at night measured by weather satellites can be used as a proxy for GDP.28
Most economic activities such as production, transport, and consumption produce light
as a by-product. Therefore, light intensity is positively correlated with the intensity of
local economic activities. We calculate the average light intensity within the geographical
boundaries of cities and use this as a proxy for economic activity. In column (1) of Table
2.10 we re-run our baseline regression with the logarithm of the average light intensity
as the dependent variable.29 Unfortunately, light intensity is only available since 1992,
26On average, the GDP of the prefecture (including the city) is about twice as large as that of the city
only. The size of the population of the prefecture is about four times as large as that of the city, and the
size of the land area is about eight times as large.
27Land area and population are adjusted accordingly. There is a small drop in the number of observa-
tions, since in some cases the city coincides with the prefecture, and thus there is no periphery.
28Elvidge et al. (1997) are among the first to discuss the relationship between light and economic
activity. See also Henderson et al. (2012) and Chen and Nordhaus (2011) and the literature cited there
on the use of light to measure economic activity. Ma et al. (2012) and Hälg (2012) discuss the use of
light data in Chinese prefecture-level cities.
29We do not control for the size of the land area in the regressions in columns (3) and (4) because light
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and only one-third of the (first) SEZ were established after that year. Moreover, even for
later reformers we lose annual observations that would be useful for a precise estimation
of the within-city effect of SEZ establishment. The loss of precision is confirmed by the
observation that if we run the baseline regression of section 2.4 with GDP as the depen-
dent variable for the post-1992 period we obtain a point estimate of 0.042, statistically
insignificant. Yet, when GDP is proxied by satellite light, we find that the establishment
of a SEZ triggers a 5.2% increase in light intensity. The point estimate for the inland
sample is similar in magnitude, albeit statistically insignificant.
We also check the robustness of our results by using electricity consumption as a
proxy of economic activity (see, e.g., Rawski 2001). Data on electricity consumption
by households and firms are reported in the same statistical yearbooks as GDP, and is
available at the city level. In column (3) of Table 2.10 we re-run our baseline regression
using the logarithm of electricity consumption as the dependent variable. The result
shows that the establishment of a SEZ is associated with an 11% increase in electricity
consumption. The raw elasticity of GDP with respect to electricity consumption in our
sample is 0.91, such that the estimated effect would translate into a 10% increase in the
GDP level.30
2.5.3 Controlling for Government Spending
The establishment of a SEZ is likely to have been associated with a number of policy
changes from the central and local governments. Most notably, the central or the provin-
cial government may increase the transfers to cities when these are granted SEZ status.
Unfortunately, we have no direct information on such transfers. SEZ may have also trig-
gered government investments in infrastructure. The effects identified in the previous
sections are gross of such investments. On the one hand, the infrastructure investments
are part of the government’s strategy to facilitate economic development and therefore
are part of the treatment. On the other hand, one may be interested in estimating the
net effects after controlling for changes in public investments.
is measured within the city boundaries of 2010. Therefore, unlike for the official GDP data, the area on
which we measure economic activity is held constant over the years.
30However, we find no significant effect in the inland sample. We suspect that this is due to the
poor quality of electricity data in this subsample, for which we have no explanation. We calculated the
correlation between GDP (data) and electricity separately in four sub-samples: inland reformers, inland
non-reformers, coastal reformers and coastal non-reformers. The correlation is high and significant in all
subsamples except for that of inland reformers where the elasticity of GDP with respect to electricity
is very low (0.02) and statistically insignificant. Interestingly, the correlation between GDP (data) and
satellite light intensity is instead consistent and significant across the four sub-samples, suggesting that
the source of problems is not the GDP statistics, but rather the electricity data.
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While we have no information on public investments at the city level, we do observe
the overall expenditures of the local government for a subset of the years in our sample.
This measure can be used as a proxy of the contribution of public investments to GDP.
The disadvantage of including the local government expenditure is twofold. First, we lose
some observations. Second, causation could run in the opposite direction: government ex-
penditure might have increased because the GDP expansion caused by the SEZ increased
the tax revenue accruing to the local authorities.
Table 2.11 shows that the reform effects are robust to the inclusion of government
expenditure among the control variables. The effect of the reform remains positive and
highly significant in both samples, and is in fact larger than the point estimates in Table
2.3.
2.5.4 Earlier GDP Data
Our main analysis focuses on the period 1988-2010 for which the NBS provides a consistent
measurement across cities and years. This conservative approach entails the cost of losing
variation in the reform variable, since some SEZ were established before 1988. We re-
estimate our baseline specification for a subset of cities for which GDP is also available
for earlier years.31 In this case, we cannot control for changes in land area, government
spending and population as this data is missing for the earlier years. The reform effect
estimated with this subsample is a 12.3% increase in the level of GDP, and the estimated
coefficient is highly significant.
2.5.5 Population Data
In our analysis so far, we have used the population data from the City Statistical Year-
books. To the best of our knowledge, these data cover only the registered population in
the city, that is, people with "hukou". The existence of a large number of non-resident
immigrant workers in the cities could potentially bias our estimation. To address this
issue, we check first the CSY statistics against the population census that in principle
should record the entire resident population at the city level. However, as noted above,
census data are only available for three years (1990, 2000 and 2010) in our sample. We
find that there is a gap between the two data sources. In particular, if the census is right,
the population growth rate is overestimated by an annual 0.24% in non-reforming cities,
and underestimated by 0.35% in reforming cities in the city statistics. The observation
that the population is underestimated in the treatment group and overestimated in the
31Namely the cities in the following provinces: Fujian, Guizhou, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Inner
Mongolia, Jiangsu, Shaanxi, Shandong and Shanxi.
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control group is not surprising, as the treatment cities are likely to have attracted many
non-hukou workers from the control group.
To test the robustness of our baseline results, we repeat the baseline regressions of
Table 2.3 restricting our sample to the three census years and using population census
data instead of population CSY data. Columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) of Table 2.12 simply
replicate the results in Table 2.3 in the restricted sample. In column (3) and (7) of Table
2.12, where population is used as a control variable, the estimated effect of SEZ is found to
be highly significant and of similar magnitude to that of the baseline specification in Table
2.3 (although the estimated coefficient drops from 0.18 to 0.13 in the inland sample). In
the specification using output per capita as the dependent variable (column (4) and (8)),
the effects of SEZ on per capita GDP are somewhat smaller than in the corresponding
columns of Table 2.3 (the effect being 8% and the full sample and 10% in the inland
sample). The estimates continue to be statistically significant, albeit only at the 95%
confidence level in the full sample and at the 90% confidence level in the inland sample.
It is important to note that by restricting the sample to only three years, we lose precision
in the time variation of the treatment effect.32 This could explain part of the reduction in
the estimated treatment effect. In addition, the estimates including non-hukou workers
should be regarded as a lower bound of the effect, since these workers on average carry a
lower human capital than officially resident workers. All in all, our baseline results appear
to be robust to using the resident population data from the census.
2.5.6 Placebo Analysis
Our estimation exploits the time and spatial variation in the establishment of SEZ. Since
the establishment of the SEZ is staggered, but clustered in few years, there could be con-
cern about the extent to which the exact timing of the reform matters for the identification
of the reform effect. Furthermore, we would like to rule out that our reform indicators
pick up shocks unrelated to SEZ that could be present also in other cities. In order to deal
with these concerns, we run three placebo exercises based on the specification in column
3 of Table 2.3, but assign reform years randomly.
In a first exercise, we assign the actual number of new zone establishments in each
year to a random selection of cities. The resulting placebo distribution is the same as
the true distribution over time, but SEZ are assigned artificially to random cities. We
repeat this exercise 1000 times. We find that in no case are the absolute t values and the
32Consider, for instance, columns (5)-(6), which involve no population data. The estimated coefficients
in Table 2.3 are 0.27 and 0.21, respectively, whereas the corresponding coefficients in Table 2.12 are 0.22
and 0.15, repectively.
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R-squared of the placebo regressions larger than those of the true reform.33 This suggests
that the spatial distribution of SEZ indeed drives our result.
In a second more demanding placebo test, we assign the random reforms only to
reformers, again holding the distribution of reforms across years constant. However, the
timing of the treatment is scrambled across cities. This allows us to assess the extent to
which the time dimension of the reform matters, because we are only randomizing the
year of the reform but not the treated city. We find that the absolute t-values are higher
when using the year of the true reform than in the placebo regressions in all but 1.8%
of the cases.34 This indicates that the actual year in which the SEZ were implemented
is critical for our results, and supports our identification strategy based on within-city
variation.
Finally, we use the random assignment of reforms from above and include the true
reform year and the placebo reform year in the same regression.35 While the estimate for
the true reform is always significant at 5%, the placebo reforms are significant in only 24%
of the cases.36 Overall, these placebo exercises strengthen our confidence in the empirical
strategy used. Both the spatial and the time variation of the SEZ appear to be important
for the results.
2.5.7 Alternative Clustering Strategies
In our main analysis we cluster standard error at the city level, to allow for observations
within a given city to be correlated as well as for heteroskedasticity. Our results are robust
to alternative clustering strategies. First, we cluster the standard errors by province and
year of reform (i.e., the first year in which a city hosts a SEZ). This strategy takes
account of the fact that the introduction of SEZ is highly clustered in time. Many HIDZ
were introduced in 1991–92, and many ETDZ were introduced in 2001–03, implying that
different cities in these years cannot be treated as independent observations. The results
are essentially unchanged. Appendix Tables B.1-B.2-B.3-B.4-B.5 and appendix Figures
B.2-B.3 yield the analogues of Tables 2.3-2.4-2.5-2.6-2.7 and of Figures 2.3-2.4 under
the alternative clustering strategy. The results are robust: the statistical significance
of the coefficients of interests is even strengthened, and in a few cases coefficients that
33The mean estimate of the placebo reform is -0.0004 and it is never significant and higher than the
one of the true reform.
34The mean estimate of the placebo reform is 0.088. The placebo specification yields significant co-
efficients in only 5% of the draws. It yields higher point estimates than the specification with the true
reform year in 5% of the draws.
35The assignment of random reform years among reformers implies that a placebo reform year is likely
to coincide with the true reform year. This is the case in 36% of the 1000 draws.
36The mean estimate of the true reform is 0.11 and the mean estimate of the placebo reform is 0.046.
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were marginally insignificant when clustering at the city level turn significant here. Most
notably, this is the case of appendix Figure B.2, the analogue of Figure 2.3, capturing the
lagged effect of reforms in the inland sample.
We also run the regressions clustering standard errors at the province level (instead
of province×year of first reform). This strategy is even more demanding, and runs into
potential problems since we have only 28 provinces in the full sample and 18 provinces
in the inland sample, and so the number of clusters is small. The results are robust to
even this demanding approach. The coefficients of interests in appendix Tables B.6-B.7-
B.8-B.9-B.10 and the lagged reform effects in appendix Figure B.4-B.5 remain significant
with 2 exceptions, both of which occur in specifications using the inland sample.37
2.6 Conclusion
China has experienced an astonishing economic development over the past 30 years. The
SEZ are a building block of the development strategy pursued by its government. Ac-
cording to Naughton (2007): "Bold, fragmented, open to outside investment, but with a
strong role for government: Special Economic Zones typify much of the Chinese transition
process" (p. 410). This paper estimates the effect of SEZ on local economic performance.
We considered a number of specifications that control for unobserved heterogeneity at the
city level and at the province-time level. The results suggest that the establishment of SEZ
has yielded large positive effects for the cities in which these were located. Although our
estimates are smaller than those found by the earlier literature based on cross-sectional
growth regressions (typically on a smaller set of cities and years), the effects are sizeable
and robust. We also find that the effect of the SEZ on output worked mainly through the
acceleration of physical capital investment – although there is some indication of positive
effects on TFP and human capital accumulation.
What can we learn from the Chinese experience about the role of economic reform
and industrial policy during the process of development? Existing theoretical and em-
pirical work suggests that policies and institutions should be "appropriate" to the stage
of development, and particularly to the stage of the process of technological convergence
(Acemoglu et al. 2006). The Chinese reform process was characterized by a mixture of el-
ements of market liberalization and an active role of government in promoting investment
and technology adoption. Rodrik (2006) argues that the active role of the government
was crucial for China’s development because it supported a fast move towards more mod-
ern and productive sectors which have positive externalities on the whole economy. The
37The exceptions are: policy indicators of state-leve zone in column (7) of Table B.8 and column (7)
of Table B.9.
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results of our empirical analysis suggest that the industrial policy may have indeed been
a catalyst of the development process. At the same time, the estimated effects are not
quantitatively very large relative to the high growth rates experienced by China in this
period. Therefore, it would be hazardous to conclude that SEZ were the most impor-
tant component of the reform package. Two limitations to recall are that (i) we cannot
quantify the costs of the policy, and thus the judgment about the welfare effects of SEZ
must remain suspended; (ii) by design, our methodology can only uncover differential
effects. If the establishment of SEZ had positive spillovers outside of the areas where they
were introduced, our estimates represent a lower bound of the actual effects. In spite of
these limitations, we believe that our results provide a useful starting point for a realistic
understanding of the effects of industrial policy in China.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: State and Province Level Zones in 3 Provinces
Province #S #P Avg indus-output share of S Avg indus-output share of P
Jiangsu 12 113 3.13% 0.55%
Guangdong 14 56 4.89% 0.56%
Zhejiang 8 57 4.09% 1.18%
Source: WEFore (2010). The table displays the number of state level development
zones (#S) and province level development zones (#P) in three provinces: Jiangsu,
Guangdong and Zhejiang. In the last two columns, it also displays the average
share of the state level and province level zones in the industrial output of each
province. The data is for the year 2009.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Real GDP (mil) 10388.9 21776.23 116.62 414700.53 5147
Growth of real GDP (%) 13.07 18.13 -52.19 594.78 4738
Land area (sq km) 1728.36 2028.58 25 20169 5159
Growth of land area (%) 8.44 170.69 -93.23 9852 4750
Population (mil) 1.01 0.87 0.1 8.01 5275
Growth of population (%) 2.71 17.97 -77.18 586.19 4876
Electricity consumption (GWh) 3.08 4.71 0.01 56.3 5085
Growth of electricity consumption (%) 17.41 202.25 -98.97 13486.34 4674
Mean light intensity (calibrated) 13.32 11.27.4 0.12 64.38 4435
Growth of light intensity (calibrated) (%) 5.22 13.98 -38.93 124.57 4178
The table shows the descriptive statistics of our main variables in our sample of 276 cities
in 25 provinces. Real GDP is derived from city-level nominal GDP and provincial deflators.
Land area is the offical size of the prefecture level cities. Population includes registered
residents only. Electricity consumption is by households and firms. Mean light intensity is
the average brightness of pixels in the city.
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Table
2.5:
Trend
break
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
any
state-levelzone
0.127***
0.0825***
0.0837***
0.181***
0.0858
0.0972*
(4.43)
(2.84)
(2.87)
(3.51)
(1.52)
(1.89)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
province-levelzone
0.000497
0.000738
0.000861
0.00219
-0.00775
-0.00668
-0.00768
-0.00996
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.11)
(-0.28)
(-0.24)
(-0.28)
(-0.36)
T
im
e
trend
of
reform
ers
(state-level)
0.00548**
0.00595*
0.00656*
0.00855*
0.00262
-0.000951
(2.15)
(1.68)
(1.88)
(1.69)
(0.26)
(-0.09)
P
ost-reform
trend
(state-level)
-0.000747
0.0156**
0.00624
0.0450**
(-0.19)
(2.25)
(0.53)
(2.58)
Sq.
post-reform
trend
(state-level)
-0.000740***
-0.00182***
(-2.60)
(-2.80)
Sam
ple
Full
Full
Full
Full
Inland
Inland
Inland
Inland
N
5141
5141
5141
5141
2686
2686
2686
2686
A
R
2
0.975
0.975
0.975
0.975
0.971
0.971
0.971
0.971
T
he
dependentvariable
isthe
logarithm
ofannualG
D
P
atthe
city
levelin
allcolum
ns.
G
D
P
ism
easured
in
currentprices.
A
llspecifications
also
controlfor
the
logarithm
ofpopulation
and
land
area
and
they
include
city
fixed
effects
and
the
interaction
ofprovince-year
dum
m
ies.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
parenthesis.
Standard
errors
are
clustered
at
the
city
level.
T
he
sam
ple
includes
276
cities
from
25
provinces
over
the
sam
ple
period
1988-2010
(unbalanced
panel).
T
he
regressions
in
colum
ns
(5)–(8)
are
restricted
to
cities
in
18
inland
provinces
(as
defined
in
the
appendix).
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E
ffe
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s
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di
ffe
re
nt
ty
pe
s
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ne
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(1
)
(2
)
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)
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)
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)
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Lo
g
la
nd
ar
ea
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36
1
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m
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m
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ci
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l
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ic
es
.
O
th
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B
E
C
Z,
B
on
de
d
Zo
ne
s,
an
d
zo
ne
s
of
un
kn
ow
n
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Table
2.7:
D
ecom
position
ofthe
effect
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
first
state-levelzone
0.138***
0.148***
0.00343
0.0825***
0.131***
0.244***
0.00409
0.0442
(4.81)
(3.26)
(0.86)
(3.04)
(3.00)
(3.75)
(0.70)
(1.23)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
first
province-levelzone
-0.0127
-0.0159
0.00242
-0.0125
-0.0145
-0.0201
0.00448**
-0.00705
(-0.74)
(-0.53)
(1.44)
(-0.64)
(-0.67)
(-0.47)
(1.98)
(-0.26)
Log
landarea
-0.218***
-0.532***
-0.0157***
0.0120
-0.212***
-0.490***
-0.0157***
-0.000134
(-6.41)
(-10.94)
(-4.58)
(0.36)
(-5.35)
(-8.97)
(-3.98)
(-0.00)
D
ependent
V
ariable
log(Y
/L)
log(K
/L)
log(h)
log(T
F
P
)
log(Y
/L)
log(K
/L)
log(h)
log(T
F
P
)
Sam
ple
Full
Full
Full
Full
Inland
Inland
Inland
Inland
N
5171
4521
4381
3970
3242
2744
2610
2320
A
R
2
0.948
0.959
0.957
0.802
0.938
0.954
0.950
0.731
T
he
dependent
variables
are
the
logarithm
s
ofrealG
D
P
per
capita
colum
n
(1)
and
(5),and
the
three
decom
posed
com
ponents:
logarithm
ofphysical
capital
stock
(colum
n
(2)
and
(6)),
logarithm
s
of
average
hum
an
capital
(colum
n
(3)-(7))
and
logarithm
of
T
F
P
(colum
n
(4)-(8)),
of
the
prefecture
area.
A
llspecifications
include
land
area,city
fixed
effect
and
the
interaction
of
province-year
dum
m
ies
as
controlvariables.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
parenthesis.
Standard
errors
are
clustered
at
the
city
level.
T
he
sam
ple
includes
276
cities
from
25
provinces
over
the
sam
ple
period
1988-2010
(unbalanced
panel).
T
he
regression
is
carried
out
for
the
fullsam
ple
(colum
n
(1)-(4))
and
restricted
inland
sam
ple
((5)-(8)).
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0.
90
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9
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de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
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av
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e
ye
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sc
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in
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w
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le
du
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(p
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ho
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w
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T
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Table
2.9:
R
eform
effects
on
entire
prefecture
and
on
periphery
only
P
anelA
:P
refecture
A
rea
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
any
state-levelzone
0.156***
0.118***
0.132***
0.136***
0.213***
0.186***
0.190***
0.197***
(4.72)
(4.05)
(4.80)
(4.85)
(3.07)
(3.39)
(3.65)
(3.63)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
province-levelzone
0.0236
-0.00340
-0.00858
-0.0102
0.0272
-0.00933
-0.0144
-0.0143
(1.01)
(-0.19)
(-0.50)
(-0.60)
(0.81)
(-0.37)
(-0.61)
(-0.60)
Log
landarea
0.410***
-0.0566
-0.218***
0.345***
-0.0178
-0.210***
(12.89)
(-0.79)
(-6.35)
(5.76)
(-0.22)
(-4.58)
Log
population
0.743***
0.686***
(7.67)
(6.04)
Sam
ple
Full
Full
Full
Full
Inland
Inland
Inland
Inland
N
5403
5329
5327
5327
2871
2637
2803
2803
A
R
2
0.957
0.975
0.979
0.973
0.945
0.971
0.976
0.967
P
anelB
:P
eriphery
O
nly
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
any
state-levelzone
0.219**
0.107***
0.143***
0.149***
0.310
0.123*
0.184***
0.194***
(2.23)
(3.25)
(5.02)
(5.12)
(1.26)
(1.87)
(3.86)
(4.01)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
province-levelzone
0.0789
-0.00561
-0.0105
-0.0113
0.0910
-0.000238
0.00138
0.000197
(1.57)
(-0.25)
(-0.52)
(-0.55)
(1.37)
(-0.01)
(0.05)
(0.01)
Log
landarea
0.878***
0.147*
0.0287
0.880***
0.216**
0.0705*
(18.54)
(1.75)
(0.82)
(11.66)
(2.09)
(1.92)
Log
population
0.860***
0.816***
(8.85)
(6.10)
Sam
ple
Full
Full
Full
Full
Inland
Inland
Inland
Inland
N
4944
4913
4912
4912
2561
2425
2546
2546
A
R
2
0.865
0.966
0.973
0.967
0.865
0.962
0.969
0.962
T
he
dependent
variable
is
the
logarithm
of
annual
G
D
P
in
colum
ns
(1)–(3)
and
in
colum
ns
(5)–(7);
it
is
annual
G
D
P
per
capita
in
colum
ns
(4)
and
(8).
G
D
P
is
m
easured
in
current
prices.
P
anelA
reports
the
results
for
the
w
hole
prefecture
and
P
anelB
reports
the
results
for
the
periphery
only
(the
prefecture
less
the
city).
A
llspecifications
include
city
fixed
effects
and
the
interaction
ofprovince-year
dum
m
ies.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
parenthesis.
Standard
errors
are
clustered
at
the
city
level.
T
he
sam
ple
includes
276
cities
in
P
anelA
and
260
cities
in
P
anelB
(in
2010)
from
25
provinces
over
the
sam
ple
period
1988-2010
(unbalanced
sam
ple).
T
he
regressions
in
colum
ns
(5)–(8)
are
restricted
to
cities
in
18
inland
provinces
(as
defined
in
the
appendix).
Chapter 2 111
Ta
bl
e
2.
10
:
Li
gh
t
in
te
ns
ity
an
d
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
P
os
t-
re
fo
rm
in
di
ca
to
r
fo
r
an
y
st
at
e-
le
ve
lz
on
e
0.
05
28
**
0.
05
44
0.
11
1*
*
0.
00
16
6
(2
.1
5)
(1
.1
1)
(2
.2
7)
(0
.0
2)
P
os
t-
re
fo
rm
in
di
ca
to
r
fo
r
pr
ov
in
ce
-le
ve
lz
on
e
-0
.0
08
54
-0
.0
33
8
0.
03
31
0.
03
47
(-
0.
47
)
(-
1.
22
)
(0
.9
7)
(0
.8
1)
Lo
g
po
pu
la
ti
on
0.
01
04
0.
00
17
5
0.
53
5*
**
0.
21
2*
(0
.4
9)
(0
.0
4)
(4
.9
0)
(1
.7
0)
Lo
g
la
nd
ar
ea
-0
.0
76
5
0.
01
58
(-
1.
57
)
(0
.2
7)
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
lo
g(
Li
gh
t)
lo
g(
Li
gh
t)
lo
g(
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
)
lo
g(
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
)
Sa
m
pl
e
Fu
ll
In
la
nd
Fu
ll
In
la
nd
N
47
08
25
54
52
00
27
15
A
R
2
0.
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2.11:
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.1: Share of prefecture level cities with different types of zones
The figure shows the share of cities which have different types
of SEZ: Hightech Industrial Development Zones, Economic and
Technolocial Development Zones, Export Processing Zones, Bonded
Zones, Border Economic Cooperation Zones, and other types. The
sample is restricted to 107 cities that are observed in all years be-
tween 1988 and 2010.
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Figure 2.2: Location of treated cities in 2010
The map shows the boundaries of Chinese prefecture level cities
and counties in 2010. The cities in our sample with at least one
state-level SEZ in 2010 are marked in red (a city may have more
than one zone).
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Figure 2.3: Reform effects over time
The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
nominal GDP on indicators for years before and after the first zone.
The solid and dashed lines show the confidence interval. The ver-
tical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach
2010 and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-
reform indicators drops to 9. The regression also controls for an
indicator for province-level zones, land area, population, city fixed
effects, and province-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clus-
tered by city. The sample includes 276 cities from 25 provinces for
the period 1988-2010.
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Figure 2.4: Reform effects over time in the inland sample
The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
nominal GDP on indicators for years before and after the first zone.
The solid and dashed lines show the confidence interval. The ver-
tical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach
2010 and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-
reform indicators drops to 9. The regression also controls for an in-
dicator for province-level zones, land area, population, city fixed ef-
fects, and province-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
by city. The sample includes 158 cities from 18 inland provinces
(as defined in the appendix) for the period 1988-2010.
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Figure 2.5: Effects on GDP per capita over time
The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
GDP per capita on indicators for years before and after the first
SEZ was established. The solid and dashed lines show the con-
fidence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19 shows when the
reformers from 1991 reach 2010 and subsequently the number of
observations to identify post-reform indicators drops to 9. The
regression uses data at the prefecture level and also controls for
an indicator for province-level zones, land area of the prefecture,
prefecture fixed effects, and province-time fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by prefecture. The sample includes 276 cities
from 25 provinces for the period 1988-2010.
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Figure 2.6: Effects on physical capital per capita over time
The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
physical capital per capita on indicators for years before and after
the first SEZ was established. The solid and dashed lines show
the confidence interval. The vertical dashed line at 19 shows when
the reformers from 1991 reach 2010 and subsequently the number
of observations to identify post-reform indicators drops to 9. The
regression uses data at the prefecture level and also controls for
an indicator for province-level zones, land area of the prefecture,
prefecture fixed effects, and province-time fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by prefecture. The sample includes 276 cities
from 25 provinces for the period 1988-2010.
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Figure 2.7: Effects on TFP over time
The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
TFP on indicators for years before and after the first SEZ was es-
tablished. The solid and dashed lines show the confidence interval.
The vertical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991
reach 2010 and subsequently the number of observations to iden-
tify post-reform indicators drops to 9. The regression uses data at
the prefecture level and also controls for an indicator for province-
level zones, land area of the prefecture, prefecture fixed effects, and
province-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by pre-
fecture. The sample includes 276 cities from 25 provinces for the
period 1988-2010.
3 Divide and Rule: An Origin of Polarization
and Ethnic Conflict
Joint with Yikai Wang
3.1 Introduction
Violent conflict causes enormous costs for people, and yet we often observe wide support
in the population for political elites that initiate conflicts. A recent literature has argued
theoretically and empirically that ethnic polarization is an important determinant of the
incidence of conflict (see for example Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray, 2012). Many recent
civil wars were indeed fought along ethnic lines. Conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi in
Rwanda have led to around 800,000 deaths from genocide and triggered further violence
in the form of counter-attacks and civil wars in the larger region (Prunier, 2009).1 For
the vast majority of people the consequences of this ethnic violence were catastrophic.
How can ethnic groups be so highly polarized that deadly violence erupts on a large
scale? Predetermined differences can hardly be an explanation, as the same groups have
lived in peace for long periods of time. For example, there is no evidence of political
violence between Hutu and Tutsi before 1959 (Gourevitch, 1998) and the ethnic labels did
not even have a political meaning until the mid 19th century (Pottier, 2002). In contrast,
there are numerous examples in Rwanda and elsewhere showing that ethnic violence was
a strategic choice of a political elite. Fearon and Laitin (2000: 846) emphasize this in
their review of conflict studies:
“If there is a dominant or most common narrative in the texts under review,
it is that large-scale ethnic violence is provoked by elites seeking to gain,
maintain, or increase their hold on political power.”
By initiating conflict along ethnic lines, elites can deepen ethnic divisions and thus increase
polarization (Horowitz, 2000). The polarization in society strengthens the position of
1Ethnicity is also a key component of conflicts in Yugoslavia. Section 3.3 provides a more detailed
description of these cases.
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the elite and allows it to exploit power. This strategy is well known as “divide-and-
rule”(Posner, Spier, and Vermeule, 2010).2
We propose a model of divide-and-rule where the ethnic polarization between groups is
endogenous. Polarization is modeled as a lack of trust between ethnic groups. High levels
of trust threaten the autocratic elite because it may be overthrown if trust is high and
the common interest among the ethnic groups in society becomes large. A key question
for such a divide-and-rule argument is how an elite can induce people to polarize. Fearon
and Laitin (2000: 853) describe this challenge as follows:
“The puzzle for such theoretical arguments is to explain how elites can convince
their followers to adopt false beliefs and take actions that the followers would
not want to take if they understood what the leaders were up to.”
Our contribution is to provide a micro-foundation for how elites can polarize society when
people are rational. This is achieved by embedding a model of trade and trust (Rohner,
Thoenig, and Zilibotti, 2013a) into a political economy framework that allows for war and
revolution (Besley and Persson, 2011).
The model society has two ethnic groups of equal size, one of which initially being
the incumbent group. Within each group, there is a small political elite that derives
rents from being in power. We start from a situation of autocracy where the elite of the
incumbent group sets policies. The incumbent elite faces a threat from the other group
(transition of power) and from the people of its own group (revolution). A revolution
leads to a regime switch to democracy where people of both groups trade with each other
without being expropriated by an elite. The threat of revolution therefore depends on the
expected gains from trade.
Similar to Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013a), we model the expected outcome
of trade as a function of trust between trade partners. More specifically, the outcome of
trade is stochastic and the likelihood of a good trade outcome depends on how mutually
beneficial trade is (e.g. the complementarity between the trade partners), which is un-
known. Agents hold a prior belief about how beneficial trade is. A belief that trade is
beneficial implies a high level of trust. Trust can increase through Bayesian updating of
this belief after good trade outcomes occur. However, trade can only take place during
peaceful times such that trust cannot emerge while there is war. The ruling elite can
therefore prevent trust from emerging by starting a war. This enables the elite to limit
the threat of revolution that originates in the common interest of people when trust is
high.
2Posner, Spier, and Vermeule (2010) discuss divide-and-rule strategies from a theoretical perspective.
See also Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004).
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The precise tradeoffs faced by the people and by the elite are as follows. A currently
ruling elite taxes people in both groups but redistributes part of the revenues as transfers
to the people of its own group. When trust is very low and therefore expected gains from
trade small, then transfers are relatively more important for the people of the incumbent
group than the gains from trade. They therefore prefer their own elite to stay in power.
The probability that the currently ruling group stays in power is higher when it fights a
war against the other group than when it is in peace. Elite and people of the incumbent
group therefore both support war when trust is very low. When trust increases somewhat,
the people start to prefer peace because they want to reap the gains from trade with the
other group. But the elite still prefers war over peace because it is afraid of losing power to
the other group. The people are less concerned about such a transition of power because
they know that they will still have part of the trade surplus even if the other group takes
over. This setting therefore generates that the elite stays at war for longer than is optimal
for the people, because the elite has more at stake from being in power.
At intermediate levels of trust, both elite and people of the incumbent group support
peace and trade with the other group. Both also prefer to maintain the autocracy because
it allows them to exploit the other group. The interest of elite and people of the incumbent
group are therefore aligned again for these intermediate levels of trust. But when trust
increases further to a high level, the interests start to diverge once more: income from
trade surplus becomes so high that it is more important for the people of the incumbent
group than the transfers through their elite. The people may therefore start a revolution
and establish a peaceful democracy with the other group in order to reap the full benefits
from trade without being taxed by an elite. The elite on the other hand loses all its rents
when there is a revolution. At high levels of trust, we therefore again get the result that
the elite starts a war in order to lower the chances of losing power, while people would
prefer to trade in peace.
In summary, an autocratic elite that knows that trust is relatively high has to decide if
it should allow for peace or start a war. It faces the following tradeoff: (1) During peace,
people can trade across groups and this may (depending on whether trade outcomes are
good) generate trade surpluses that the elite can tax. However, good trade outcomes
also imply that people update their beliefs such that trust can emerge. The expectation
of high gains from trade (based on high trust) increases the threat of revolution, since
people may become willing to incur the cost of revolution in order to not have the trade
surplus taxed by the elite. (2) If the elite starts a war, then there is no trade and the elite
therefore cannot tax the trade surplus. But it also prevents trust from emerging between
the two ethnic groups, which limits the risk of a revolution. A key implication of this
setup is that the elite can apply a divide-and-rule strategy: when the threat of revolution
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is high, it starts a conflict between the groups, which harms trust, polarizes society, and
limits the common interest of people. This strategy is against the interest of both groups
of people in society, since they may be better off under a democracy where they trade
and are not exploited by an elite.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature,
including empirical studies on conflict and ethnic polarization as well as theoretical work
on the divide-and-rule strategy. In section 3.3, we discuss the anecdotal evidence on the
divide-and-rule strategy, in particular the cases of Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Section 3.4
presents a simple benchmark model to illustrate how the tradeoff between peace and war
depends on trust. In section 3.5, the benchmark model is extended to a dynamic setting
to study how trust evolves over time and how it can be manipulated by the elite. Finally,
we conclude in section 3.6.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands in the existing literature. First, we relate to a
large literature on civil conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010, provide a survey). Fearon
and Laitin (2003) estimate that there were about 127 major civil wars between 1945 and
1999 with more than 16 million fatalities overall. Our analysis is particularly related to
the strand in the civil war literature focusing on conflict between ethnic groups. Esteban
and Ray (2011), Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012), and Rohner (2011) show that the
polarization of societies along ethnic lines is associated with high degrees of conflict. Este-
ban and Ray (2008) argue that coalitions along ethnic lines are more likely to emerge than
along classes. Caselli and Coleman (2013) point out that certain ethnic characteristics
that are easily observable (such as skin color) allow to distinguish between winners and
losers of a conflict and therefore make starting a conflict along these lines more profitable.
Besley and Persson (2011) provide a framework where repression and civil war can depend
on polarization between groups. We contribute to this literature by endogenizing ethnic
polarization. In our framework, a ruling elite can strategically affect polarization between
people in order to sustain its own power. Such patterns of “divide-and-rule” have been
described also outside of the economic literature.3 Related papers have argued that a
political elite can expropriate its supporting group because of their fear that otherwise
3See for example the review of case studies by Fearon and Laitin (2000). Similarly, Horowitz (2000)
writes “By appealing to electorates in ethnic terms, by making ethnic demands on government, and by
bolstering the influence of ethnically chauvinist elements within each group, parties that begin by merely
mirroring ethnic divisions help to deepen and extend them. Hence the oft-heard remark in such states
that the politicians have created ethnic conflict.”
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an even less favorable elite would take over (De Figueiredo and Weingast, 1997; Padro i
Miquel, 2007)
The findings on the salience of ethnic conflict are complemented by a set of theoretical
papers on divide-and-rule strategies. Posner, Spier, and Vermeule (2010) analyze divide-
and-rule strategies in two simple game theoretic models, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
the Stag Hunt Game. They consider how an outsider (the elite) that is affected by the
cooperation of the agents can influence outcomes.4 They state that two conditions are
important for such strategies: “(1) A unitary actor bargains with or competes against a
set of multiple actors. (2) The unitary actor follows an intentional strategy of exploiting
problems of coordination or collective action among the multiple actors.” They consider
different ways to apply a divide-and-rule strategy: destroying communication channels,
payment of bribes, imposition of penalties, generating distrust, limiting interaction, and
mixing agents with heterogeneous interests. Our model is best described by the category
“generating distrust”. However, Posner, Spier, and Vermeule (2010) implement this by
the elite being able to directly manipulate agents beliefs about the other agents’ private
payoffs. In contrast, we provide a setting where the elite cannot directly manipulate
beliefs, but it can limit the learning process between agents by starting conflict. In this
sense our setting also relates to the category “limiting interaction”, although their use of
this strategy refers to limiting the time horizon of repeated interactions.
Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) consider a divide-and-rule strategy that falls
into the category described by Posner, Spier, and Vermeule (2010) as “payment of bribes”.
In Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004), elites can exploit people because they can
prevent them from cooperating in a revolution. The kleptocratic elite achieve this by
bribing one of two groups in society in order to induce them to reject offers by the other
group to cooperate in a revolution. They show that such kleptocratic regimes are more
likely to arise if the regime faces fractionalized opponents instead of large players that can
solve the coordination problem internally and thus put a constraint on the behaviour of
the ruler.
We model polarization as a lack of common interest, which in turn depends on trust
between trade partners. This is based on Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013a) where
trust and cooperation is shaped by Bayesian updating during interactions with the trade
partner. Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013a) show that even accidental conflicts can
be persistent and generate cycles of recurring conflict due to the destruction of trust. Such
cycles are also a feature of Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2010), although without the
4Posner, Spier, and Vermeule (2010) use the term “divide-and-conquer”, which is equivalent to “divide-
and-rule”. The Oxford Dictionary (2014) defines both terms as “[t]he policy of maintaining control over
one’s subordinates or opponents by encouraging dissent between them, thereby preventing them from
uniting in opposition.”
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link to trade. Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013b) provide empirical evidence on the
effect of conflict on trust in Uganda. A related literature has analyzed social learning
(for example Banerjee, 1992; Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2014). Our contribution to this
literature is to show that a conflict can be started strategically by the currently ruling
elite in order to affect people’s beliefs and to sustain its own power.
The channel through which in this framework polarisation can be manipulated by a
political elite is trade. We therefore relate to the literature on the relationship between
conflict and trade – without the link to trust. The “liberal peace” argument postulates
that increased economic interdependence through trade between countries reduces the
likelihood of conflict. However, recent contributions find that this relationship is more
complex. Barbieri (1996) finds that strong economic interdependence is positively asso-
ciated with militarised conflict. Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) show theoretically
and empirically that increases in multilateral trade increases the risk of conflict, especially
between neighboring states.5 In our framework, an increase in trade may fail to prevent
conflict for a different reason: a forward looking autocratic elite fears that high levels of
economic interaction will augment the common interest of people because this increases
the threat that the elite may be overthrown by the people.
3.3 Evidence on Divide-And-Rule Strategies
Our model provides a micro-foundation for why and how an elite strategically polarizes
society in order to sustain its own power. Such patterns have frequently been described in
the literature (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). The evidence suggests that provoking conflict is
a way of polarizing society. We discuss two cases below that illustrate the role of violence
for polarization. These examples will show that ethnic conflict was initiated by elites
with the purpose of dividing society, which allowed them to strengthen their role as the
ruling elite. We first discuss the case of Rwanda in detail and then show that similar
developments have occurred in Yugoslavia.
3.3.1 Rwanda
The history of Rwanda and of its neighbouring countries contains several episodes of
large-scale ethnic violence. The conflict between Tutsi and Hutu is often associated with
extreme hatred and violence between deeply divided ethnic groups.6 But the ethnic
5The liberal peace argument has recently also been challenged by other authors, for example Goldsmith
(2013) or Gowa and Hicks (2014).
6Hutu (Bantu) are the majority group in Rwanda with 84% of the population. Tutsi (Hamitic) account
for 15% and Twa (Pygmy) for 1% (CIA World Factbook, 2014).
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cleavages were not just due to pre-existing differences between people. Neither is there
evidence that ethnic groups in Rwanda have always been in violent conflict with each
other. On the contrary, it seems that there has been no systematic political violence
between Hutu and Tutsi before 1959 (Gourevitch, 1998).
The history of Rwanda is an example of how ethnicity is to some extent “constructed”
by elites for their own benefit.7 We show below that the motivation for creating ethnic
tensions often was the elite’s aim to sustain its power in response to political or socio-
economic changes. Contrary to the belief that predetermined ethnic differences triggered
conflict, it seems that the conflict in the 1990s “had its origin in modern struggles for
power and wealth” (Pottier, 2002).
Evidence on how the terms Hutu and Tutsi were initially used prior to colonisation is
scant. But it appears that before 1860 there was substantial social mobility and “ethnicity
was not a principal organising factor” (Pottier, 2002). From the mid 19th century on,
it is known that the Tutsi king Rwabugiri started to polarise the Rwandan people with
discriminating rules concerning the ownership of cattle (Newbury, 1988). Families rich in
cattle were regarded as Tutsi while poorer families were labeled Hutu. Therefore, “[. . . ]
wealth, not race, was the basis of the ethnic distinction between Hutu and Tutsi” (Pottier,
2002: 14).
In her study of the impact on the region of Kinyaga, Newbury (1978) states that
“social stratification” was among the most important transformation due to the new rule.
The king established chiefs from outside of the community in order to collect taxes and
these chiefs were typically Tutsi. This led to a strong association of the sharpened ethnic
distinction with social status and a notion of inferiority of the Hutus. However, it did not
yet lead to systematic violence. The use of external chiefs also broke up the ties within
clans and led to struggles among the groups to be favoured by the rulers. This weakened
the people and strengthened the rule of the elite (Newbury, 1978). Therefore, while
ethnicity initially played a minor role in Rwanda, it became an increasingly important
factor due to policies that polarised society.
With colonization, ethnic identity gained further relevance. The European colonizers
used the Tutsi administration in order to control the country and even helped it in ex-
panding its region of influence. The Hutus were under “dual colonialism” by the Tutsi
administration and Belgian colonizers (Newbury, 1998).8 Belgian colonizers actively di-
vided society further. In 1933-34, they introduced identity cards that labeled individuals
as either “Hutu”, “Tutsi”, or “Twa” (Gourevitch, 1998). This labelling drastically reduced
7See Fearon and Laitin (2000) for a comprehensive discussion of the “construction” of ethnic differences
and the implications for violent conflict.
8The Belgium support of the Tutsi elite ended only shortly before independence when it started
supporting the Hutu majority (Pottier, 2002).
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the mobility between Hutu and Tutsi, which previously was relatively high. Gourevitch
(1998: 57) explains how ethnicity gained importance with the identity cards:
“The identity cards made it virtually impossible for Hutus to become Tutsis,
and permitted the Belgians to perfect the administration of an apartheid sys-
tem rooted in the myth of Tutsi superiority. [. . . ] Whatever Hutu and Tutsi
identity may have stood for in the precolonial state no longer mattered; the
Belgians had made “ethnicity” the defining feature of Rwandan existence.”
Rwanda therefore had several episodes that show how ethnic differences were con-
structed by an elite for their own benefit. This polarization of Rwanda through dividing
people along ethnic lines had a persistent effect on the relationship between Hutu and
Tutsi. It repeatedly led to large scale conflict over several decades in Rwanda and in its
neighbouring countries. The ethnic distinction that was initially strengthened by the king
and then by colonial powers was since shortly before independence repeatedly used by the
elites of both Hutu and Tutsi in order to gain political power.
According to Prunier (1995), the ethnic identity was a key aspect in the mobilization
of Hutu peasants in the genocide that started in 1994. One channel through which elites
could affect polarization was trust. Prior to the start of the genocide, Hutu extremists
purposely fostered conflict in order to harm the interaction between moderate Hutu and
Tutsi and to reduce trust. Their success with this strategy of limiting the relevance of
moderate Hutus strengthened their position within the Hutu group. This allowed them to
mobilize the masses for the genocide. Fearon and Laitin (2000: 865) describe this episode
as follows:
“In 1992, two years before the genocide, moderate Hutus gained some con-
trol over the tense situation and negotiated a cease-fire with the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF, a guerrilla movement that despite seeking a multieth-
nic constituency, represented Tutsi interests) at Arusha. But Hutu extremists
led by the president’s wife, Agathe Habyarimana, began taking to the streets
against the ensuing peace process. She and her three brothers helped form
the “Zero Network” death squads, the institutional precursors of the genocide.
After a formal power-sharing deal was signed in January 1993, and the day the
International Commission on Human Rights mission left, the extremist Hutus
sent their squads to the northwest region where they were strong, and three
hundred Tutsis were killed in six days of violence. The in-exile Tutsi-led army
then broke the cease-fire and marched across the Ugandan border toward the
Rwanda capital, with many of the soldiers defying their own moderate lead-
ership. These wildcats engaged in counterviolence, scaring many Hutus who
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escaped to Zaire. [. . . ] Unable to assign blame for the failure of the cease-
fire with certainty, Hutu moderates increased their estimate that the RPF
could not be trusted in political negotiations, exactly what the extremists had
sought in their violent attacks.”
The legacy of ethnic conflict and polarisation went much beyond the genocide. After
Tutsi groups gained power and ended the genocide of Tutsis by Hutus, there were repeated
counter-killings undertaken by Tutsi extremists. The large refugee flows destabilised the
entire region and contributed to the two Congo Wars (Prunier, 2009). These wars drew
several countries of the region into violence and were the deadliest since the Second World
War. A key figure in the first Congo War was Mobutu, president of the Democratic
Republic of Congo. He also followed the strategy of “ethnicizing the political situation”
(Prunier, 2009: 78) in order to sustain his own power. He purposely destabilised the
region by manipulating refugees and constantly changing who is favoured by his regime.
Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) describe him as a clear example of a kleptocratic
leader that applied a divide-and-rule strategy to sustain his own power.
3.3.2 Yugoslavia
In the late 1980s, Yugoslavia was a relatively open country that allowed for free travel
of people and movement of goods. As Woodward (1995) points out, Yugoslavia was in a
good position to make a successful transition to a free market economy and it was moving
towards an integration with the West.9 This trend changed abruptly after 1989 and over
the following two years Yugoslavia experienced wars, disintegration, and the creation of
new states. War in Croatia led to 20,000 deaths and more than 200,000 refugees. In
Bosnia-Herzegovina, it generated 2 million refugees and 70,000 fatalities.
Although intrinsic ethnic differences are often used as an explanation for the eruption
of violence in the region, the case of Yugoslavia actually provides yet another example
of how political elites construct ethnicity in order to divide people and sustain their own
power. Referring to the Balkan conflict, Fearon and Laitin (2000: 867) state that violence
was used strategically:
“[. . . to] foment outrage among their own moderates, ethnic leaders will provoke
interethnic violence.”
An important episode discussed by Woodward (1995: 90) describes how Slobodan
Milo˘sević polarized politics:
9Unless otherwise noted, the historical exposition below is based on Woodward (1995).
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“The Serbian shift was part of a factional struggle within the Serbian party,
which culminated at the eighth party plenum (September 23-24 [1987]), when
Slobodan Milo˘sević made a successful move to oust his former patron and
friend Ivan Stambolić as president of Serbia and to engineer a coup against its
Belgrade party organization, Serbia’s most powerful (and liberal). Milo˘sević
accused Stambolić’s crowd of being too lenient on Albanians in Kosovo and
of failing to protect Serbian territorial integrity and Serbs and Montenegrins
from forced expulsion.”
One interpretation of this description is that Slobodan Milo˘sević strategically sought to
polarize in order to gain power within his own group. By provoking fear of other groups,
he could convince his own people that cooperation with them was not an option. That
Milo˘sević was acting strategically – and not just motivated by his own extremist ideas
– is confirmed by the former US ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989 to 1992, Warren
Zimmermann. In his review of this period, he writes (Zimmermann, 1995: 5):
“Milo˘sević is an opportunist, not an ideologue, a man driven by power rather
than nationalism. He has made a Faustian pact with nationalism as a way to
gain and hold power.”
Zimmermann (1995: 12) also makes clear that the nationalism that emerged in Yugoslavia
during this period was the product of elite’s manipulation by way of triggering ethnic
violence:
“The breakup of Yugoslavia is a classic example of nationalism from the top
down – a manipulated nationalism in a region where peace has historically
prevailed more than war and in which a quarter of the population were in
mixed marriages. The manipulators condoned and even provoked local ethnic
violence in order to engender animosities that could then be magnified by the
press, leading to further violence.”
The descriptions above show that elites can strategically start ethnic conflict in order
to affect trust and to divide societies. They may apply such a policy of divide-and-rule to
strengthen their power. The incentives to do so depend on the rents from being in power
and the gains from peaceful trade. The model in the next section allows us to analyse
this tradeoff.
3.4 The Benchmark Model
In this section, we discuss a static model as a benchmark. This allows us to discuss the
basic tradeoffs of the elite between war and peace and the people’s decision to revolt.
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Section 3.5 will then extend the model to a dynamic setting to discuss the evolution of
trust over time and how it can be affected by the elite.
3.4.1 Environment
The model is based on Besley and Persson (2011) and consists of two ethnic groups, A
and B. One group is the incumbent group, while the other is the opponent group. In this
section, we assume that group A initially is the incumbent group. Within each group,
there are two types of agents: an elite and the people. The elites do not produce. People
in each group can produce at home and also benefit from trade with the other group. The
incomes of people in the incumbent and the opponent group through home production are
yI and yO, respectively, and the income from trade is yT , which for simplicity is assumed
to be the same for both groups. In the following, we always denote the people in the
incumbent and the opponent group as I and O, respectively. Moreover, we denote the
elite in the incumbent group as E.10
There are two types of political systems: autocracy and democracy. In autocracy, the
elite of the incumbent group controls the government and makes the following decisions.
First, it decides whether to be at war or peace with the opponent group. Second, it sets
economic policies: taxes and transfers. The role of the people of the incumbent group is to
trade with the other group (only under peace) and to choose whether to revolt against the
ruling elite. If a revolution occurs, the regime switches to democracy. In democracy, the
elite plays no role anymore, people from both groups together run the government, and
the equilibrium is laissez-faire. In other words, we assume away tyranny of the majority
in democracy. This means that we avoid the case where one group decides policies and
exploits the other group.11 We use superscriptW , P , and R to indicate the possible states
of the world, i.e. war, peace and revolution, respectively.
The outcome of trade can be “good”, in which case it yields the surplus yH for both
groups, or “bad”, in which case the surplus is yL < yH . The probability of getting the good
outcome depends on the type of relation between the two ethnic groups. If the relation
is of type “beneficial”, the outcome is good with probability qH and bad with probability
1−qH ; if it is “harmful”, the outcome is bad with probability qL and good with probability
1− qL.12 Naturally, we assume qH > 1− qL, that is to say, if the relation is beneficial, the
10The elite of the opponent group plays no role in the model, as we will see later, which is why we refer
to the incumbent elite simply as the elite and use the index E.
11Note that we assume that the two groups are of equal size. However, even in this case a majority
decision could favour one group.
12Although in our model the expected gains from trade cannot be negative even for the “harmful”
relation, this could well be the case in reality. We therefore use the term “harmful”, although “not
beneficial” would also be an accurate description.
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probability of a good trade outcome is higher than under a “harmful” relation. The agents
don’t know the type of relation for sure, but hold a common belief about the probability
of the relation being beneficial, denoted by p.
We interpret this framework as follows. The type of the relation between two ethnic
groups, or equivalently, the likelihood of getting good outcomes from trade, depends on
the characteristics of the two groups. For example, if two groups have complementary
skills, it is more likely that trade and cooperation between them lead to good outcomes.
If the two groups can’t communicate well during the trade, for example due to conflicting
cultures, then there may be very costly frictions in trade that lead to a low trade surplus.
Moreover, we interpret p as trust: the higher is trust in the relation (believing that with
high probability the relation is beneficial), the higher is the expected trade surplus. It
also implies a larger common interest between the two groups. We therefore view trust
as the opposite of ethnic polarization, since the latter emphasizes the conflicting interests
across groups.
The timing is shown in Figure 3.1 and it is described in detail below:
1. At the beginning of the period, the political regime is autocracy. The level of trust
p is given.
2. I people decide to revolt or not.
(a) If revolution happens, I people pay the (exogenous) cost fR and the political
system switches to democracy. The elite pays the cost fRE and disappears.
Then, both groups of people live in the laissez-faire equilibrium and the game
ends.
(b) If there is no revolution, then autocracy survives. The elite stays in government
and the game moves to step 3.
3. With a continuing autocracy, the elite decides whether to wage war against O or to
retain peace.
(a) If war occurs, I people pay the cost fW . There is no trade and the game goes
to step 5.
(b) If peace is chosen, I people can trade with O people and the game goes to step
4.
4. Trade: If trade occurs – either in democracy or in peaceful autocracy – then its
outcome can either be good (yH) or bad (yL) as described in the text above.
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5. Political turnover: In autocracy, with probability pis, the existing incumbent group
remains as the incumbent group, and with probability 1 − pis, the other group
becomes the new incumbent. The superscript s ∈ {W,P} denotes the state of the
world: war or peace. Turnover is less likely when there is war, such that piP < piW .
In democracy, as both groups of people live in the laissez-faire equilibrium, the
distinction of incumbent and opponent group no longer exists.
6. Tax and transfer: In autocracy, the elite from the incumbent group chooses the
tax rate on the total income of people, including production and trade surplus.
Moreover the elite decides transfer to the people. In democracy, the laissez-faire
equilibrium implies that there are no taxes and transfers.
7. Finally, trade outcome realizes and incomes, taxes, and transfers are allocated.
Following Beasley and Persson (2011), we assume that the maximal tax rate is exogenously
determined by the state capacity, denoted by τ . The minimal transfer to I people is a
θ fraction of total taxes, which is also exogenously determined by checks and balances.
Transfers to O people are 0. To understand the state capacity, we can think of the
following case: tax payers can hide each unit of income at cost τ . The more capable the
state is, the higher costs tax payers have to pay to hide their income. The state, in order
to maximize the tax income, prefers to set the tax rate as high as τ , but it can not set it
higher, as the Laffer curve goes down towards 0 for tax rates higher than τ . Moreover, the
elite sets transfers as low as possible. Therefore, in autocracy, the transfers to I people
are a θ fraction of total tax and to O people they are 0. Note that transfers happen after
the revolution decision by the people. This implies that a promise by the elite to transfer
more than the minimum amount given by checks and balances is not credible. Therefore,
a promise of transfers cannot be used by the elite to prevent revolution.
3.4.2 Incomes
The equilibrium concept is sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. We solve the model by
backward induction. First of all, we calculate the payoffs of the game, i.e. the incomes
of the agents – the elite and the incumbent people – in all the states of the world, i.e. in
war, peace, and revolution.
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3.4.2.1 I People
The expected trade surplus given belief p is the following:
E [yT ] = p (qHyH + (1− qH) yL) + (1− p) (qLyL + (1− qL) yH)
= p (qH + qL − 1) (yH − yL) + (qLyL + (1− qL) yH) .
Recall that qH > 1 − qL. We know that yP is positively correlated with p, namely, the
higher trust, the higher is the expected trade surplus. To simplify the expression, we set
yH =
qL
qH + qL − 1 ,
yL =
qL − 1
qH + qL − 1 ,
which leads to
E [yT ] = p.
The key relationship between the trade surplus and the belief of the other group is pre-
served, so this normalization is without loss of generality and does not change the results
of this model.
The final expected income of I people includes production, trade surplus, and transfers
minus taxes. I people get positive transfers if group I stays the incumbent group. If a
political turnover occurs, I people become the opponent group and get 0 in transfers.
This implies the following incomes of the I people in each state of the world:
• Peace: yPI = (1− τ)(yI + p) + piP θτ(yI + yO + 2p).
• War: yWI = (1− τ)yI + piW θτ(yI + yO − fW ).
• Revolution: yRI = yI + p− fR.
We assume that piW > piP , implying that for group I, there is a tradeoff between peace
and war: in peace, there is extra income from trade, while in war, the probability of
staying as the incumbent group is higher. Peace dominates war for I people if and only
if trust, or equivalently, the expected gain from trade, p, is large enough. In this case,
yPI ≥ yWI , which is equivalent to the following:
(1− τ)(yI + p) + piP θτ(yI + yO + 2p) ≥ (1− τ)yI + piW θτ(yI + yO − fW ) ⇐⇒
p ≥
(
piW − piP ) θτ(yI + yO)− piW θτfW
1− τ + 2piP θτ
.
= pW .
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In other words, if p < pW , I people strictly prefer to go to war instead of peace. When
do I people prefer revolution to peace? Under the condition that θ < 1
2piP
, we can derive
the condition as follows:
yRI ≥ yPI ⇐⇒
yI + p− fR ≥ (1− τ)(yI + p) + piP θτ(yI + yO + 2p) ⇐⇒
p ≥ pi
P θτyO −
(
1− piP θ) τyI + fR
τ(1− 2piP θ)
.
= pR.
The condition that θ < 1
2piP
implies that the transfer to I people can not be too large. If
it is violated, I people expect to get more transfers than what they pay in taxes. Their
income would then increase by more than 1 unit when trust and the trade surplus for
them increase by 1 unit. This would lead to the case that I and O people cooperate to
start the revolution only when trust between them is very low. This case is unlikely to
happen in the real world and we therefore rule it out. We maintain this as an assumption
throughout the paper:
Assumption 1. θ < 1
2piP
.
3.4.2.2 Elite
If it can maintain its power, then the final income of the elite consists of taxes minus
transfers. If there is a revolution, then it incurs a high cost because it is thrown out of
the government. The payoffs for each state of the world are therefore as follows:
• Peace: yPE = piP (1− θ)τ(yI + yO + 2p).
• War: yWE = piW (1− θ)τ(yI + yO − fW ).
• Revolution: yRE = −fRE .
If there is no revolution, then the elite prefers peace to war when p is large enough:
yPE ≥ yWE ⇐⇒
piP (1− θ)τ(yI + yO + 2p) ≥ piW (1− θ)τ(yI + yO − fW ) ⇐⇒
p ≥
(
piW − piP ) τ(yI + yO)− piW τfW
2piP τ
.
= pWE .
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It can be verified that pWE > pW by observing the following:
pW =
(
piW − piP ) θτ(yI + yO)− piW θτfW
1− τ + 2piP θτ
=
(
piW − piP ) τ(yI + yO)− piW τfW
1−τ
θ
+ 2piP τ
<
(
piW − piP ) τ(yI + yO)− piW τfW
2piP τ
.
= pWE .
This implies that the elite, compared to the people, is more willing to go to war when the
trust is relatively low. The reason is that if the political turnover occurs, the elite loses
more compared to I people, who can still get the after-tax income even under the rule
of the other group. This difference between the elite and the people in the willingness to
go to war is frequently discussed in the literature. For example, Rohner, Thoenig, and
Zilibotti (2013a) use such an argument to generate a random war that is out of the control
of people. Jackson and Morelli (2007) argue that if the political process is captured by a
biased political elite, then the war occurs against the interest of people. Here we offer an
explanation for why the elite is more eager to go to war than the people. One reason is
the fear of political turnover. But there is another reason, which is the fear of revolution
when trust is high. This second reason will be discussed in section 3.5 where we present
the dynamic model.
3.4.3 Equilibrium Outcomes
Given the incomes of agents, we can discuss the choices of the elite and the I people for
different levels of trust. This is summarized formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If trust is sufficiently low (p ≤ pW ), both the elite and the incumbent
people prefer war over peace. The elite is more eager to go to war than the people. Namely,
if trust is in the interval
[
pW , pWE
]
, then the elite prefers war to peace while incumbent
people prefer peace. Moreover, if trust is high enough, i.e., p ≥ pR, incumbent people
prefer revolution to peace.
The cut-off values of trust, pW , pWE , and pR, can be ranked from low to high given
certain values of the cost parameters fR and fRE . In the case where fR and fRE are
sufficiently large, we have pW < pWE < pR, and the elite never prefers revolution to peace.
By sufficiently large costs, we mean fR > fR and fRE > fRE , where the expressions for
fRand fRE are given in the appendix. Then, the equilibrium outcomes for all p can be
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characterized. We summarize this in the next proposition (proof in the appendix) and it
is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Proposition 2. Given that fR > fR and fRE > fRE , we have pW < pWE < pR, and the
equilibrium outcomes for different levels of p (from low to high) are given by the following
four cases.
p < pW : war. Both elite and incumbent people prefer war, since the expected trade
surplus under peace is too low.
pW < p < pWE : war. Though incumbent people prefer peace given the large trade
surplus, the elite decides to stay at war. The elite has more to lose if there is a political
turnover.
pWE < p < p
R: peace. There is enough trade surplus to gain and no threat of revolution.
The elite prefers peace and so do incumbent people.
p > pR: revolution. The expected trade surplus is so large that incumbent people decide
to revolt. The elite is overthrown and democracy is established. The elite never prefers
revolution.
If p is at the threshold level p = pWE , then the equilibrium outcome can be either war
or peace, because the elite is indifferent between the two states and pure strategies and
mixed strategies between war and peace can all be equilibria. The analogous result holds
for the case p = pR.
The revolution occurs when trust is too high. This implies that the elite may have an
incentive to prevent trust from getting too high. Starting a conflict and thus preventing
the updating of beliefs during trade interactions gives the elite a way of limiting trust. The
dynamic model in section 3.5 allows discussing how the elite can apply this divide-and-rule
strategy.
3.5 The Dynamic Model
In this section, we consider a dynamic model that includes the evolution of trust. With this
model, we study under which circumstances the elite wants to decrease the trust between
the two ethnic groups, or equivalently, polarize the society. The elite seeks to influence
trust because trust affects the decisions of people to revolt, which in turn influence the
income of the elite.
3.5.1 Environment
We assume that the elite lives for infinite periods and is forward-looking. Each cohort of
people lives for only one period and in the next period a new cohort of people are born.
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The assumption that people care only about the current period income simplifies the
analysis substantially. Although people’s decision on revolution or peace will be different
from the current setting if we were to assume that people are forward-looking, we expect
the key results of the model to still hold – as long as they still prefer revolution to peace
when trust is sufficiently high. We show after the presentation of the dynamic model that
this is plausible.
Each period of the dynamic model includes everything that happens in the static
model. Moreover, the evolution of the political system and trust over the periods follows
the rules below. If democratization occurs in one period, democracy is set up and consol-
idated for all the periods afterwards. The equilibrium in all these periods will be laissez
faire, such that people of both groups simply gain their home production income and the
trade surplus. If autocracy survives this period, the next period starts with autocracy.
The dynamics of trust follow the following rule. First, in the beginning of each period,
trust is p, i.e., the common belief about the probability that the relation between the two
groups is “beneficial”. Then, if trade occurs in this period, agents update their belief about
the relation after observing the trade outcome, i.e. they update their belief of trust using
Bayes’ rule. If there is no trade, agents learn nothing about the type of relation. Finally,
at the end of each period, there is some probability that the type of the relation switches.
The stochastic types are driven by cultural shifts, which can be related to social structure,
population mixture, and so on (see Tabellini, 2008, and Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti,
2013a). For example, consider a case where in the beginning both groups consist of mainly
young people. Their skills are not complementary with each other and the interactions
and trade between young people are full of frictions. Some time later, the population of
one group becomes older due to different demographic trends, while the other group stays
the same. Now their skills are complementary, since the old group brings in experience
and knowledge while the young group contributes for example creativity and energy. The
relation between the two groups thereby becomes beneficial and trade and cooperation
are more likely to generate good outcomes. More specifically, we assume that the type of
the relation follows a two-state first-order stochastic Markov process with the following
transition matrix:
t B H
t− 1
B 1− ψ ψ
H φ 1− φ
where B and H denote the types of the relation being “beneficial” and “harmful”, re-
spectively, and ψ and φ are the probabilities that the type changes, conditional on the
relation being “beneficial” or “harmful”, respectively. Agents are aware of the possibility
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that types can switch. This implies that agents change their belief even if there was no
trade, because they anticipate that the nature of the relation may have switched.
How does trust change when there is a political turnover? We assume that turnover
doesn’t affect trust. This is a fairly natural assumption in our setting. Trust is the
common belief about the probability of the relation being beneficial, based on the common
observations of past trade outcomes. It should therefore be the same for both ethnic
groups, either as incumbent or opponent.
We also assume that after the turnover, the elite of the old incumbent group loses its
rents and exits the economy. If some periods later, this group becomes the incumbent
group again, then a new cohort of elite is ruling. Therefore, the current elite’s continuation
value only comes from the consecutive periods that it stays in power without turnover.
3.5.2 Solution
In the beginning of each period, we still denote the variables of the incumbent group with
subscript I, and the variables of the opponent group with subscript O. If at the end
of this period the incumbent group becomes opponent, we still keep the subscript I to
denote the (new) incumbent, but keep in mind that the values of the variables changes.
For instance, in the period when group A is the incumbent group, yI takes the value of
the home-production income of people A, while in the next period when group B is the
incumbent group, y′I takes the value of the home-production income of people B, which
can be different from yI .
The incomes and the choices of people are exactly the same as in the static model as
each cohort lives for only one period. Therefore, if p > pR, I people choose revolution,
otherwise the elite stays in power and sets government policies. Essentially, this is what
we need to know about the people. This is why, if people were to live for infinite periods,
we would expect the results of the model not to be too different – as long as people choose
to revolt when trust is very high.
We now show how trust evolves. Lets say that initially trust is at some level p at the
beginning of the period and that trade takes place. Then, all agents update their belief
according to Bayes’ rule based on the trade outcome, either in democracy or in autocracy
with peace, i.e.
p+ =

pqH
pqH+(1−p)(1−qL) if yT = yH ,
p(1−qH)
p(1−qH)+(1−p)qL if yT = yL.
If there is no trade due to the war, then there is no new information about the type of
the relation, so the belief stays the same at this moment, i.e. p+ = p. But at the end of
the period, the stochastic shock to the type of the relation realizes. After that, the belief
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that the type is “beneficial” becomes p′ = p+ (1− ψ) + (1− p+)φ = p+ (1− ψ − φ) + φ,
and this is also the level of trust at the beginning of the next period. The evolution of
trust across two periods is summarized below:
p′ =

(1− ψ − φ) p+ φ if s = W,
(1− ψ − φ) pqH
pqH+(1−p)(1−qL) + φ if s = P, yT = yH ,
(1− ψ − φ) p(1−qH)
p(1−qH)+(1−p)qL + φ if s = P, yT = yL.
We can see that if war continues for infinitely many periods, trust converges to the “nat-
ural” level φ
φ+ψ
with the auto-correlation (1− ψ − φ). We want the probability of the
change of types not to be too high and the “natural” level of trust not to be too low nor
too high, such that people prefer peace at this level. We therefore maintain the following
assumption:
Assumption 2. ψ ≤ 1
2
, φ ≤ 1
2
and φ
φ+ψ
∈ [pW , pR].
If revolution happens, then the equilibrium outcomes are just a repetition of the case
of revolution in the static model. If there is no revolution, then in autocracy the elite’s
choice sets are the same as in the static model: war or peace, tax and transfer. Tax and
transfer are trivially determined by the maximal tax rate and the minimal transfer, as in
the static model. However, when the elite decides on war or peace, it now maximizes the
expected life-time income, given the current period’s level of trust:
V (p) =
maxs∈{W,P} ysE (p) + βpisEsV (p′) , if p ≤ pR,−fRE , if p > pR,
where ysE is the elite’s current period income, pis is the probability that the current incum-
bent group stays in power (both depending on s ∈ {W,P}), p′ is the level of trust in the
next period, and β is the discount factor. From this follows the law of motion discussed
above.
We can characterize important properties of the value function and of its solution,
given certain conditions and a value of p. We can for example consider the cases when
(1) both the cost of war and trust are low, or (2) when both the cost of revolution for the
elite and trust are high. We discuss the elite’s behavior and the equilibrium outcomes in
each of these cases.
First, when trust and the cost of war are both low enough, then there is not much
to gain from peace and trade, and the loss from going to war is small. Moreover, war
implies a lower chance of political turnover compared to peace, which increases the elite’s
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expected income both this period and in the future. This property can be summarized in
the following proposition (proof in the appendix).
Proposition 3. Suppose that fW < pi
W−piP
piW
(yI + yO), then when p is sufficiently low,
the elite wages war. More precisely, for p = 0, the elite chooses war; and if V (p) is
continuous at p = φ, then there exist a pWE > 0, such that for all p < pWE , war is chosen
as well.
Second, consider the following scenario: in a given period, trust is relatively high,
peace is chosen by the elite, trade occurs between the two groups for many periods, and
there are enough good trade outcomes such that trust keeps increasing. The increasing
trust raises the trade surplus and income of people in peace, but is it good news for the
elite? Not necessary. While the high level of trust implies gains from trade and thus
large resources in the society that the elite can potentially extract, it is also a threat to
the elite, since a too high level of trust may trigger a revolution. In particular, when
p > pR, I people find that cooperating with O people in democracy (where they are
not taxed by an elite) is better than autocracy (in which they extract income from the
O people but are also being expropriated by their own elite). If p is large enough and
very close to pR, choosing peace means that with some positive probability the trade
outcome will be good. Then, p may increase to a level higher than pR, which will trigger
a revolution in the next period. Since revolution implies a high cost for the elite, it can
be optimal for the elite to choose war instead of peace even when trust is already high,
since during the war the trust is expected to regress back to the natural level p0 where
there is no risk of revolution. To avoid that trust can grow above this critical level after
sufficiently many good trade outcomes, the elite can strategically start a war to prevent
people from seeing good trade outcomes. In the appendix, we derive the “sufficiently large”
cost of revolution as fRE
.
=
piP (1−θ)τ(yI+yO+2pR)−piW (1−θ)τ(yI+yO−fW )+βpiP (1−qR)V¯−βpiWV
βpiP qR
. Then
we have the following proposition (proof in the appendix):
Proposition 4. Suppose that fRE > fRE , then if p is sufficiently large, the elite chooses to
wage war, while people would prefer peace. The war not just prevents trust from growing,
but it leads to declining trust. The elite increases polarization and reduces the interaction
between the two groups in order to increase its own probability of staying in power. More
precisely, when p = pR, then the elite prefers war over peace; and there exists a pRE < pR,
such that for all p > pRE, the elite chooses war.
In this case, war occurs when trust is high and when there is a lot to gain from trading
in peace. This is an interesting result, since high trust makes peace more attractive for
the society overall. The reason for this result is that the elite’s interest is different from
the interest of the society and of the people. It is true that the higher level of trust
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generates larger total income in the whole society, but it also changes the allocation of
income by triggering a revolution, which reduces the income of the elite drastically. This
is the second reason why the elite decides to go to war and to stop the trade interaction
against the interest of people: the fear of an increase in trust and of the revolution that
this may trigger.13
If war starts and trade is interrupted at a high level of trust, then there is no chance
of a further increase in trust. Although the termination of trade between the two ethnic
groups does not directly harm trust, it in fact prevents the potential growth of trust.
Trust during war gradually converges back to its natural level which is lower than the
threshold where a revolution can occur. This means that after the elite purposely stops
trade, polarization can increase. This strengthens the power of the elite and prevents
revolution. This is one of the key findings of this paper and it represents the divide-and-
rule strategy that has frequently been described as a source of ethnic tensions.
Given the conditions in the propositions above, the dynamic model generates certain
results that are similar to the ones in the static model in the following respects. First, if
the cost of war is sufficiently small, the elite chooses to go to war when trust is low, because
the benefit from peace, i.e., the trade surplus, is expected to be low. The incumbent group
fights with the opponent group in order to stay in power with higher probability. Second,
if trust is too high, I people prefer revolution and democracy together with O people, in
which they benefit from the expected high trade surplus and are no longer expropriated
by the elite. Such a revolution is very costly for the elite since they lose all their rents.
While in the static model trust is exogenously given, the dynamic model allows us to
analyze how trust evolves. More importantly, the dynamic model allows us to see how
the elite strategically influences trust. The elite achieves this by going to war in order to
stop further increase in trust, which otherwise would lead to revolution.
How does trust evolve over time? If trust is very low, then the elite (and also the
incumbent people) prefer to be at war with the other group. In the absence of trade
interactions during the war, trust regresses to the natural level due to the stochastic
switch of types. After some periods, trust may reach a level that can lead to peace.
Then, if there are sufficiently many good trade outcomes during peace, trust rises further.
But if trust becomes so high that the elite sees the potential of a revolution in the near
future, then it wages a war again to stop trade. During the war there are again no trade
interactions. This war, in a situation when the level of trust is high, is at the cost of the
people and the society. But it helps the elite to stay in power, since it keeps trust low
(and thus polarization high), so that the incumbent people do not have sufficient common
13Recall from the discussion of the static model that the other reason why the elite is more likely to
go to war than the people is that they have more to lose from a transition of power to the other group.
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interest with the other group to revolt against the own elite. During the war, trust may
regress down due to the stochastic relation type such that there is no threat of revolution
anymore. Then, the elite may stop the war and allow trade again.
This model helps us to understand some of the most disturbing episodes of violence
in recent history. As we have shown in Section 3.3, elites in Rwanda and Yugoslavia have
purposely destroyed the common interest of people in order to maintain or increase their
power. This destruction of the common interest often took the form of ethnic violence
which hampered trust. The lack of trust then triggered further violence between groups
who thought that they have little to gain from peaceful interaction. Our model provides
an explanation for why rational people follow leaders into destructive violence. Some
previous approaches to answering this question have assumed that elites can directly
manipulate people’s beliefs (for example Posner, Spier, and Vermeule, 2010). In contrast,
agents in our model are perfectly aware of other agents strategies. The elite’s ability to
initiate conflict to prevent economic interaction allows it to induce people to polarise by
affecting trust between people of different groups.
3.6 Conclusion
We propose a theory of divide-and-rule where political elites strategically initiate conflicts
between ethnic groups in order to polarize society and thus sustain their own power. We
model polarization as a lack of trust that is shaped by trade interactions between agents
of the different ethnic groups. The elite can prevent trust from emerging by starting a
conflict that interrupts trade. The elite follows this strategy when there is a threat of
revolution. The model also generates that an elite is more likely to seek war than the
people. This is the case because the elite has the double fears of losing power to the other
group and to be overthrown by the own group if the common interest between groups
becomes too large.
We document that our model is consistent with a number of cases of large-scale ethnic
violence, in particular with the incidents in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. These cases show
that polarization was not simply exogenously given, but to some extent constructed by
power-seeking elites. Violence often had the goal of destroying trust and creating in-
stability. This allowed elites to exercise their power more freely. An implication of these
observations is that treating conflicts as “inherently ethnic” may be misleading. Our model
shows the elite’s role in creating ethnic polarization and it therefore enables us to dis-
cuss possible counter-measures. Generally speaking, attempts to prevent ethnic violence
should pay considerable attention to the role of the elite. Promising ways to achieve this
would be to reduce elites’ incentive or ability to reduce trust. This is especially important
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in cases where the elite may attempt to do so because they are threatened by a high level
of trust. In such cases, the interests of the elite diverge from those of society overall, since
the elite values being in power more than possible gains from trade.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: Game Tree
People of group I
Revolution
(Democracy)
No revolution
(Autocracy)
Elite
War Peace
Elite
Tax rate
Elite
Tax rate
Transfer rate Transfer rate
Realization of Trade outcome (N)
Good Bad
Turnover (N)
Yes No
1− piP piP
Turnover (N)
Yes No
1− piP piP
Turnover (N)
Yes No
1− piW piW
The figure shows the timing in the baseline model. (N) denotes
nature.
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Figure 3.2: Trust and Income
Trust
Income
War Peace Revolution
Elite
People
pWpWE p
R
The figure shows the relationship between trust and income. The
thin solid lines refers to the elite, while the thick solid line represents
the people. The dashed lines separate the different states of the
world. The dotted line marks the threshold level of trust where
people would prefer peace over war. The jump in people’s income
at the switch from war to peace is due to the timing of the switch,
since the people would have higher income from peace already at
lower levels of trust, while the elite decides to stay at war.
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A Appendix to Chapter 1: Chinese Roads in
India: The Effect of Transport Infrastruc-
ture on Economic Development
A.1 Model Details
This appendix provides a detailed discussion of the model presented in Section 1.5. The
framework is based on Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) and Eaton and Kortum (2002).
Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) derive a reduced form expression for the impact of
railroads on land values from general equilibrium trade theory. I adapt their framework
to a version which can be estimated with satellite data and digitized geographic data
alone, thus making it suitable for my estimation and counterfactual analysis across 590
Indian districts. Furthermore, I focus on the case with immobile labor as this is the more
realistic assumption during the 9-year period which I consider.
The basic setup is a Ricardian trade model as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) with the
immobile production factors land and labor and the mobile factor capital. The economy
consists of many trading regions (Indian districts), where the origin of a trade is indexed
by o and the destination by d.
A.1.1 Preferences
Consumers have CES preferences over a continuum of differentiated goods indexed by j,
Uo =
(∫
j
xo(j)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
,
where xo(j) is the quantity consumed of variety j by a consumer in district o and σ > 0
is the elasticity of substitution between goods. Consumers in location o maximize Uo
subject to ∫
j
po(j)xo(j)dj = yo
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where yo is income per capita in district o. This yields a demand function for variety j
equal to
xo(j) =
yo
Po
(
p(j)
Po
)−σ
,
where Po is the a CES price index of the form
Po =
(∫
j
po(j)
1−σdj
) 1
1−σ
.
Indirect utility of a consumer who has income yo and faces a vector of prices Po then is
V (Po, yo) =
yo
Po
.
A.1.2 Production Technology
Each district produces intermediate goods with a Cobb-Douglas technology using land
(L), labor (H), and capital (K),
xo(j) = zo(j)
(
Lo(j)
)α(
Ho(j)
)γ(
Ko(j)
)1−α−γ
,
where the amounts of land and labor in o are fixed but capital is mobile across districts.
zo(j) is an exogenous productivity shifter as explained below. The production function
implies marginal costs
MCo(j) =
qαow
γ
or
1−α−γ
o
zo(j)
,
where qo is the land rental rate, wo is the wage, and ro is the interest rate. Following Eaton
and Kortum (2002), each district draws its productivity zo(j) from a Fréchet distribution
with CDF
Fo(z) = Pr[Zo ≤ z] = exp(−Toz−θ),
where θ > 1 governs the variation of productivity within districts (comparative advantage)
and To is a district’s state of technology (absolute advantage).
A.1.3 Transport Costs and Prices
Trade costs between locations o and d are modeled according to an “iceberg” assumption:
for one unit of a good to arrive at its destination d, τod ≥ 1 units must be shipped from
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origin o. This implies that if a good is produced in location o and sold there at the price
poo(j), then it is sold in location d at the price pod(j) = τodpoo(j).
We assume perfect competition such that prices equal the marginal costs of producing
each variety:
poo = MCo(j) =
qαow
γ
or
1−α−γ
o
zo(j)
pod = τodMCo(j) = τod
qαow
γ
or
1−α−γ
o
zo(j)
zo(j) = τod
qαow
γ
or
1−α−γ
o
pod
(A.1)
Consumers search for the cheapest price of each variety, such that the distribution of
prices is governed by the productivity distribution. Eaton and Kortum (2002) show, by
substituting Equation (A.1) into the distribution of productivity, that district o offers
district d a distribution of prices
God(p) = Pr[Pod ≤ p] = 1− Fo
[
τod
qαow
γ
or
1−α−γ
o
p
]
= 1− exp
[
− To
(
τodq
α
ow
γ
or
1−α−γ
o
)−θ
pθ
]
.
District d buys variety j from another district if at least one district offers a lower price
than itself. The distribution of prices for what district d purchases then is
Gd(p) = P [Pd ≤ p] = 1−
∏
o
{1−God(p)}.
Inserting for God(p) yields
Gd(p) = 1−
∏
o
{exp [− To(τodqαowγor1−α−γo )−θpθ]}
= 1− exp
[
−
∑
o
[
To
(
τodq
α
ow
γ
or
1−α−γ
o
)−θ]
pθ
]
= 1− exp
[
− Φdpθ
]]
where the destination-specific parameter Φd =
∑
o
[
To
(
τodq
α
ow
γ
or
1−α−γ
o
)−θ] summarizes the
exposure of destination d to international technology, factor costs, and trade costs.
Eaton and Kortum (2002) show that the price index takes the form
Pd = γΦ
− 1
θ
d (A.2)
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with
γ =
[
Γ
(
θ + 1− σ
θ
)] 1
1−σ
,
where Γ is the Gamma function. The rental rate for capital is equalized everywhere to
ro = r because capital is perfectly mobile. Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) then define
κ1 = γ
−θr−(1−α−γ)θ
and rearrange Equation (A.2) to
P−θd = κ1
∑
o
[
To
(
τodq
α
ow
γ
o
)−θ]
= κ1
∑
o
[
To
(
qαow
γ
o
)−θ
τ−θod
]
≡ CMAd. (A.3)
They refer to CMAd as “consumer market access” because it measures district d’s access
to cheap goods (i.e. low production costs in supplying district and low trade costs).
A.1.4 Trade Flows and Gravity
Eaton and Kortum (2002) show that the fraction of expenditure of district d on goods
from district o is
Xod
Xd
=
To
(
qαow
γ
or
1−α−γ)−θτ−θod
Φd
=
To
(
qαow
γ
or
1−α−γ)−θτ−θod∑
o
[
To
(
qαow
γ
or1−α−γ
)−θ
τ−θod
] . (A.4)
Assuming that aggregate expenditures equal aggregate income (Xd = Yd) and canceling
out the interest rate, this can be rearranged to
Xod = To
(
qαow
γ
o
)−θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Origin’s productivity and factor costs
× Yd︸︷︷︸
Destination’s income
×
(∑
o
[
To
(
qαow
γ
o
)−θ
τ−θod
])−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Destination’s CMA
τ−θod︸︷︷︸
Trade costs
.
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Using Equation (A.3), the competitiveness of the destination’s market can be written as
∑
o
[
To
(
qαow
γ
o
)−θ
τ−θod
]
=
CMAd
κ1
,
which yields
Xod = To
(
qαow
γ
o
)−θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Origin’s productivity and factor costs
× Yd︸︷︷︸
Destination’s income
(A.5)
× κ1CMA−1d︸ ︷︷ ︸
Destination’s CMA
τ−θod︸︷︷︸
Trade costs
A.1.5 Consumer market access and firm market access
Equation (A.5) is a gravity equation with the standard features that trade increases
in income of the destination and in productivity of the origin, while trade decreases in
production costs, trade costs, and in consumer market access of the destination. Summing
the gravity equation over destinations d yields total income of origin o,
Yo =
∑
d
Xod = κ1To(q
α
ow
γ
o )
−θ∑
d
[
τ−θod CMA
−1
d Yd
]
= κ1To(q
α
ow
γ
o )
−θFMAo, (A.6)
where Donaldson and Hornbeck define “firm market access” of district o as
FMAo ≡
∑
d
τ−θod CMA
−1
d Yd. (A.7)
FMAo depends positively on all other destination’s income Yd and negatively on their
CMAd (since a higher consumer market access in d implies that district o faces more
competition when exporting to d). Using Equation (A.6), one can obtain
Yo
κ1FMAo
= To(q
α
ow
γ
o )
−θ
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which can be substituted into the definition of CMAd to obtain
CMAd = κ1
∑
o
To(q
α
ow
γ
o )
−θτ−θod
=
∑
o
τ−θod FMA
−1
o Yo
CMAo =
∑
d
τ−θod FMA
−1
d Yd. (A.8)
Following Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013), if trade costs are symmetric, then a solution
to the Equations (A.7) and (A.8) must satisfy CMAo = FMAo and they refer to this
term as “market access”, such that
MAo =
∑
d
τ−θod MA
−1
d Yd. (A.9)
This system of non-linear equation captures the general equilibrium effects of the bilateral
trade costs τod, because a decline in the trade costs of d enters in MAd and will have an
effect on the market access measure of o.
A.1.6 Measuring real market access with light
I adapt the approach of Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) to incorporate light as a measure
for real income. The starting point is Equation (A.9). I then use the fact that the sum
of light in a district o measures aggregate real economic activity
Yd = Y
r
d × Pd
such that
MAo =
∑
d
τ−θod MA
−1
d PdY
r
d
Using the formula for the price index,
Pd = MA
− 1
θ
d ,
I obtain
MAo =
∑
d
τ−θod MA
−(1+θ)
θ
d Y
r
d .
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A.1.7 Income and Market Access with Immobile Labor
Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) proceed to solve Equation (A.6) for land prices. I instead
solve for real income, which in the empirical analysis I can approximate with luminosity.
Using that result that firm market access equals consumer market access, this yields
Yo = κ1To(q
α
ow
γ
o )
−θMAo (A.10)
where income is a function of productivity, factor prices, and market access. Note that
the constant κ includes the interest rate, which is equalised across districts because of full
capital mobility. The rental rates for the immobile factors land and labor are related to
their income share according to the Cobb-Douglas production function, such that
qoLo = αYo
woHo = γYo.
Using this in Equation (A.10) and solving for income yields
Yo =
(
κ1To
) 1
1+θα+θγ
(
α
Lo
) −θα
1+θα+θγ
(
γ
Ho
) −θγ
1+θα+θγ (
MAo
) 1
1+θα+θγ (A.11)
Furthermore, luminosity measures real economic activity. I therefore use the relationship
between the price index and market access,
Po = MA
− 1
θ
o ,
to obtain
Yo
Po
=
(
κ1To
) 1
1+θα+θγ
(
α
Lo
) −θα
1+θα+θγ
(
γ
Ho
) −θγ
1+θα+θγ (
MAo
) 1+θ(1+α+γ)
(1+θα+θγ)θ
After taking logs, the determinants of real income can be grouped into
ln
(
Y ro
)
=
1
1 + θα + θγ
ln
(
κ1
)− θα
1 + θα + θγ
ln
( α
Lo
)− θγ
1 + θα + θγ
ln
( γ
Ho
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Constant over districts or time
+
1
1 + θα + θγ
ln
(
To
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity
+
1 + θ(1 + α + γ)
(1 + θα + θγ)θ
ln(MAo)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Market access
. (A.12)
This equation suggests a log-linear relationship between real income and transport infras-
tructure, where the effect of transport infrastructure goes through the measure of market
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access. The elasticity of income with respect to market access,
β =
1 + θ(1 + α + γ)
(1 + θα + θγ)θ
,
can be estimated using variation in income and market access over time.
B Appendix to Chapter 2: Economic Reforms
and Industrial Policy in a Panel of Chinese
Cities
Joint with Lin Shao and Fabrizio Zilibotti
B.1 Data Sources
Official Statistics: City-Level The main source for the official city statistics are the
China City Statistical Yearbooks, which cover all prefecture-level cities from 1988 to 2010.
Most of the city-level statistics, including nominal GDP, electricity consumption, popula-
tion, government spending and land area, are taken from this data set. As complementary
sources to this data set, we include three other city-level statistical collections. First, we
take the GDP data for the years 1992 and 1993 from New China City in 50 Years Statis-
tical Collection, since these years are missing in China City Statistical Yearbooks. Second,
for a subset of cities, we collect GDP and investment data for the period of 1978-1988
from New China in 60 Year Provincial Statistical Collection. Third, we obtain additional
population and educational attainment data from the China Population Census (for the
years 1990, 2000, and 2010).
Official Statistics: Province-Level The main source for province-level statistics is
the New China in 60 Years Statistical Collection. We obtain the province-level price
indexes, including the GDP and investment deflator, from this data set.
Light and Digital Maps Light intensity at night, an alternative measure for local
economic activities, is provided by the National Geographical Data Center for the period
of 1992-2010. Using the digital maps of China, we aggregate the light intensity at the
level of cities.1
1The digital maps for several levels of administrative units of the People’s Republic of China from
1992 to 2000 were obtained from the Asian Spatial Information and Analysis Network (ACASIAN), where
they were produced by Dr. L. W. Crissman.
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The light data are obtained from the National Geographical Data Center.2 The data
is available in cleaned form (taking into account clouds, forest fires, gas flaring, etc.) and
on a yearly basis from 1992 to 2010. Light is measured on each pixel of approximately one
square kilometer on an integer scale from 0 (no light) to 63 (maximum light). In order
to map the light intensity of pixels to the administrative entities of cities, we use digital
maps of Chinese cities from 2010.
Light is measured by different satellites over time and they show different light inten-
sities because of differences in their calibration. These differences do not matter for our
empirical analysis as they are absorbed by the year fixed effects, but for the descriptive
data we calibrate the values ex-post following Elvidge et al. (2009).
Establishment of SEZ The information on the establishment of the various zones is
taken from three sources. The major source is the website of the Ministry of Commerce.3
We also use the Information Site of China’s Development Zones4 and the Report of the
Ministry of Commerce (2006). From these sources, we can derive the year in which the
zone was established, its type, and its location.
B.2 Sample Selection
In our main estimations, we focus on a sample of cities for the years 1988-2010. The
sample is unbalanced because of the creation of new cities: in the year 1988 the sample
has 170 cities (and prefectures) and this number increases to 276 in the year 2010.5 Our
sample covers all provinces in China except for Tibet, Hainan and the province-level cities
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing. We also exclude the cities of the first wave
of comprehensive SEZ: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen.
We discuss below in detail our sample selection criteria. Specifically, we provide rea-
sons for three key choices, 1) time period, 2) prefecture-level cities, and 3) urban core.
Notice that in the main body of the paper, for simplicity, we call prefecture-level cities
"prefecture" and the urban core "city".
2See http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html
3See http://english.mofcom.gov.cn.
4See http://www.cdz.cn/www/index.asp.
5See Table 1 in Chung and Lam (2004) for a more detailed assessment of the increase in the number
of cities in China.
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Sample Period The GDP data in China City Statistical Yearbooks only go back to
the year 1988.6 Although pre-1988 GDP data for a subset of cities are available from
other data sources, we do not combine them with the China City Statistical Yearbooks
data in the main empirical studies, due to their inconsistent definition of cities. The
inconsistency is a result of the transformation of the administrative structure of local
governments, especially at the city-level, during the past 30 years. Before 1983, the
administrative structure consisted of four layers. From the top to the bottom, these are
province, municipality, county and village.7 Starting from 1983, the municipalities were
gradually transformed into prefecture-level cities. Broadly speaking, the prefecture-level
cities replaced municipalities as the third layer in the administrative structure. However,
the transformation often coincided with various other changes, which we lack the data to
control for. For example, a county which was part of the previous municipality may not
be part of the prefecture-level city that is succeeding it. At the same time, new counties
which were previously under the jurisdiction of a different municipality may become part
of the prefecture-level city. Therefore, the composition of newly formed cities may differ
substantially from that of the preceding municipalities.
Most city-level statistic sources fail to distinguish between municipalities and prefecture-
level cities. It is therefore impossible to identify the break-point when the transformation
was made using just the time-series of a prefecture-level city. The China City Statistical
Yearbooks are an exception. A prefecture-level city only starts to appear in the China
City Statistical Yearbooks as soon a municipalities has been granted the official status of
prefecture-level city. Therefore, the China City Statistical Yearbooks yields a consistent
sample of prefecture-level cities for the period 1988-2010.
Prefecture- and County-Level Cities A prefecture-level city (di ji shi in Chinese)
is in the new administrative system a level between provinces and counties. A prefecture-
level city consists of the urban core ("city") and potentially several surrounding counties
and rural areas. As part of the transformation of administrative structures, some counties
were promoted into county-level cities (xian ji shi in Chinese) after the population exceed
a certain threshold. After promotion, they remain at the same administration level as
counties, which is one layer below prefecture-level cities. In fact, they were still under the
administration of the original prefecture-level government. At the same time, a number
of county-level cities were promoted to new prefecture-level cities and thereby cut out of
6The earliest city statistical yearbook goes back to 1984. However, the yearbook only starts to report
city-level GDP after 1988.
7As specified in the 1982 constitution, the structure should only consist of three layers: province,
county and village. In reality, however, due to practical reasons, another administrative layer called
municipality served as the connection between counties and provinces.
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their previous prefecture.
The China City Statistical Yearbooks contain statistics for both prefecture-level and
county-level cities. To have a consistent definition of cities, we drop the cities that were
county-level throughout the sample period. For those cities which were promoted to
prefecture-level, we keep only the years after the promotion to prefecture-level city.
Prefecture Area and Urban Core China City Statistical Yearbooks report statistics
at the level of both the whole prefecture area and the urban core (shi xia qu in Chinese).
Urban core corresponds to the traditional definition of the urban center, which often
consists of several urban districts. The prefecture area covers the whole geographic area
of the prefecture, which includes the urban core and the surrounding counties, county-level
cities and rural areas.
The distinction between the two statistical areas and its implication for the estimation
result deserves discussion. First, urban cores are usually more industrialized than the
whole prefecture area. Second, most of the SEZ are located in the suburbans of the urban
core (Zeng, 2011).8 Therefore, by focusing on the urban core (or, more simply, cities as
we call them in the text), we get a more direct estimation of the effects of SEZ. In some
parts of the paper we also report results for the entire prefecture.
Inland Sample When we restrict the sample to cities from inland provinces, we define
the following provinces as inland: Anhui, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan,
Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Yun-
nan, and Inner Mongolia. This classification was not purely based on access to the sea,
but also considers whether the provinces were part of the reform wave targeted towards
inland regions.
B.3 Level Decomposition
The following paragraphs provide information on the decomposition of real GDP per
capita into physical capital per capita, human capital (labor efficiency) and TFP. The
decomposition is carried out in the prefecture area, instead of the urban center. This is
due to the lack of educational attainment data in the urban center.
Real GDP We use the provincial GDP deflators to obtain the real GDP in prefecture
cities. They are calculated using provincial constant and current price GDP series for the
period 1988-2008.
8In our sample, all of the state level zones were located in the city and not on the surrounding
periphery.
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Physical Capital Stock We apply the perpetual inventory approach to construct the
physical capital stock in each city. The physical capital (Kipt) is the sum of physical
capital stock after depreciation and new investment (Iipt), such that
Kipt = (1− δk)Kipt−1 + Iipt/deflatorInvpt .
The deflator for new investment, deflatorInvpt , is province-specific. We set δk, the annual
depreciation rate for physical capital, to be 0.08.9
In order to carry out the perpetual inventory approach, we need a reasonable estimate
for the physical capital stock of the initial year, which is the year of 1988 given our sample
period.
For a subset of cities whose investment data go back to 1978, we derive the capital
stock for those cities in the year 1978 as follows
Kip1978 =
Iip1978
g1978 + δk
,
where Iip1978 is the new investment in year 1978 and g1978 is the average growth rate of
real physical capital stock before 1978.10 This is the steady state formula for physical
capital stock of a Solow-type growth model (Caselli, 2005). By doing this, we assume
that the economy was in steady state in 1978, which is quite plausible.11
For those cities whose investment data begins in 1988, we approximate the initial
physical capital stock in 1988 using the same formula
Kip1988 =
Iip1988
g1988 + δk
,
where g1988 is the average growth rate of physical capital stock before 1988.
Size of Labor Force We use population as an approximation for employment in each
city because the number of employed persons reported in the China City Statistical Year-
books has some drawbacks. The most imporant drawback is that there is a huge drop in
the number of employed persons in the year 1998, the reason of which is unclear to us.
Two reasons could potentially contribute to this huge drop. The first potential reason is
9Given the large amount of creative destruction that took place in China, we pick the number to be
higher than other cross-country growth accounting exercises, for example Caselli (2005).
10The growth rate of real physical capital stock, g1978, is calculated using the national physical capital
stock. See the personal website of Kuai Wai Li and Li et al. (2009) for the detailed construction of the
data.
11Notice that our sample starts in 1988, the error of the estimate for initial physical capital stock (1978)
would have only marginal impacts on the estimate of the physical capital stock ten years later.
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that the reform of state-owned enterprises laid off a large number of redundant workers
around 1998.12 The second reason is that perhaps the definition of employed persons
changes on 1998. Specifically, before 1998, the employed persons include people who are
registered as workers. After 1998, the number only includes people who are registered
and are currently working in that city. 13
Human Capital Following Hall and Jones (1999), we use the average educational at-
tainment (years of schooling) as an approximation for the level human capital of the cities,
such that
hipt = e
φt(sipt),
where sipt is the average years of schooling and φt(.) is a piece-wise linear function whose
slopes represent the return to schooling. To construct φt(.), we take the estimation for
the return to schooling in China over the period 1988-2009 from Li et al. (2009).14
The only data source that reports city-level education attainment is the China Pop-
ulation Census. Therefore, the data is only available for the years 1990, 2000 and 2010.
We do a simple linear interpolation (extrapolation if needed) to obtain the approximation
of human capital for the other years in our sample period.
TFP At last, we obtain the log TFP using the following formula,
logAipt = log
Yipt
Lipt
− α log Kipt
Lipt
− (1− α) log hipt.
where α, the share of capital in the output function, is set to be 0.4.
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Table
B
.5:
D
ecom
position
ofthe
effect
clustering
at
province-reform
year
level
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
first
state-levelzone
0.138***
0.148***
0.00343
0.0825***
0.131***
0.244***
0.00409
0.0442
(4.84)
(3.36)
(0.94)
(3.08)
(3.00)
(4.02)
(0.75)
(1.33)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
first
province-levelzone
-0.0127
-0.0159
0.00242
-0.0125
-0.0145
-0.0201
0.00448**
-0.00705
(-0.77)
(-0.48)
(1.46)
(-0.75)
(-0.68)
(-0.39)
(2.19)
(-0.27)
Log
landarea
-0.218***
-0.532***
-0.0157***
0.0120
-0.212***
-0.490***
-0.0157***
-0.000134
(-5.95)
(-9.75)
(-4.19)
(0.36)
(-4.96)
(-7.62)
(-3.60)
(-0.00)
D
ependent
V
ariable
log(Y
/L)
log(K
/L)
log(h)
log(T
F
P
)
log(Y
/L)
log(K
/L)
log(h)
log(T
F
P
)
Sam
ple
Full
Full
Full
Full
Inland
Inland
Inland
Inland
N
5171
4521
4381
3970
3242
2744
2610
2320
A
R
2
0.948
0.959
0.957
0.802
0.938
0.954
0.950
0.731
T
he
dependentvariables
are
the
logarithm
sofrealG
D
P
percapita
colum
n
(1)and
(5),and
the
three
decom
posed
com
ponents:
logarithm
of
physical
capital
stock
(colum
n
(2)
and
(6)),
logarithm
s
of
average
hum
an
capital
(colum
n
(3)-(7))
and
logarithm
of
T
F
P
(colum
n
(4)-(8)),ofthe
prefecture
area.
A
llspeci.cations
include
land
area,prefecture
fixed
effect
and
the
interaction
ofprovince-year
dum
m
ies
as
controlvariables.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
parenthesis.
Standard
errors
are
clustered
at
the
province
and
reform
year
level.
T
he
sam
ple
includes
276
cities
from
25
provinces
over
the
sam
ple
period
1988-2010
(unbalanced
panel).
T
he
regression
is
carried
out
for
the
fullsam
ple
(colum
n
(1)-(4))
and
restricted
inland
sam
ple
((5)-(8)).
Chapter B 173
Ta
bl
e
B
.6
:
B
as
el
in
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
cl
us
te
ri
ng
at
pr
ov
in
ce
le
ve
l
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
P
os
t-
re
fo
rm
in
di
ca
to
r
fo
r
an
y
st
at
e-
le
ve
lz
on
e
0.
19
0*
**
0.
14
7*
**
0.
12
7*
**
0.
11
7*
**
0.
26
8*
**
0.
21
2*
**
0.
18
1*
**
0.
16
6*
*
(3
.7
0)
(3
.6
6)
(3
.7
9)
(3
.4
6)
(4
.1
6)
(3
.5
3)
(2
.9
1)
(2
.5
2)
P
os
t-
re
fo
rm
in
di
ca
to
r
fo
r
pr
ov
in
ce
-le
ve
lz
on
e
-0
.0
00
48
6
-0
.0
07
06
0.
00
04
97
0.
00
41
2
-0
.0
15
7
-0
.0
24
4
-0
.0
07
75
0.
00
31
9
(-
0.
02
)
(-
0.
28
)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.1
6)
(-
0.
57
)
(-
0.
96
)
(-
0.
28
)
(0
.1
2)
Lo
g
la
nd
ar
ea
0.
24
0*
**
-0
.0
32
5
-0
.1
54
**
*
0.
21
1*
**
-0
.0
53
3
-0
.1
75
**
*
(8
.3
6)
(-
1.
55
)
(-
8.
34
)
(4
.6
6)
(-
1.
10
)
(-
4.
92
)
Lo
g
po
pu
la
ti
on
0.
69
2*
**
0.
67
3*
**
(1
6.
53
)
(6
.6
6)
Sa
m
pl
e
Fu
ll
Fu
ll
Fu
ll
Fu
ll
In
la
nd
In
la
nd
In
la
nd
In
la
nd
N
51
60
51
43
51
41
51
41
26
92
25
54
26
86
26
86
A
R
2
0.
96
0
0.
96
9
0.
97
5
0.
96
4
0.
96
1
0.
96
5
0.
97
1
0.
96
1
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
lo
ga
ri
th
m
of
an
nu
al
G
D
P
at
th
e
ci
ty
le
ve
li
n
co
lu
m
ns
(1
)–
(3
)
an
d
in
co
lu
m
ns
(5
)–
(7
);
it
is
an
nu
al
G
D
P
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
at
th
e
ci
ty
le
ve
li
n
co
lu
m
ns
(4
)
an
d
(8
).
G
D
P
is
m
ea
su
re
d
in
cu
rr
en
t
pr
ic
es
.
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
ci
ty
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
an
d
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
of
pr
ov
in
ce
-y
ea
r
du
m
m
ie
s.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
si
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
pr
ov
in
ce
le
ve
l.
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
in
cl
ud
es
27
6
ci
ti
es
fr
om
25
pr
ov
in
ce
s
ov
er
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
19
88
-2
01
0
(u
nb
al
an
ce
d
pa
ne
l)
.
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
co
lu
m
ns
(5
)–
(8
)
ar
e
re
st
ri
ct
ed
to
ci
ti
es
in
18
in
la
nd
pr
ov
in
ce
s
(a
s
de
fin
ed
in
th
e
ap
pe
nd
ix
).
174 Appendix to Chapter 2
Table
B
.7:
P
re-and
post
indicators
clustering
at
province
level
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Indicator
for
3
years
before
any
state-levelzone
-0.00764
0.0247
0.0229
0.0221
-0.00543
0.00564
-0.0172
-0.0283
(-0.21)
(0.65)
(0.81)
(0.84)
(-0.08)
(0.10)
(-0.18)
(-0.22)
Indicator
for
2
years
before
any
state-levelzone
-0.0147
0.0255
0.0238
0.0230
-0.0429
-0.0221
-0.0400
-0.0487
(-0.39)
(0.67)
(0.86)
(0.88)
(-0.65)
(-0.38)
(-0.42)
(-0.39)
Indicator
for
1
year
before
any
state-levelzone
-0.0252
0.0165
0.0161
0.0159
-0.0572
-0.0367
-0.0536
-0.0618
(-0.60)
(0.40)
(0.54)
(0.57)
(-0.88)
(-0.65)
(-0.56)
(-0.50)
Indicator
for
year
of
any
state-levelzone
-0.00290
0.0213
0.0232
0.0241
-0.0816
-0.0599
-0.0742
-0.0811
(-0.08)
(0.48)
(0.69)
(0.76)
(-1.18)
(-1.03)
(-0.75)
(-0.63)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
any
state-levelzone
0.180***
0.165***
0.144***
0.134***
0.229***
0.188**
0.143
0.121
(3.05)
(2.93)
(3.64)
(3.51)
(3.13)
(2.61)
(1.35)
(0.89)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
province-levelzone
-0.000807
-0.00645
0.00110
0.00471
-0.0166
-0.0307
-0.00860
0.00215
(-0.03)
(-0.25)
(0.04)
(0.19)
(-0.59)
(-1.11)
(-0.31)
(0.08)
Log
landarea
0.241***
-0.0321
-0.154***
0.197***
-0.0536
-0.175***
(8.52)
(-1.55)
(-8.26)
(4.54)
(-1.12)
(-4.94)
Log
population
0.692***
0.673***
(16.58)
(6.73)
Sam
ple
Full
Full
Full
Full
Inland
Inland
Inland
Inland
N
5160
5143
5141
5141
2692
2686
2686
2686
A
R
2
0.960
0.969
0.975
0.964
0.961
0.966
0.970
0.961
T
he
dependent
variable
is
the
logarithm
of
annualG
D
P
at
the
city
levelin
colum
ns
(1)–(3)
and
in
colum
ns
(5)–(7);it
is
annualG
D
P
per
capita
at
the
city
levelin
colum
ns
(4)
and
(8).
G
D
P
is
m
easured
in
current
prices.
A
llspecifications
include
city
fixed
effects
and
the
interaction
of
province-year
dum
m
ies.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
parenthesis.
Standard
errors
are
clustered
at
the
province
level.
T
he
sam
ple
includes
276
cities
from
25
provinces
over
the
sam
ple
period
1988-2010
(unbalanced
panel).
T
he
regressions
in
colum
ns
(5)–(8)
are
restricted
to
cities
in
18
inland
provinces
(as
defined
in
the
appendix).
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Table
B
.9:
E
ffects
ofdifferent
types
ofZones
clustering
at
province
level
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
E
T
D
Z
0.220***
0.156***
0.120***
0.104**
0.239***
0.171**
0.0969
0.0581
(4.63)
(3.36)
(2.89)
(2.47)
(3.39)
(2.45)
(1.45)
(0.83)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
H
ID
Z
0.117*
0.0794*
0.0755*
0.0736*
0.122**
0.0925
0.106*
0.113*
(1.80)
(1.72)
(2.00)
(2.03)
(2.16)
(1.46)
(1.80)
(1.88)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
E
P
Z
0.0412
0.0361
0.0205
0.0131
-0.0123
0.00190
0.0490
0.0738
(1.12)
(0.96)
(0.56)
(0.33)
(-0.14)
(0.02)
(0.56)
(0.89)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
O
therT
ypes
0.0710
0.0583
0.0898***
0.104***
0.0827*
0.174***
0.213***
0.233***
(1.14)
(1.20)
(3.14)
(4.27)
(1.76)
(3.18)
(3.96)
(4.42)
P
ost-reform
indicator
for
province-levelzone
0.00286
-0.00532
0.00260
0.00649
-0.0158
-0.0297
-0.00878
0.00223
(0.11)
(-0.21)
(0.11)
(0.26)
(-0.63)
(-1.12)
(-0.32)
(0.08)
Log
landarea
0.233***
-0.0361
-0.159***
0.187***
-0.0535
-0.180***
(7.70)
(-1.68)
(-8.25)
(4.00)
(-1.10)
(-4.94)
Log
population
0.686***
0.655***
(15.20)
(6.37)
Sam
ple
Full
Full
Full
Full
Inland
Inland
Inland
Inland
N
5160
5143
5141
5141
2692
2686
2686
2686
A
R
2
0.961
0.969
0.975
0.964
0.962
0.967
0.971
0.961
T
he
dependent
variable
is
the
logarithm
of
annualG
D
P
at
the
city
levelin
colum
ns
(1)–(3)
and
in
colum
ns
(5)–(7);it
is
annualG
D
P
per
capita
at
the
city
levelin
colum
ns
(4)
and
(8).
G
D
P
is
m
easured
in
current
prices.
A
llspecifications
include
city
fixed
effects
and
the
interaction
of
province-year
dum
m
ies.
T
-statistics
are
reported
in
parenthesis.
Standard
errors
are
clustered
at
the
province
level.
T
he
sam
ple
includes
276
cities
from
25
provinces
over
the
sam
ple
period
1988-2010
(unbalanced
panel).
T
he
regressions
in
colum
ns
(5)–(8)
are
restricted
to
cities
in
18
inland
provinces
(as
defined
in
the
appendix).
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Figure B.1: Effects of different types of zones over time
The four panels show the coefficients of different policy variables
estimated in the same regression. The bars show the coefficients
of a regression of the logarithm of nominal GDP on indicators for
years before and after a type of zone was established. The solid and
dashed lines show the confidence intervals. The vertical dashed line
shows the lag at which the number of observations drops due to the
first zones reaching the end of the sample period. The regression
also controls for an indicator for province-level zones, land area,
population, city fixed effects, and province-year fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by city. The sample includes 276 cities
from 25 provinces for the period 1988-2010.
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Figure B.2: Reform effects over time
The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
nominal GDP on indicators for years before and after the first zone.
The solid and dashed lines show the confidence interval. The ver-
tical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach
2010 and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-
reform indicators drops to 9. The regression also controls for an
indicator for province-level zones, land area, population, city fixed
effects, and province-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clus-
tered by province and reform year. The sample includes 276 cities
from 25 provinces for the period 1988-2010.
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Figure B.3: Reform effects over time
The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
nominal GDP on indicators for years before and after the first zone.
The solid and dashed lines show the confidence interval. The ver-
tical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach
2010 and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-
reform indicators drops to 9. The regression also controls for an
indicator for province-level zones, land area, population, city fixed
effects, and province-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clus-
tered by province and reform year. The sample includes 158 cities
from 18 inland provinces (as defined in the appendix) for the period
1988-2010.
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Figure B.4: Reform effects over time
The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
nominal GDP on indicators for years before and after the first zone.
The solid and dashed lines show the confidence interval. The ver-
tical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach
2010 and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-
reform indicators drops to 9. The regression also controls for an
indicator for province-level zones, land area, population, city fixed
effects, and province-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clus-
tered by province. The sample includes 276 cities from 25 provinces
for the period 1988-2010.
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Figure B.5: Reform effects over time
The bars show the coefficients of a regression of the logarithm of
nominal GDP on indicators for years before and after the first zone.
The solid and dashed lines show the confidence interval. The ver-
tical dashed line at 19 shows when the reformers from 1991 reach
2010 and subsequently the number of observations to identify post-
reform indicators drops to 9. The regression also controls for an
indicator for province-level zones, land area, population, city fixed
effects, and province-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clus-
tered by province. The sample includes 158 cities from 18 inland
provinces (as defined in the appendix) for the period 1988-2010.
C Appendix to Chapter 3: Divide and Rule:
An Origin of Polarization and Ethnic Con-
flict
Joint with Yikai Wang
C.1 Proofs of Propositions
In this appendix, we provide proofs for the propositions and some lemmata that are useful.
First, we prove the propositions in the static model. The results in proposition 1 are
already established in the main text. Here we provide the proof for proposition 2, which
states the equilibrium outcomes conditional on sufficiently large revolution cost.
Proof. If the cost of revolution for incumbent people is high, then they prefer revolution
to peace only when trust is very high, potentially higher than the cut-off value of war and
peace. This is to say,
pR > pW ⇐⇒
piP θτyO −
(
1− piP θ) τyI + fR
1− piP θ >
(
piW − piP ) θτ(yI + yO)− piW θτfW
1− τ + 2piP θτ ⇐⇒
fR >
(
1− piP θ) ((piW − piP ) θτ(yI + yO)− piW θτfW )
1− τ + 2piP θτ
−piP θτyO +
(
1− piP θ) τyI
.
= fR.
If the cost of revolution on the elite is high enough, then the elite doesn’t want revolution
at all, since it is always dominated by either war or peace. Let us consider the case when
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revolution is always dominated by war, as the following:
yRE < y
W
E ⇐⇒
−fRE < piW (1− θ)τ(yI + yO − fW ) ⇐⇒
fRE > −piW (1− θ)τ(yI + yO − fW )
.
= fRE .
Lemma 1. The value function of the elite’s lifetime income V (p) is bounded above and
below by some V¯ and V , respectively.
Proof. To find the solution for the value function, we first characterize important proper-
ties of the value function. First, it is bounded. If the expected trade surplus is very close
to its lower bound 0, then the elite can always at least start a war and gain from the tax
extraction, so we get a lower bound of V :
V ≥ yWE + βpiWyWE + β2piWyWE + ...
=
1
1− βpiW y
W
E
.
= V .
Similarly, if in each period the elite expects to get at most piW (1− θ)τ(yI + yO + 2) .= y¯E
when the expected trade surplus is as high as 1 for each group and the probability of the
elite staying in power is at most piW , then we can get an upper bound of V as follows:
V ≤ y¯E + βpiW y¯E + β2piW y¯E + ...
=
1
1− βpiW y¯E
.
= V¯ .
With this lemma, we can first prove and discuss proposition 3 which shows that war
occurs when trust is low.
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Proof. War dominates peace if and only if:
V P (p) < V W (p) ⇐⇒
piP (1− θ)τ(yI + yO + 2p) + βpiPEP [V (p′)]
< piW (1− θ)τ(yI + yO − fW ) + βpiWEW [V (p′)] ⇐⇒
p <
(
piW − piP ) (1− θ)τ(yI + yO) + βpiWEW [V (p′)]− βpiPEP [V (p′)]− piW (1− θ)τfW
2piP (1− θ)τ
.
= p (p) .
This means that if p is sufficiently small, the gain from trade is smaller than the benefit of
war p (p), which contains three parts: (1) higher probability of staying in power and getting
the current period income:
(
piW − piP ) (1 − θ)τ(yI + yO); (2) difference in continuation
value in the future between war and peace: βpiWEW [V (p′)]−βpiPEP [V (p′)]; and (3) the
cost of war piW (1−θ)τfW . If the cost the war fW is small, p (p) is large, and if meanwhile
the trust is low, we have p < p (p), implying that the elite chooses war instead of peace.
Consider the case that fW < (
piW−piP )
piW
(yI + yO)
.
= ¯fW . If the trust is at the minimal
level, i.e., p = 0, we have p (0) > p = 0, and the elite prefers war. We can verify this
in the following three steps. First, EW [V (p′)] = EP [V (p′)] = V (φ), as p = 0 implies
p+ = 0 in both war and peace, and then p′ = φ due to the possibility of type change.
Second, V (φ) > 0. We know that φ ≤ φ
φ+ψ
≤ pR, and given p = φ, one possible choice
for the elite is to keep having war forever and there will be no threat of revolution, as
p will converges to φ
φ+ψ
≤ pR. In his case, every period, the elite’s expected income is
yWE = pi
W (1−θ)τ(yI+yO−fW ) > 0. The optimal choice for the elite gives higher life-time
income than permanent war, so V (φ) > 0. This is in fact true for all p ≤ pR. Third,
p (0) =
(
piW − piP ) (1− θ)τ(yI + yO)− piW (1− θ)τfW
2piP (1− θ)τ +
βpiW [V (φ)]− βpiP [V (φ)]
2piP (1− θ)τ
> 0 + 0
= 0.
This shows that when the trust is as low as 0, the elite prefers war. Moreover, if V (p)
is continuous at p = φ, p (p) is continuos at p = 0. Then given 0 < p (0), there exists a
neighborhood of 0, denoted as [0, pWE ) , for any p ∈ [0, pWE ), we have p < p (p). In other
words, in this low trust region, war is started because there is little to gain from trade.
Proposition 4 shows that “surprisingly”, war also occurs when trust is too high, because
the elite is afraid of even higher trust leading to revolution. We provide the proof and the
discussion below.
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Proof. Consider the situation p = pR. If peace is chosen, with probability qR = pRqH +(
1− pR) (1− qL), the trade outcome is good and p′ > pR, which triggers a revolution in
the next period. Then
V P
(
pR
) ≤ piP (1− θ)τ(yI + yO + 2pR) + βpiP (−qRfRE + (1− qR) V¯ ) .
A sufficient condition for V P
(
pR
)
< V W
(
pR
)
is:
piP (1− θ)τ(yI + yO + 2pR) + βpiP
(−qRfRE + (1− qR) V¯ )
< piW (1− θ)τ(yI + yO − fW ) + βpiWV ⇐⇒
fRE >
piP (1− θ)τ(yI + yO + 2pR)− piW (1− θ)τ(yI + yO − fW ) + βpiP
(
1− qR) V¯ − βpiWV
βpiP qR
.
= fRE .
We can see that given fRE is sufficiently large, the elite chooses to go to war when the trust
is as high as pR. In fact, we can see that if p increases from below, before it reaches pR,
war is already preferred by the elite to peace. This is because if trust is slightly smaller
than pR, the threat of revolution during peace – the probability of having a high enough
trust that leads to revolution – is only slightly smaller and the cost of peace for the elite
is still large. In other words, there exists a neighborhood of pR, denoted as (pRE, pR], for
all p in this neighborhood, we have
fRE >
piP (1− θ)τ(yI + yO + 2p)− piW (1− θ)τ(yI + yO − fW ) + βpiP
(
1− qR) V¯ − βpiWV
βpiP qR
=⇒ V P (pR) < V W (pR) .
War is preferred by the elite when p > pRE.
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